Pages that link to "Property:P203"
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The following pages link to quote (P203):
Displayed 250 items.
View (previous 250 | next 250) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- Twitter (Q252) (← links)
- Oura ring (Q1139) (← links)
- Federal Act on Data Protection (Q1210) (← links)
- Research into tiers-lieu configuration : re-politicisation through services (Q2071) (← links)
- Crystal Knows (Q2417) (← links)
- Left Populism and the Rediscovery of Agonistic Politics (Q2663) (← links)
- Wikimedia (Q3511) (← links)
- A la trace, enquête sur les nouveaux territoires de la surveillance (Q3764) (← links)
- Malt (Q3794) (← links)
- Clearview.AI (Q3826) (← links)
- Guidelines on the right to data portability (Q3968) (← links)
- AI and Facial Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities (Q4018) (← links)
- Les CFF collectionnent toujours plus de données clients (Q4027) (← links)
- Fairtiq (Q4028) (← links)
- Décret n° 2020-151 (Q4070) (← links)
- CFF SmartWay (Q4076) (← links)
- SBB wollen mit Axon Vibe neue Mobilitätsplattform entwickeln (Q4077) (← links)
- Google kennt Ihr Wunschgewicht (Q4079) (← links)
- Avec les CFF, mes données sont en sécurité (Q4092) (← links)
- Algorithmes :contrôle des biais S.V.P. (Q4129) (← links)
- You Shouldn’t Have to Give Google Your Data to Access a COVID-19 Test (Q4137) (← links)
- South Korea is watching quarantined citizens with a smartphone app (Q4146) (← links)
- self-quarantine safety protection mobile app (Q4147) (← links)
- Co-Epi (Q4150) (← links)
- Sustainable containment of COVID-19 using smartphones in China: Scientific and ethical underpinnings for implementation of similar approaches in other settings (Q4151) (← links)
- With coronavirus containment efforts, what are the privacy rights of patients? (Q4153) (← links)
- Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand (Q4159) (← links)
- Quantifying dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests that epidemic control and avoidance is feasible through instantaneous digital contact tracing (Q4160) (← links)
- Israeli Coronavirus Surveillance Explained: Who's Tracking You and What Happens With the Data (Q4165) (← links)
- What the coronavirus bill will do (Q4169) (← links)
- Projet de loi d'urgence pour faire face à l'épidémie de Covid-19 (Q4170) (← links)
- Telekom shares data on "flows of movement" of mobile phone users with Robert-Koch-Institut (Q4171) (← links)
- Searching for infected persons with mobile phone tracking (Q4172) (← links)
- Confinement: A1 provides movement data to government (Q4173) (← links)
- Zuckerberg: Facebook isn't giving governments data to track coronavirus spread (Q4175) (← links)
- U.S. government, tech industry discussing ways to use smartphone location data to combat coronavirus (Q4176) (← links)
- The U.S. wants smartphone location data to fight coronavirus. Privacy advocates are worried. (Q4177) (← links)
- Surveillance Company Says It's Deploying 'Coronavirus-Detecting' Cameras in US (Q4179) (← links)
- Mass testing, school closings, lockdowns: Countries pick tactics in ‘war’ against coronavirus (Q4185) (← links)
- NHS developing coronavirus contact tracking app (Q4186) (← links)
- Coronavirus : quand les Etats font pression pour utiliser les données personnelles (Q4188) (← links)
- "Utilisons les données télécom de tous les Belges pour stopper le coronavirus" (Q4189) (← links)
- Iran Launched an App That Claimed to Diagnose Coronavirus. Instead, It Collected Location Data on Millions of People (Q4190) (← links)
- Etat d’urgence sanitaire : les modifications adoptées par le Sénat en commission (Q4193) (← links)
- Facebook has a coronavirus problem. It's WhatsApp (Q4194) (← links)
- Vodafone produces anonymous heat map to help Lombardy understand population movements (Q4197) (← links)
- Coronavirus, come funzionano il controllo delle celle e il tracciamento dei contagi. Il Garante: "Non bisogna improvvisare" - Intervista ad Antonello Soro (Q4198) (← links)
- Private map plots locations of Singaporean COVID-19 patients (Q4199) (← links)
- Movement of visitors from high-risk areas to be tracked with mandatory sim and app (Q4200) (← links)
- Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study (Q4203) (← links)
- Personal data protection amid coronavirus: Key takeaways for businesses operating in China (Q4207) (← links)
- WHO guidelines on ethical issues in public health surveillance (Q4212) (← links)
- Paraguay: Military will accompany police in enforcing restrictions on movement (Q4214) (← links)
- Berne pourrait utiliser les portables pour suivre les flux de populations (Q4217) (← links)
- Contre le virus, la tentation du pistage par smartphone (Q4222) (← links)
- Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response (Q4230) (← links)
- Swiss COVID tracker (Q4231) (← links)
- We have taken the number of deaths from Wikipedia (Q4232) (← links)
- Yuval Noah Harari: the world after coronavirus (Q4235) (← links)
- Swisscom Mobility Insights Platform (Q4236) (← links)
- Trust in Government Policies. Kore'as approach to COVID-19 (Q4239) (← links)
- Self-Health Management App for COVID-19-Taïwan (Q4241) (← links)
- COVID-19, Scientific Research and the GDPR – Some Basic Principles (Q4243) (← links)
- How the Virus Got Out (Q4246) (← links)
- Singapore launches TraceTogether mobile app to boost COVID-19 contact tracing efforts (Q4249) (← links)
- La méthode sud-coréenne face au coronavirus : traquer nos données personnelles pour sauver des vies… le pour et le contre (Q4250) (← links)
- Apps Gone Rogue: Maintaining Personal Privacy in an Epidemic (Q4251) (← links)
- Legal data protection framework for coronavirus containment (Q4256) (← links)
- Data protection and Coronavirus (COVID-19) resources (Q4257) (← links)
- TraceTogether (Q4259) (← links)
- Russian officials will track coronavirus patients' geolocation data to design a national warning system (Q4260) (← links)
- Phone location data could be used to help UK coronavirus effort (Q4261) (← links)
- Open Letter: Contract Tracking and NHSX (Q4263) (← links)
- Seznam’s Mapy.cz app has coronavirus tracking feature, but not everyone is impressed - Prague, Czech Republic (Q4264) (← links)
- New contact tracer app for COVID-19 developed in Cebu (Q4267) (← links)
- Artificial intelligence in the fight against COVID-19 (Q4269) (← links)
- COVID 19: A Call to Arms to Rescue Privacy (from Itself) | LinkedIn (Q4271) (← links)
- A third of virus cases may be ‘silent carriers’, classified data suggests (Q4273) (← links)
- COVID Symptom Tracker (Q4274) (← links)
- World Health Organization App (Q4275) (← links)
- Die scheinbar stillgelegte Stadt: Bleiben die Zürcher jetzt wirklich zu Hause? (Q4276) (← links)
- Zurich monitoring COVID-19 effects (Q4277) (← links)
- An Official WHO Coronavirus App Will Be a “Waze for COVID-19” - IEEE Spectrum (Q4278) (← links)
- Health rating system deployed in over 100 cities: Alipay (Q4279) (← links)
- Covid-19 : après le confinement, l’inéluctable recul de nos libertés (Q4283) (← links)
- How South Korea Flattened the Curve (Q4284) (← links)
- 'Selfie app' to keep track of quarantined Poles (Q4285) (← links)
- US Health Weather Map (Q4287) (← links)
- Swisscom aidera la Confédération à détecter les attroupements via les téléphones (Q4290) (← links)
- French data on the covid-19 epidemic (Q4291) (← links)
- Houseparty (Q4292) (← links)
- Privacy fears as India hand stamps suspected coronavirus cases (Q4308) (← links)
- Moscow deploys facial recognition technology for coronavirus quarantine (Q4309) (← links)
- Swisscom nous épie pour le compte du Conseil fédéral (Q4312) (← links)
- Stopp Corona (Q4314) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Mit Apps gegen die Pandemie? (Q4332) (← links)
- Alipay Health Code (Q4333) (← links)
- The Swiss federal government wants to use high-tech to fight the coronavirus (Q4340) (← links)
- CoronaMadrid (Q4351) (← links)
- Track Virus (Q4352) (← links)
- Monitoring spread of COVID-19 (Q4353) (← links)
- Personium Trails (Q4354) (← links)
- Early in the epidemic: impact of preprints on global discourse about COVID-19 transmissibility (Q4361) (← links)
- Watchdog approves use of UK phone data to help fight coronavirus (Q4366) (← links)
- Government Measures Dataset (Q4367) (← links)
- Monitoring of COVID-19 via mobile data (Q4370) (← links)
- What You Should Know About Online Tools During the COVID-19 Crisis (Q4373) (← links)
- Apple COVID-19 (Q4375) (← links)
- Bottom-up data Trusts: disturbing the ‘one size fits all’ approach to data governance (Q4376) (← links)
- Règlement sur le télétravail (Q4377) (← links)
- SARS-CoV-2 Tracking under GDPR (Q4383) (← links)
- Joint Statement on the right to data protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4384) (← links)
- Rapport d’activités de l’Autorité de surveillance indépendante des activités de renseignement (AS-Rens) : potentiel d’amélioration du traitement des données par le Service de renseignement de la Confédération (SRC) (Q4392) (← links)
- Lessons from Italy’s Response to Coronavirus (Q4394) (← links)
- Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing (Q4402) (← links)
- Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool (Q4410) (← links)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4412) (← links)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4414) (← links)
- Coronavirus pandemic sparks new calls for personal surveillance, and concerns (Q4417) (← links)
- Rakning C-19 (Q4420) (← links)
- COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422) (← links)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425) (← links)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426) (← links)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429) (← links)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430) (← links)
- ProteGO Safe (Q4432) (← links)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433) (← links)
- HaMagen (Q4435) (← links)
- Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436) (← links)
- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438) (← links)
- We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444) (← links)
- I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447) (← links)
- Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450) (← links)
- A phased lift of control: a practical strategy to achieve herd immunity against Covid-19 at the country level (Q4452) (← links)
- New York State Geolocation Tracking Ban - A10246 Bill Text (Q4454) (← links)
- Analysis of DP3T: Between Scylla and Charybdis (Q4461) (← links)
- Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465) (← links)
- Bluetooth's Complexity Has Become a Security Risk (Q4466) (← links)
- Guide to bluetooth security (Q4467) (← links)
- Flattening the curve helps protect privacy, too (Q4468) (← links)
- Give more data, awareness and control to individual citizens, and they will help COVID-19 containment (Q4469) (← links)
- DataWalk (Q4474) (← links)
- Contre le Covid-19, les immenses défis et inconnues des applications mobiles de « suivi de contacts » (Q4475) (← links)
- Visible and vocal - Delivery apps have transformed urban life in China (Q4479) (← links)
- Covid ou la fabrique du consentement aveugle (Q4483) (← links)
- Data Protection Impact Assessment for the Corona App (Q4484) (← links)
- Contact-Tracing: Nur die staatliche App schafft Vertrauen (Q4485) (← links)
- A European roadmap to lifting coronavirus containment measures (Q4486) (← links)
- ePrivacy Directive (Q4487) (← links)
- GDPR Article 23 (Q4488) (← links)
- EDPB Letter concerning the European Commission's draft Guidance on apps supporting the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4490) (← links)
- Corona-Datenspende (Q4492) (← links)
- Germany launches smartwatch app to monitor coronavirus spread (Q4495) (← links)
- Testing, not tracing, is the privacy preserving response to COVID-19 (Q4496) (← links)
- development of EPFL's "Covid proximity tracing App" project is in line with data protection requirements. (Q4500) (← links)
- ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol (Q4504) (← links)
- Exit through the App Store?A rapid evidence review on the technical considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis (Q4511) (← links)
- Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515) (← links)
- NHS coronavirus app: memo discussed giving ministers power to 'de-anonymise' users (Q4522) (← links)
- Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data (Q4526) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Clear majority in Switzerland supports tracking infection chains via smartphone (Q4529) (← links)
- Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537) (← links)
- Face-to-Face Proximity Estimation Using Bluetooth On Smartphones (Q4541) (← links)
- StopCovid est un projet désastreux piloté par des apprentis sorciers (Q4542) (← links)
- Délibération n° 2020-046 du 24 avril 2020 portant avis sur un projet d’application mobile dénommée « StopCovid » (Q4544) (← links)
- Introductory remarks before the committee for European Affairs of the senate of the Republic of France - Wojciech Wiewiórowski (Q4550) (← links)
- Avis sur le suivi numérique des personnes (Q4552) (← links)
- Test criteria and contact tracing. FAQs (Q4553) (← links)
- Tracking Anonymized Bluetooth Devices (Q4554) (← links)
- «Capture d’écrans» N°8 : StopCovid, la zizanie franco-française (Q4557) (← links)
- Why use Bluetooth for contact tracing? (Q4560) (← links)
- Inventor finds bluetooth unsuitable for corona app (Q4561) (← links)
- GDPR Article 35 (Q4570) (← links)
- The Pronto-C2 Fully Decentralized Automatic Contact Tracing System (Q4571) (← links)
- Une pandémie à l’ère des technologies émergentes (Q4592) (← links)
- Centralized or Decentralized? The Contact Tracing Dilemma (Q4608) (← links)
- The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609) (← links)
- Bluetooth vs Ultra-Wideband: which indoor location system? (Q4610) (← links)
- The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611) (← links)
- Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612) (← links)
- ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625) (← links)
- How Facebook Could Use Giphy to Collect Your Data (Q4638) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-App (Q4639) (← links)
- Etude de la sensibilité des citoyens au traçage numérique (Q4640) (← links)
- Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642) (← links)
- Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643) (← links)
- Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646) (← links)
- NOVID (Q4649) (← links)
- CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650) (← links)
- L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651) (← links)
- Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652) (← links)
- Your browser can pick up ultrasonic signals you can't hear, and that sounds like a privacy nightmare to some (Q4655) (← links)
- Distance Estimation of Smart Device using Bluetooth (Q4656) (← links)
- Human interaction discovery in smartphone proximity networks (Q4657) (← links)
- Evaluating the Implications of Varying Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Transmission Power Levels on Wireless Indoor Localization Accuracy and Precision (Q4658) (← links)
- Apps for COVID: to do or not to do (Q4659) (← links)
- The Institutionalisation of Digital Public Health: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 App (Q4665) (← links)
- Nextdoor (Q4670) (← links)
- Coronavirus Contact Tracing: Evaluating The Potential Of Using Bluetooth Received SignalStrength For Proximity Detection (Q4671) (← links)
- A BLE RSSI ranking based indoor positioning system for generic smartphones (Q4675) (← links)
- « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708) (← links)
- E7mi (Q4709) (← links)
- Ehteraz (Q4711) (← links)
- An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718) (← links)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720) (← links)
- Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721) (← links)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724) (← links)
- L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725) (← links)
- Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728) (← links)
- TraceCovid (Q4730) (← links)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737) (← links)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745) (← links)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748) (← links)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749) (← links)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752) (← links)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756) (← links)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758) (← links)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760) (← links)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763) (← links)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769) (← links)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773) (← links)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774) (← links)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775) (← links)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778) (← links)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780) (← links)
- BLE calibration calculation (Q4792) (← links)
- BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793) (← links)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796) (← links)
- Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797) (← links)
- How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801) (← links)
- Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852) (← links)
- A research agenda for digital proximity tracing apps (Q4863) (← links)
- SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864) (← links)
- New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872) (← links)
- SwissCovid - méthodes d'estimation du nombre d'applications actives- Notes sur les méthodes de calcul (Q4881) (← links)
- Cuando Google elimina tus datos pero no protege tu privacidad (Q4890) (← links)
- Ordinance on the Proximity Tracing System for the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus (Q4906) (← links)
- A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet (Q4910) (← links)
- Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914) (← links)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917) (← links)
- An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918) (← links)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919) (← links)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)