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This page lists pages with no connected data item (in namespaces that support connected items). The list is sorted by descending page ID, so that newer pages are listed first.

 

Showing below up to 500 results in range #101 to #600.

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  1. La protection des données personnelles (Q5407)
  2. Item talk:Q920
  3. postcode (Q5406)
  4. Template:MailtoAccessUK
  5. Template:AccessUK
  6. The Labour Party (Q5405)
  7. UK political party that had a data breach (Q5404)
  8. Quora (Q5403)
  9. Pinterest (Q5402)
  10. VK (Q5401)
  11. OK.ru (Q5400)
  12. WeChat (Q5399)
  13. bol.com (Q5398)
  14. RTBF (Q5397)
  15. postNL (Q5396)
  16. Stockmann (Q5395)
  17. Dating Privacy (Q5394)
  18. The Eyeballs (Q5393)
  19. Aamulehti (Q5392)
  20. Donkey Republic (Q5391)
  21. Book Beat (Q5390)
  22. Template:AccessSitra
  23. User:Eloy56T1954
  24. IQOS (Q5389)
  25. Philipp Morris (Q5388)
  26. Facebook XCheck program (Q5387)
  27. content rules violation score (Q5386)
  28. Checkr (Q5385)
  29. Garbo (Q5384)
  30. Comment Facebook pourrait encore étendre sa domination (Q5383)
  31. DataNeo (Q5382)
  32. BlaBlaCar (Q5381)
  33. terms of service (Q5380)
  34. Open Terms Archive (Q5379)
  35. algorithmic audit (Q5378)
  36. French public authority "Pôle d'Expertise de la Régulation Numérique" (Q5377)
  37. "UXP2 Dark Patterns" research group (Q5376)
  38. Sciences Po Paris (Q5375)
  39. Le grand débat - La vaccination devient-elle un critère de séduction? (Q5374)
  40. How Private Is My VPN? (Q5373)
  41. SAS Scandinavian Airlines (Q5372)
  42. Nordic Regional Airlines (Q5371)
  43. Hesburger (Q5369)
  44. Wolt (Q5368)
  45. Foodora (Q5367)
  46. Etelä-Suomen Sanomat (Q5366)
  47. Ilkka-Pohjalainen (Q5365)
  48. Savon Sanomat (Q5364)
  49. Keskisuomalainen (Q5363)
  50. Ålandsbanken (Q5362)
  51. Aktia Bank (Q5361)
  52. St1 (Q5360)
  53. Nordnet bank (Q5359)
  54. Pivo (Q5357)
  55. MobilePay (Q5356)
  56. Turun Sanomat (Q5355)
  57. Lidl Finland (Q5354)
  58. DNA Oyj (Q5353)
  59. Hoop (Q5352)
  60. HSL (Q5351)
  61. Samocat (Q5350)
  62. Voi (Q5349)
  63. Lime (Q5348)
  64. Whim (Q5347)
  65. scooter rental service (Q5346)
  66. Tier (Q5345)
  67. VR Matkalla (Q5344)
  68. Iltalehti (Q5343)
  69. corrupt marketing (Q5342)
  70. ABC-mobiili (Q5340)
  71. Pass sanitaire: la faille qui va provoquer une épidémie de fraudes (Q5339)
  72. Commons and cooperatives: A new governance of collective action (Q5338)
  73. Data and Digital Intelligence Commons (Making a Case for their Community Ownership) (Q5337)
  74. The Value of Data (Q5336)
  75. metaverse (Q5335)
  76. Ostrom, the Commons, and today's data economy (Q5334)
  77. Ostrom's Law: Property rights in the commons (Q5333)
  78. Digital contact tracing apps: do they actually work? A review of early evidence (Q5332)
  79. Les applications de rencontre n’ont pas le sens de l’orientation (Q5331)
  80. «Une application de rencontre peut ignorer nos préférences», notamment l’orientation sexuelle (Q5330)
  81. Facebook Dating and Facebook ad data (Q5329)
  82. German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), January 2021 (Q5328)
  83. Template:MailtoAccessFR
  84. Entraîner des algorithmes sans dévoiler les données personnelles (Q5327)
  85. TOMP-API (Q5326)
  86. KargoBike (Q5325)
  87. COVID-19 Technology in the EU: A Bittersweet Victory for Human Rights? (Q5324)
  88. political tool (Q5323)
  89. ZeCible (Q5322)
  90. GenePartner (Q5321)
  91. DNA Romance (Q5320)
  92. Pithus : un projet pour analyser les dangers des applications Android (Q5319)
  93. La nouvelle guerre des étoiles (Q5317)
  94. Features of using the SwissCovid app (Q5316)
  95. Contrôle de nos données: quel est le rôle de Genève dans la gouvernance mondiale des données? (Q5315)
  96. Geneva Human Rights Talks (Q5314)
  97. Journée de la protection des données 2021 (Q5313)
  98. Rencontres par affinités : «Sur ces sites, on suit aussi ce que l’appli et les algorithmes nous imposent» (Q5312)
  99. Très fortes réactions sur Facebook, Twitter et Linkedin suite au Cash sur les données personnelles (Q5311)
  100. Template talk:AccessFR
  101. Template:AccessFR
  102. Regional elections in 2021 (Q5310)
  103. (Q5309)
  104. SelfContact (Q5308)
  105. NAF (Q5307)
  106. ISIC (Q5306)
  107. NACE (Q5305)
  108. Poligma (Q5304)
  109. Caisse primaire de l'assurance maladie du Bas-Rhin (Q5303)
  110. Caisse primaire de l'assurance maladie de Paris (Q5302)
  111. Caisse nationale de l'assurance maladie (Q5301)
  112. Organismes ayant désigné un(e) délégué(e) à la protection des données (DPD/DPO) (Q5300)
  113. Common Agricultural Policy (Q5299)
  114. Payments for Environmental Services (Q5298)
  115. Suez (Q5297)
  116. Orange (Q5296)
  117. Agdatahub (Q5295)
  118. E-commerce negotiations advance, delve deeper into data issues (Q5294)
  119. What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5293)
  120. Abuse of power: coordinated online harassment of Finnish government ministers (Q5292)
  121. participative investigation (Q5291)
  122. Project:EcosystemeSante
  123. pharmaceutical company (Q5290)
  124. patient (Q5289)
  125. occupation (Q5288)
  126. role type (P392)
  127. pharmacist (Q5287)
  128. Resopharma (Q5286)
  129. health data PersonalData.IO investigation (Q5285)
  130. cooperative (Q5284)
  131. Pharmastat (Q5283)
  132. Euris (Q5282)
  133. Interhop (Q5281)
  134. Données personnelles : un outil pour les récupérer facilement auprès des entreprises (Q5280)
  135. Révision de la Loi sur la protection des données (Q5279)
  136. HarveyWalsh (Q5278)
  137. MediData (Q5277)
  138. contract research organization (Q5276)
  139. Navigo Agency (Q5275)
  140. passabene (Q5274)
  141. Exercice du droit d’accès aux données personnelles (Q5273)
  142. Privacy at the Margins (Q5272)
  143. Solving the ‘Gig-saw’? Collective Rights and Platform Work (Q5271)
  144. Art. 173 du Code pénal suisse (CP) : Délits contre l’honneur (Q5270)
  145. Algorithmic management and collective bargaining (Q5269)
  146. UAB Adnet (Q5268)
  147. Vinted (Q5267)
  148. AddApptr (Q5266)
  149. Nos données personnelles valent de l'or (Q5265)
  150. Vie privée: comment savoir ce que les géants des données personnelles savent de vous (Q5264)
  151. BFMTV (Q5263)
  152. OpenHealth (Q5262)
  153. AeroLeads (Q5261)
  154. Marmiton (Q5260)
  155. Ma grossesse Doctissimo (Q5259)
  156. IQVia (Q5258)
  157. Insure the box (Q5257)
  158. ryd (Q5256)
  159. telematics insurance (Q5255)
  160. datenauskunftsbegehren.ch (Q5254)
  161. La piattaforma per il test del Covid "spiffera" i dati personali: a rischio migliaia di assicurati (Q5253)
  162. Le site du groupe M3 rend nos données vulnérables (Q5252)
  163. HestiaLabs (Q5251)
  164. Autonomy and Meaning through Data Collaboratives (Q5250)
  165. Réseaux sociaux, avons-nous perdu le pouvoir? (Q5249)
  166. Kaspr (Q5248)
  167. Lusha (Q5247)
  168. contestation of the curb (Q5246)
  169. Roundtable on Socializing Data Value (Q5245)
  170. Dark Data: Why What You Don’t Know Matters (Q5244)
  171. (Q5243)
  172. list of blocked users (Q5242)
  173. UBP (Q5241)
  174. Mahandry Rambinintsoa (Q5240)
  175. Michael Platen (Q5239)
  176. Aequivalent SA (Q5238)
  177. La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237)
  178. Libération (Q5236)
  179. Arc Publishing (Q5235)
  180. Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Q5234)
  181. Action populaire (Q5233)
  182. Hinge-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5232)
  183. HER-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5231)
  184. Bumble-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5230)
  185. Jdate-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5229)
  186. Christian mingle-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5228)
  187. eHarmony-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5227)
  188. Match.com-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5226)
  189. Coffee Meets Bagel-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5225)
  190. Facebook Dating-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5224)
  191. Lovoo (Q5223)
  192. Mektoube (Q5222)
  193. Evermatch (Q5221)
  194. Mignonne (Q5220)
  195. eharmony (Q5219)
  196. Hily (Q5218)
  197. yoomee (Q5217)
  198. Filling the gaps in the Mueller report:part one. Robert Mercer, the Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media (Q5216)
  199. Schufa (Q5215)
  200. Le casse-tête de la modération des réseaux sociaux (Q5214)
  201. website builder (Q5213)
  202. Elementor (Q5212)
  203. Yaniv Benhamou (Q5211)
  204. Big Data and the Law: a holistic analysis based on a three-step approach – Mapping property-like rights, their exceptions and licensing practices (Q5210)
  205. Control Creep: When the Data Always Travels, So Do the Harms (Q5209)
  206. 3D ECO - Deep fake et fake news: la parade des entreprises (Q5208)
  207. real estate agency (Q5207)
  208. Foncia (Q5206)
  209. Omegle (Q5205)
  210. (Q5204)
  211. Optile (Q5203)
  212. bike station (Q5202)
  213. itineraries (Q5201)
  214. (Q5200)
  215. tariffs (Q5199)
  216. accessibility for people with disabilities (Q5198)
  217. timetables (Q5197)
  218. (Q5196)
  219. open data (Q5195)
  220. Law LOM (Q5194)
  221. mobility organizing authority (Q5193)
  222. Ile-de-France Mobilités (Q5192)
  223. Vianavigo (mobile app) (Q5191)
  224. Calypso Networks Association (Q5190)
  225. (Q5189)
  226. RFID chip (Q5188)
  227. Navigo (travel pass) (Q5187)
  228. Somupi (Q5186)
  229. distance travelled (Q5185)
  230. (Q5184)
  231. (Q5183)
  232. (Q5182)
  233. investment fund (Q5181)
  234. (Q5180)
  235. (Q5179)
  236. (Q5178)
  237. public procurement (Q5177)
  238. (Q5176)
  239. (Q5175)
  240. public service (Q5174)
  241. Brand (Q5173)
  242. (Q5172)
  243. (Q5171)
  244. Ile-de-france (Q5170)
  245. (Q5169)
  246. comité des usagers Vélib' (Q5168)
  247. (Q5167)
  248. (Q5166)
  249. (Q5165)
  250. (Q5164)
  251. Moventia (Q5163)
  252. Indigo (Q5162)
  253. consortium of companies (Q5161)
  254. (Q5160)
  255. (Q5159)
  256. Smovengo (Q5158)
  257. (Q5157)
  258. (Q5156)
  259. bike rental service (Q5155)
  260. Vélib' Métropole (Q5154)
  261. Etat d'urgence technologique (Q5153)
  262. GDPRhub (Q5152)
  263. Project:Post
  264. User:Genferei/Zatoo
  265. User:Genferei/Blick
  266. User:Genferei/Bluewin
  267. Rocket Mountain (Q5151)
  268. Converto (Q5150)
  269. Le droit d'accès (Q5149)
  270. What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5148)
  271. Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147)
  272. Hornet (Q5146)
  273. Shaadi (Q5145)
  274. Inshallah (Q5144)
  275. Jdate (Q5142)
  276. Sparks networks (Q5141)
  277. Christian mingle (Q5140)
  278. Tesla dating (Q5139)
  279. Zoosk (Q5138)
  280. XO (Q5137)
  281. Pickable (Q5136)
  282. (Q5135)
  283. (Q5134)
  284. Ola drivers v. Ola Cabs (transparency requests) (Q5133)
  285. Uber drivers v. Uber (deactivation) (Q5132)
  286. Uber drivers v. Uber (transparency requests) (Q5131)
  287. Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130)
  288. Ola Cabs (Q5129)
  289. GDPR Article 22 (Q5128)
  290. Dispo (Q5127)
  291. Predicio (Q5126)
  292. An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125)
  293. Androguard (Q5124)
  294. Pithus (Q5123)
  295. User talk:Jud
  296. Events/Trainings/UniGETransversal
  297. Posmo (Q5122)
  298. Kantara Initiative (Q5121)
  299. User-Managed Access (Q5120)
  300. HEART WG (Q5119)
  301. HIE of One (Q5118)
  302. Dua.com (Q5117)
  303. MyData operator (Q5116)
  304. Where You Go Matters: A Study on the Privacy Implications of Continuous Location Tracking (Q5115)
  305. Wie viel verdient Google mit unseren Daten? (Q5114)
  306. TikTok without filters (Q5113)
  307. Sephora (Q5112)
  308. Technology, Privacy, and User Opinions of COVID-19 Mobile Apps for Contact Tracing: Systematic Search and Content Analysis (Q5111)
  309. Singles50 (Q5110)
  310. Nos belles années (Q5109)
  311. Google Adsense (Q5108)
  312. club 50 plus (Q5107)
  313. DisonsDemain - Site de rencontre pour les 50+ (Q5106)
  314. Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105)
  315. growth hacking (Q5104)
  316. Template:MailtoDual
  317. Item talk:Q5103
  318. Clubhouse (Q5103)
  319. Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102)
  320. User:Frandrews
  321. File:Datingprivacy.png
  322. “Out Of Control” – A Review Of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps (Q5101)
  323. X-Mode Controversy: Find Apps that Track Location Data (Q5099)
  324. Facebook’s secret settlement on Cambridge Analytica gags UK data watchdog (Q5098)
  325. L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096)
  326. Project:Location tracking/Exponea
  327. Project:Location tracking/Fysical
  328. Project:Location tracking/GeoUniq
  329. Project:Location tracking/OneAudience
  330. Project:Location tracking/OpenSignal
  331. Project:Location tracking/Placed Foursquared
  332. Project:Location tracking/Quadrant
  333. Project:Location tracking/Sense360
  334. Project:Location tracking/SignalFrame
  335. Project:Location tracking/Predic.io
  336. Project:Location tracking/Sygic
  337. Project:Location tracking/X-mode
  338. Project:Location tracking
  339. ExpressVPN investigation into geolocation adtech (Q5095)
  340. Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094)
  341. HUD (Q5093)
  342. waiter (Q5092)
  343. PLAY (Q5091)
  344. Rencontre coquine - Plan Cul (Q5090)
  345. Pure (Q5089)
  346. lovescout24 (Q5088)
  347. Fruitz (Q5087)
  348. (Q5086)
  349. (Q5085)
  350. Once (Q5084)
  351. Ce que WhatsApp révèle de la vulnérabilité de la protection des données en Suisse (Q5083)
  352. Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082)
  353. Ranking PlayStore CH (P390)
  354. Ranking PlayStore FR (P389)
  355. Ranking PlayStore UK (P388)
  356. Ranking AppStore CH (P387)
  357. Ranking AppStore FR (P386)
  358. Ranking AppStore UK (P385)
  359. number of downloads in Google Play (P384)
  360. Swiped: How dating apps harm marginalized communities (Q5080)
  361. Photo Roulette (Q5079)
  362. Ingress (Q5078)
  363. Talk:Beta-testing Facebook Dating
  364. Beta-testing Facebook Dating
  365. Facebook Dating (Q5077)
  366. Cisco Meraki (Q5076)
  367. User:HermineL
  368. Digital Markets Act (Q5074)
  369. Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073)
  370. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072)
  371. Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071)
  372. Digital Services Act (Q5070)
  373. Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069)
  374. Contact Tracing & Giant Data Collectors: A Journey from Utopia to Dystopia? (Q5068)
  375. Template talk:Item
  376. Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067)
  377. User talk:Frandrews
  378. online dating application (Q5066)
  379. Project:Dating Privacy
  380. Veraset (Q5065)
  381. Ethos Fund (Q5064)
  382. Cambridge Analytica scandal: history and lessons (Q5063)
  383. APEC MyData Forum (Q5062)
  384. Les applications COVID-19: quels choix techniques pour des choix éthiques? (Q5061)
  385. Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060)
  386. Match.com (Q5059)
  387. Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058)
  388. How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057)
  389. Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056)
  390. Applying Mobile Location Data to Improve Hurricane Evacuation Plans (Q5055)
  391. MobiRescue: Reinforcement Learning based RescueTeam Dispatching in a Flooding Disaster (Q5054)
  392. MobiAmbulance: Optimal Scheduling of Emergency Vehicles in Catastrophic Situations (Q5053)
  393. Perils of Location Tracking? Personalized and Interpretable Privacy Preservation in Consumer Mobile Trajectories (Q5052)
  394. Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051)
  395. «Reprendre le contrôle de nos données passera par un contre-pouvoir» (Q5046)
  396. Paul-Olivier Dehaye: 'Data governance should connect with individuals to have a global reach' (Q5045)
  397. Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044)
  398. How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043)
  399. On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042)
  400. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2020 (Q5039)
  401. COVID-Tech: the sinister consequences of immunity passports (Q5038)
  402. Health Passport Ireland (Q5037)
  403. Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (Q5036)
  404. International Center for Journalists (Q5035)
  405. Hinge (Q5034)
  406. Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19 (Q5033)
  407. Dii vdoma (Q5032)
  408. Ukraine (Q5031)
  409. PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030)
  410. La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029)
  411. Jersey Covid alert (Q5027)
  412. Jersey (Q5026)
  413. The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025)
  414. (Q5024)
  415. (Q5023)
  416. (Q5022)
  417. (Q5021)
  418. electric vehicle (Q5020)
  419. (Q5019)
  420. (Q5018)
  421. (Q5017)
  422. (Q5016)
  423. electricity meter (Q5015)
  424. producer of electricity (Q5014)
  425. EDF (Q5013)
  426. Exo (Q5012)
  427. videoconferencing (Q5011)
  428. Workplace (Q5010)
  429. Omniture (Q5009)
  430. IMI Annual Event 2020 - Interview of Paul-Olivier Dehaye (Q5008)
  431. pCloud (Q5007)
  432. MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006)
  433. Human dynamics (Q5005)
  434. Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004)
  435. Engaged Journalism Accelerator (Q5003)
  436. Civic journalism (Q5002)
  437. Item talk:Q1532
  438. Item talk:Q252
  439. Transports publics fribourgeois (Q5001)
  440. leboncoin (Q5000)
  441. Traquer son ombre numérique (Q4999)
  442. Doctolib (Q4998)
  443. SAR Doctolib (Q4997)
  444. Main Page/Le Temps
  445. Privacy is power: reclaiming democracy in the digital age. (Q4996)
  446. Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995)
  447. Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994)
  448. Cyprus (Q4993)
  449. GDPR Article 9 (Q4992)
  450. GDPR Article 6 (Q4991)
  451. Contact tracing app laws in the EU (Q4990)
  452. Helping media fight misinformation and restore the public’s trust (Q4989)
  453. OASC (Q4988)
  454. working group (Q4987)
  455. MIM4 group in OASC (Q4986)
  456. Mobility Data Specification (Q4985)
  457. COVI-ID (Q4984)
  458. Lebanon (Q4983)
  459. Ma3an (Q4982)
  460. Georgia (Q4981)
  461. Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980)
  462. Ecuador (Q4979)
  463. ASI (Q4978)
  464. TraceTogether Token (Q4977)
  465. Saqbol (Q4976)
  466. Malta (Q4975)
  467. COVID Alert Malta (Q4974)
  468. Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973)
  469. Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972)
  470. L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966)
  471. Protect Scotland (Q4965)
  472. Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964)
  473. Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963)
  474. Alexa Internet (Q4962)
  475. Groupe Up (Q4961)
  476. Martin Vuagnoux (Q4960)
  477. Serge Vaudenay (Q4959)
  478. Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958)
  479. Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957)
  480. Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956)
  481. Yumuv (Q4955)
  482. Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954)
  483. Northern Ireland (Q4953)
  484. StopCovid NI (Q4952)
  485. COVID alert (Q4951)
  486. HOAI (Q4950)
  487. Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949)
  488. "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948)
  489. Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947)
  490. Slovenia (Q4946)
  491. OstaniZdrav (Q4945)
  492. User:Hmfuk
  493. User:B.
  494. User:PhilippeP
  495. User:Lezero
  496. User:Wip
  497. User:Adrianne
  498. User:Jud
  499. User:Hanz0mon
  500. User:Cedboe

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