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Showing below up to 500 results in range #501 to #1,000.

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  1. COVID-Tech: the sinister consequences of immunity passports (Q5038)
  2. Health Passport Ireland (Q5037)
  3. Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (Q5036)
  4. International Center for Journalists (Q5035)
  5. Hinge (Q5034)
  6. Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19 (Q5033)
  7. Dii vdoma (Q5032)
  8. Ukraine (Q5031)
  9. PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030)
  10. La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029)
  11. Jersey Covid alert (Q5027)
  12. Jersey (Q5026)
  13. The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025)
  14. (Q5024)
  15. (Q5023)
  16. (Q5022)
  17. (Q5021)
  18. electric vehicle (Q5020)
  19. (Q5019)
  20. (Q5018)
  21. (Q5017)
  22. (Q5016)
  23. electricity meter (Q5015)
  24. producer of electricity (Q5014)
  25. EDF (Q5013)
  26. Exo (Q5012)
  27. videoconferencing (Q5011)
  28. Workplace (Q5010)
  29. Omniture (Q5009)
  30. IMI Annual Event 2020 - Interview of Paul-Olivier Dehaye (Q5008)
  31. pCloud (Q5007)
  32. MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006)
  33. Human dynamics (Q5005)
  34. Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004)
  35. Engaged Journalism Accelerator (Q5003)
  36. Civic journalism (Q5002)
  37. Item talk:Q1532
  38. Item talk:Q252
  39. Transports publics fribourgeois (Q5001)
  40. leboncoin (Q5000)
  41. Traquer son ombre numérique (Q4999)
  42. Doctolib (Q4998)
  43. SAR Doctolib (Q4997)
  44. Main Page/Le Temps
  45. Privacy is power: reclaiming democracy in the digital age. (Q4996)
  46. Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995)
  47. Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994)
  48. Cyprus (Q4993)
  49. GDPR Article 9 (Q4992)
  50. GDPR Article 6 (Q4991)
  51. Contact tracing app laws in the EU (Q4990)
  52. Helping media fight misinformation and restore the public’s trust (Q4989)
  53. OASC (Q4988)
  54. working group (Q4987)
  55. MIM4 group in OASC (Q4986)
  56. Mobility Data Specification (Q4985)
  57. COVI-ID (Q4984)
  58. Lebanon (Q4983)
  59. Ma3an (Q4982)
  60. Georgia (Q4981)
  61. Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980)
  62. Ecuador (Q4979)
  63. ASI (Q4978)
  64. TraceTogether Token (Q4977)
  65. Saqbol (Q4976)
  66. Malta (Q4975)
  67. COVID Alert Malta (Q4974)
  68. Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973)
  69. Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972)
  70. L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966)
  71. Protect Scotland (Q4965)
  72. Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964)
  73. Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963)
  74. Alexa Internet (Q4962)
  75. Groupe Up (Q4961)
  76. Martin Vuagnoux (Q4960)
  77. Serge Vaudenay (Q4959)
  78. Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958)
  79. Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957)
  80. Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956)
  81. Yumuv (Q4955)
  82. Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954)
  83. Northern Ireland (Q4953)
  84. StopCovid NI (Q4952)
  85. COVID alert (Q4951)
  86. HOAI (Q4950)
  87. Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949)
  88. "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948)
  89. Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947)
  90. Slovenia (Q4946)
  91. OstaniZdrav (Q4945)
  92. User:Hmfuk
  93. User:B.
  94. User:PhilippeP
  95. User:Lezero
  96. User:Wip
  97. User:Adrianne
  98. User:Jud
  99. User:Hanz0mon
  100. User:Cedboe
  101. User:Rhogue
  102. User:Madprime
  103. User:Autumm
  104. User:Lucy
  105. User:EvaHolleman
  106. User:Hadi
  107. MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944)
  108. NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943)
  109. Indonesia (Q4942)
  110. PeduliLindungi (Q4941)
  111. Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940)
  112. Aman (Q4939)
  113. Jordan (Q4938)
  114. Corona Tracer BD (Q4937)
  115. Bangladesh (Q4936)
  116. Coronalert (Q4935)
  117. Radar Covid (Q4934)
  118. Stop COVID-19 (Q4933)
  119. ViruSafe (Q4932)
  120. Republic of Azerbaijan (Q4929)
  121. e-Tabib (Q4928)
  122. Virginia (Q4927)
  123. Cowidwise (Q4926)
  124. Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925)
  125. Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924)
  126. Jessica Pidoux, ou le mystère des algorithmes de Tinder (Q4923)
  127. Valais (Q4922)
  128. Loi sur l'information du public, la protection des données et l'archivage (Q4921)
  129. Association nationale de vidéoprotection (Q4920)
  130. Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919)
  131. An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918)
  132. Instagram ID (P382)
  133. How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917)
  134. Ogury (Q4916)
  135. Face++ (Q4915)
  136. Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914)
  137. Hashomer – A Proposal for a Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth BasedContact Tracing Scheme for Hamagen (Q4913)
  138. Pixel de tracking (Q4911)
  139. A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet (Q4910)
  140. Für Mathematiker ist Schweizer Tracing-App ein Fail (Q4909)
  141. Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracking (TACT) (Q4908)
  142. Alberta TraceTogether (Q4907)
  143. Ordinance on the Proximity Tracing System for the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus (Q4906)
  144. How does contact tracing work? (Q4905)
  145. Non solo “Immuni”: le App anti-Covid in ritardo in tutta Europa (Q4904)
  146. RSI interview on contact tracing app (Q4903)
  147. Covid-19: the race to create privacy-focused contact tracing tools (Q4902)
  148. Des doutes sur la sécurité de SwissCovid, basée sur l'API d'Apple et Google (Q4901)
  149. Apple and Google's Coronavirus Tracking Plan Is a Symptom of Their Power (Q4900)
  150. Die verrückte Geschichte, wie die Schweiz zur (vielleicht) weltbesten Corona-Warn-App kam (Q4898)
  151. The Great Hack: the film that goes behind the scenes of the Facebook data scandal (Q4897)
  152. L’homme qui aimait «The Great Hack» (Q4896)
  153. ‘The Great Hack’ expert warns that Facebook data-grabbing puts ‘power over people’ (Q4895)
  154. No way out as Big Brother is spying 24/7 on your digital life (Q4894)
  155. Mortel algorithme (Q4893)
  156. Des ténors du prétoire font le procès des algorithmes (Q4892)
  157. Facebook tarde à livrer les données promises aux scientifiques (Q4891)
  158. Cuando Google elimina tus datos pero no protege tu privacidad (Q4890)
  159. Privacy concerns pushing people to change online behavior, poll shows (Q4889)
  160. Strip searches and ads: 10 tech and privacy hot spots for 2020 (Q4888)
  161. Data et RSE s'invitent dans les cursus (Q4887)
  162. Report
  163. SAR United Airlines 20180419 (Q4886)
  164. United Airlines (Q4885)
  165. cancelled by data subject (Q4884)
  166. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (Q4883)
  167. SAR KLM 20180419 (Q4882)
  168. SwissCovid - méthodes d'estimation du nombre d'applications actives- Notes sur les méthodes de calcul (Q4881)
  169. Liechtenstein (Q4880)
  170. Eins (Q4879)
  171. SAR Brussels Airlines 20180419 (Q4878)
  172. acknowledged by (P381)
  173. SAR Wire 20180427 (Q4877)
  174. Wire (Q4876)
  175. User:Genferei/Bag
  176. The great coronavirus-tracing apps mystery (Q4875)
  177. SwissCovid élargit son filet (Q4874)
  178. The Dark Side of SwissCovid (Q4873)
  179. New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872)
  180. Signal Private Messenger (Q4871)
  181. SAR Signal 20180419 (Q4870)
  182. SAR Google Hangouts 20180503 (Q4869)
  183. SAR Facebook 20180503 (Q4868)
  184. provide information (Q4867)
  185. provide access (Q4866)
  186. provide access (P380)
  187. (P379)
  188. Internet et Big Data: quid de la démocratie (Q4865)
  189. SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864)
  190. A research agenda for digital proximity tracing apps (Q4863)
  191. Bits of Freedom (Q4862)
  192. SAR Bits of Freedom 201702 (Q4861)
  193. ABN AMRO Bank (Q4860)
  194. SAR ABN AMRO Bank 201702 (Q4859)
  195. AIVD (Q4858)
  196. SAR AIVD 201702 (Q4857)
  197. final SAR status (P378)
  198. (Q4856)
  199. no response to subject access request (Q4855)
  200. (Q4854)
  201. SAR Albert Heijn 201702 (Q4853)
  202. Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852)
  203. Here are the countries using Google and Apple’s COVID-19 Contact Tracing API (Q4851)
  204. Uruguay (Q4850)
  205. Coronavirus UY (Q4849)
  206. Saudi Arabia (Q4848)
  207. Tabaud (Q4847)
  208. Portugal (Q4846)
  209. Stayaway Covid (Q4845)
  210. CoronaMelder (Q4844)
  211. Gibraltar (Q4842)
  212. Beat Covid Gibraltar (Q4841)
  213. Coronavirus – SUS (Q4840)
  214. (P377)
  215. requested by (P376)
  216. webform (Q4839)
  217. Skype (Q4838)
  218. SAR Skype 201805 (Q4837)
  219. SAR Facebook 201805 (Q4836)
  220. data provided (P375)
  221. subject access request response (Q4835)
  222. (P374)
  223. SAR Reddit 201805 (Q4834)
  224. subject access request reminder (Q4833)
  225. pdf (Q4832)
  226. SAR EasyJet 201805 (Q4831)
  227. EasyJet (Q4830)
  228. states relationship with (P373)
  229. Delta Air Lines (Q4829)
  230. SAR Delta 201805 (Q4828)
  231. ugclinks (Q4827)
  232. Lab experiments (Q4826)
  233. SAR Snapchat 201805 (Q4825)
  234. JSON (Q4824)
  235. SAR Tumblr 201805 (Q4823)
  236. Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822)
  237. X-mode social (Q4821)
  238. The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820)
  239. TUDelft SAR encoding
  240. TUDelft SAR study (Q4819)
  241. Karl Firston (Q4818)
  242. Bitmoji (Q4817)
  243. Snapchat (Q4816)
  244. Denmark (Q4815)
  245. Smitte|stop (Q4814)
  246. Contact Tracing: An Overview of Technologies and Cyber Risks (Q4813)
  247. Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812)
  248. COVID Tracker (Q4811)
  249. last active times (Q4810)
  250. registration time (Q4809)
  251. (P372)
  252. Tumblr (Q4808)
  253. Sandbox/hadi
  254. Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807)
  255. Google assistant (Q4806)
  256. Siri (Q4805)
  257. virtual assistant (Q4804)
  258. Exploring Accidental Triggers of Smart Speakers (Q4803)
  259. Can you locate your location data? (Q4802)
  260. How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801)
  261. Malgré les apparences, SwissCovid fait face à une défiance massive (Q4800)
  262. SwissCovid Exposure Score Calculation (Q4799)
  263. Http toolkit (Q4798)
  264. Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797)
  265. Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796)
  266. Reliable Beacon Detection (Q4795)
  267. AltBeacon (Q4794)
  268. Universally Unique IDentifier (P370)
  269. BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793)
  270. BLE calibration calculation (Q4792)
  271. Andrew Yang's Data Dividend Isn't Radical, It's Useless (Q4791)
  272. Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790)
  273. Ernst Hafen (Q4789)
  274. Towards Rawlsian ‘property-owning democracy’ through personal data platform cooperatives (Q4788)
  275. StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787)
  276. Android COVID-19 Tracing App Pairwise Attenuations: Calibration Needed (Q4786)
  277. Stephen Farrell (Q4785)
  278. Doug Leith (Q4784)
  279. Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783)
  280. A Coronavirus Contact Tracing App Replay Attack with Estimated Amplification Factors (Q4782)
  281. Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780)
  282. Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779)
  283. SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778)
  284. SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777)
  285. Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776)
  286. Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)
  287. GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774)
  288. Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773)
  289. Android permissions dataset (Q4772)
  290. Joel Reardon (Q4771)
  291. Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770)
  292. SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769)
  293. SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768)
  294. No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767)
  295. SciPol.org (Q4766)
  296. Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765)
  297. Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764)
  298. BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763)
  299. Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762)
  300. The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761)
  301. Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760)
  302. COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759)
  303. StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758)
  304. Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757)
  305. Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756)
  306. Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755)
  307. How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754)
  308. Android Advertising Identifier (Q4753)
  309. Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752)
  310. Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751)
  311. Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750)
  312. Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749)
  313. Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748)
  314. Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747)
  315. Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746)
  316. Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745)
  317. happn (Q4744)
  318. SwissCovid Proximity Tracing System - Public Security Test (Q4743)
  319. Federal Office of Public Health (Q4742)
  320. Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741)
  321. CovTracer (Q4740)
  322. DP3T - Exposure Score Calculation (Q4739)
  323. contact tracing protocol (Q4738)
  324. Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737)
  325. Zostan Zdravy (Q4736)
  326. Ito (Q4735)
  327. Morocco (Q4734)
  328. Wiqaytna (Q4733)
  329. Abu Dhabi Emirate (Q4732)
  330. Qatar (Q4731)
  331. TraceCovid (Q4730)
  332. Tinder: dans le ventre de l'appli (Q4729)
  333. Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728)
  334. EIT Digital (Q4726)
  335. L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725)
  336. Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724)
  337. Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721)
  338. We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720)
  339. Universally Unique IDentifier (Q4719)
  340. An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718)
  341. The 14 Features Any Ethical Covid-19 Contact Tracing Effort Should Incorporate (Q4717)
  342. Koronavilkku (Q4716)
  343. Columbia (Q4715)
  344. CoronApp (Q4714)
  345. Bahrain (Q4713)
  346. BeAware Bahrain (Q4712)
  347. Ehteraz (Q4711)
  348. Tunisia (Q4710)
  349. E7mi (Q4709)
  350. « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708)
  351. VirusTotal (Q4707)
  352. Why StopCOVID Fails as a Privacy-Preserving Design (Q4706)
  353. prospect (P368)
  354. sensor (Q4705)
  355. magnetometer (Q4704)
  356. GPS technology (Q4703)
  357. positioning technology (Q4702)
  358. indoor positioning (Q4701)
  359. outdoor positioning (Q4700)
  360. IndoorAtlas (Q4699)
  361. OHCHR (Q4698)
  362. The Citizen Lab (Q4697)
  363. human right (Q4696)
  364. privacy (Q4695)
  365. data protection (Q4694)
  366. Derechos Digitales (Q4693)
  367. Amnesty Security Lab (Q4692)
  368. AmnestyTech (Q4691)
  369. suggestion (P367)
  370. outreach (Q4690)
  371. developer community (Q4689)
  372. impact goal (Q4688)
  373. connecting communities (Q4687)
  374. thought leadership (Q4686)
  375. impact goal (P366)
  376. PersonalData.IO project (Q4685)
  377. CoronaRiskScoring (Q4684)
  378. Common Heritage of Mankind (Q4683)
  379. The Open Data Barometer (Q4682)
  380. Sagebionetworks (Q4681)
  381. Data for Policy Journal (Q4680)
  382. Sonar-X (Q4679)
  383. New Ultrasonic Contact-Tracing App Promises Better Accuracy Than Bluetooth Alternatives (Q4678)
  384. Google agenda (Q4677)
  385. Briser la chaine (Q4676)
  386. A BLE RSSI ranking based indoor positioning system for generic smartphones (Q4675)
  387. Apple app ID (P365)
  388. Latvia (Q4674)
  389. Apturi Covid (Q4673)
  390. L’API de contact tracing d’Apple et Google est opérationnelle (Q4672)
  391. Coronavirus Contact Tracing: Evaluating The Potential Of Using Bluetooth Received SignalStrength For Proximity Detection (Q4671)
  392. Nextdoor (Q4670)
  393. Split Learning (Q4669)
  394. Renee DiResta on Disinformation and COVID-19 (Q4668)
  395. CoronaInfo (Q4667)
  396. Care19 App (Q4666)
  397. The Institutionalisation of Digital Public Health: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 App (Q4665)
  398. How did the Covidsafe app go from being vital to almost irrelevant? (Q4664)
  399. Les critiques contre l’application demeurent vives (Q4663)
  400. Apple and Google’s covid-tracing tech has been released to 23 countries (Q4662)
  401. The Syllabus (Q4661)
  402. Inferring distance from Bluetooth signal strength: a deep dive (Q4660)
  403. Apps for COVID: to do or not to do (Q4659)
  404. Evaluating the Implications of Varying Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Transmission Power Levels on Wireless Indoor Localization Accuracy and Precision (Q4658)
  405. Human interaction discovery in smartphone proximity networks (Q4657)
  406. Distance Estimation of Smart Device using Bluetooth (Q4656)
  407. Your browser can pick up ultrasonic signals you can't hear, and that sounds like a privacy nightmare to some (Q4655)
  408. Les ultrasons, nouveaux ennemis invisibles de la vie privée ? (Q4654)
  409. NSW is unable to use Covidsafe app’s data for contact tracing (Q4653)
  410. Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652)
  411. L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651)
  412. CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650)
  413. NOVID (Q4649)
  414. Avec CopSonic, StopCovid pourrait bientôt intégrer les ultrasons (Q4648)
  415. Ultrasound (Q4647)
  416. Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646)
  417. A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. (Q4645)
  418. Ethics of Digital Contact Tracing and COVID-19: Who Is (Not) Free to Go? (Q4644)
  419. Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643)
  420. Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642)
  421. nRF Connect for Mobile (Q4641)
  422. Etude de la sensibilité des citoyens au traçage numérique (Q4640)
  423. Corona-Warn-App (Q4639)
  424. How Facebook Could Use Giphy to Collect Your Data (Q4638)
  425. Giphy (Q4637)
  426. Guatemala (Q4636)
  427. Alerta Guate (Q4635)
  428. COVID-19 tracing apps must not interfere with human rights (Q4634)
  429. L'Europe plaide pour l'interopérabilité des « StopCovid » nationaux, ce que proposent Apple et Google (Q4633)
  430. NHS COVID-19 (Q4632)
  431. Isle of Wight (Q4631)
  432. COVIDSafe (Q4630)
  433. VírusRadar (Q4629)
  434. Abolish Silicon Valley: How to Liberate Technology from Capitalism (Q4628)
  435. The New United Nations Coronavirus Social Distancing App Doesn’t Even Work (Q4627)
  436. Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625)
  437. Ephemeral Bluetooth Identifier (Q4623)
  438. DESIRE: A Third Way for a European Exposure Notification System (Q4622)
  439. ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621)
  440. Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4620)
  441. Critical Bluetooth Vulnerability in Android (CVE-2020-0022) – BlueFrag (Q4619)
  442. Opinion | In Stores, Secret Bluetooth Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move (Q4618)
  443. Bluetooth low energy overview (Q4617)
  444. Location needs to be enabled for Bluetooth Low Energy Scanning on Android 6.0 (Q4616)
  445. Sur Android, le StopCovid anglais demande l’accès à la localisation (mais promet de ne pas l’utiliser) (Q4613)
  446. Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612)
  447. The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611)
  448. Bluetooth vs Ultra-Wideband: which indoor location system? (Q4610)
  449. The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609)
  450. Centralized or Decentralized? The Contact Tracing Dilemma (Q4608)
  451. Applications de suivi : traque-moi si tu peux (Q4607)
  452. facial coding (Q4606)
  453. Datakalab (Q4605)
  454. Amaelle Guiton (Q4604)
  455. Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4603)
  456. Op-Ed: Coronavirus tracing apps are coming. Here’s how they could reshape surveillance as we know it (Q4602)
  457. BLE contact tracing sniffer PoC (Q4601)
  458. SafeEntry (Q4599)
  459. A Singapour, le traçage par app dégénère en surveillance de masse (Q4598)
  460. The Practical Guide to Hacking Bluetooth Low Energy (Q4597)
  461. Bluetooth Low Energy Sniffer (Q4596)
  462. Naomi Klein: How big tech plans to profit from the pandemic (Q4595)
  463. Orestis Malaspinas (Q4594)
  464. Pandemic simulation (Q4593)
  465. Une pandémie à l’ère des technologies émergentes (Q4592)
  466. L’équipe-projet StopCovid démarre la publication du code source et de la documentation de l’application StopCovid | Inria (Q4591)
  467. Beyond R0 : Heterogeneity in secondary infections and probabilistic epidemic forecasting (Q4590)
  468. I-Louvain: An Attributed Graph Clustering Method (Q4589)
  469. When individual behaviour matters: homogeneous and network models in epidemiology (Q4588)
  470. Les chercheurs français mettent en garde contre les applications de traçage (Q4587)
  471. Covid-19 : pourquoi le « contact tracking » ne fonctionnera (probablement) pas (Q4585)
  472. Application StopCovid : solution scientifique ou calcul politique ? (Q4584)
  473. INRIA (Q4583)
  474. Rémi Petitpierre (Q4582)
  475. Mathematics of Epidemics on Networks: from Exact to Approximate Models (Q4581)
  476. source code (P363)
  477. Winfried Tilanus (Q4579)
  478. Miles Fahlman (Q4578)
  479. Nazeem Muhajarine (Q4577)
  480. Fast unfolding of communities in large networks (Q4576)
  481. The Covid19Impact Survey: Assessing the Pulse of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Spain via 24 questions (Q4575)
  482. Organizational member (P362)
  483. Social Contours (Q4573)
  484. Retour sur la série Westworld : du traçage à la programmation algorithmique des comportements individuels (Q4572)
  485. The Pronto-C2 Fully Decentralized Automatic Contact Tracing System (Q4571)
  486. GDPR Article 35 (Q4570)
  487. CovApp (Q4569)
  488. web application (Q4568)
  489. Pisarasi (Q4567)
  490. Supplementary Written Evidence on COVID-19 Tracing Apps to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Q4566)
  491. Fighting Covid-19 Shouldn't Mean Abandoning Human Rights (Q4565)
  492. Freedom House (Q4564)
  493. GSMA (Q4563)
  494. accessnow.org (Q4562)
  495. Inventor finds bluetooth unsuitable for corona app (Q4561)
  496. Why use Bluetooth for contact tracing? (Q4560)
  497. 1point5 (Q4559)
  498. Apple and Google release sample code, UI and detailed policies for COVID-19 exposure-notification apps (Q4558)
  499. «Capture d’écrans» N°8 : StopCovid, la zizanie franco-française (Q4557)
  500. Coronavirus Tracking Apps Raise Questions About Bluetooth Security (Q4556)

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