Difference between revisions of "CoronaRiskScoring (Q4684)"

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(‎Created claim: interested in (P11): Immuni (Q4489))
 
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description / endescription / en
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project addressing risk scoring algorithms in contact tracing apps
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project documenting and explaining risk scoring algorithms in contact tracing apps
Property / impact goal: thought leadership / qualifier
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Property / partner
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unknown value
 
Property / partner: unknown value / rank
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Normal rank
 
Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner
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unknown value
 
Property / partner: unknown value / rank
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Normal rank
 
Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner
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unknown value
 
Property / partner: unknown value / rank
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Normal rank
 
Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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Property / partner: unknown value / qualifier
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comment: while AppCensus can't really help with risk scoring directly, they can help with auditing the functioning: input data as well as what gets exfiltrated, both through the app and through Bluetooth
 
Property / interested in
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Property / interested in: Ehteraz / rank
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Normal rank
Property / interested in
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Property / interested in: E7mi / rank
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Normal rank
Property / interested in
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Property / interested in: Apturi Covid / rank
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Normal rank
Property / interested in
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Property / interested in: Immuni / rank
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Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: Amnesty Security Lab / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: Amnesty Security Lab / qualifier
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Property / prospect: Amnesty Security Lab / qualifier
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Property / prospect: Amnesty Security Lab / qualifier
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comment: Amnesty International's Security Lab has been conducting technical analysis of many of these apps to unearth potential privacy and security issues, and better understand what collection of data are users required to concede.
Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: AppCensus / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: AppCensus / qualifier
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comment: while AppCensus can't really help with risk scoring directly, they can help with auditing the functioning: input data as well as what gets exfiltrated, both through the app and through Bluetooth
Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: International Committee of the Red Cross / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: International Committee of the Red Cross / qualifier
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Property / prospect: International Committee of the Red Cross / qualifier
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Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: IndoorAtlas / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: IndoorAtlas / qualifier
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Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: Sitra / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: Sitra / qualifier
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Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: Exodus Privacy / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: Exodus Privacy / qualifier
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comment: issues in the Android app ecosystem
Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: VirusTotal / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: VirusTotal / qualifier
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comment: APK file analysis
Property / prospect
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Property / prospect: EIT Digital / rank
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Normal rank
Property / prospect: EIT Digital / qualifier
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Property / mentions
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Property / mentions: Paul-Olivier Dehaye / rank
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Normal rank

Latest revision as of 07:42, 4 June 2020

project documenting and explaining risk scoring algorithms in contact tracing apps
Language Label Description Also known as
English
CoronaRiskScoring
project documenting and explaining risk scoring algorithms in contact tracing apps

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    Amnesty International's Security Lab has been conducting technical analysis of many of these apps to unearth potential privacy and security issues, and better understand what collection of data are users required to concede.
    0 references
    while AppCensus can't really help with risk scoring directly, they can help with auditing the functioning: input data as well as what gets exfiltrated, both through the app and through Bluetooth
    0 references
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    issues in the Android app ecosystem
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    APK file analysis
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