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This page lists pages with no connected data item (in namespaces that support connected items). The list is sorted by descending page ID, so that newer pages are listed first.
Showing below up to 500 results in range #1,001 to #1,500.
View (previous 500 | next 500) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)
- Tracking Anonymized Bluetooth Devices (Q4554)
- Test criteria and contact tracing. FAQs (Q4553)
- Avis sur le suivi numérique des personnes (Q4552)
- GDPR Article 89 (Q4551)
- Introductory remarks before the committee for European Affairs of the senate of the Republic of France - Wojciech Wiewiórowski (Q4550)
- Wojciech Wiewiórowski (Q4548)
- Joint Statement on Digital Contact Tracing (Q4547)
- User talk:Eruptpure
- User:Eruptpure
- Ultra-wideband (Q4546)
- WeTrace -- A Privacy-preserving Mobile COVID-19 Tracing Approach and Application (Q4545)
- Délibération n° 2020-046 du 24 avril 2020 portant avis sur un projet d’application mobile dénommée « StopCovid » (Q4544)
- Jean-Baptiste Soufron (Q4543)
- StopCovid est un projet désastreux piloté par des apprentis sorciers (Q4542)
- Face-to-Face Proximity Estimation Using Bluetooth On Smartphones (Q4541)
- Le Conseil est favorable au principe de StopCOVID, en tant que brique d’une stratégie plus globale (Q4540)
- Estonia (Q4539)
- How do you trace Covid-19 while respecting privacy? (Q4538)
- Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537)
- COVID-19 Content Moderation Research Letter (Q4534)
- Tracking mobile devices to fight coronavirus (Q4533)
- Technology Can Help Solve the Coronavirus Crisis If Government Steps Up (Q4532)
- Pj20 tracer (Q4531)
- A European Contact-Tracing App Might Be More Privacy-Invading Than Apple and Google’s (Q4530)
- Coronavirus: Clear majority in Switzerland supports tracking infection chains via smartphone (Q4529)
- Received signal strength indication (Q4528)
- Technology and Public Health Perspectives on Private Automated Contact Tracing (Q4527)
- Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data (Q4526)
- Die Corona-Warn-App kommt – so kannst du sie schon jetzt ausprobieren (Q4525)
- Can one fairly incentivize the adoption of a digital contact tracing app? (Q4524)
- Report: Red Cross "Corona App" reviewed by noyb (Q4523)
- NHS coronavirus app: memo discussed giving ministers power to 'de-anonymise' users (Q4522)
- Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (Q4521)
- SBB Mobile (Q4520)
- Ubique (Q4519)
- SwissCovid (Q4518)
- Bending Spoons (Q4517)
- NUO Capital (Q4516)
- Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515)
- H14 S.p.A. (Q4514)
- contact tracing application (Q4513)
- immunity passport (Q4512)
- Exit through the App Store?A rapid evidence review on the technical considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis (Q4511)
- Copasir (Q4510)
- Why are there doubts over contact-tracing apps? (Q4509)
- Rift Opens Over European Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps (Q4508)
- Scenario: effect of track&trace apps (Q4507)
- Le traçage anonyme, dangereux oxymore: Analyse de risques à destination des non-specialistes (Q4506)
- How to create a trustworthy COVID-19 tracking technology (Q4505)
- ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol (Q4504)
- Risks related to the StopCovid application (Q4503)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4502)
- Federal Statistical Office (Q4501)
- development of EPFL's "Covid proximity tracing App" project is in line with data protection requirements. (Q4500)
- Europe’s PEPP-PT COVID-19 contacts tracing standard push could be squaring up for a fight with Apple and Google (Q4499)
- The anti-corona technology still has its pitfalls (Q4498)
- Le Port d’Anvers teste l’utilisation d’un bracelet électronique pour endiguer la propagation du COVID-19 au sein de ses équipes (Q4497)
- Testing, not tracing, is the privacy preserving response to COVID-19 (Q4496)
- Germany launches smartwatch app to monitor coronavirus spread (Q4495)
- Ford Tests Buzzing Wristbands to Keep Workers at Safe Distances (Q4494)
- Apple Watch (Q4493)
- Corona-Datenspende (Q4492)
- Bluetooth tracking and COVID-19: A tech primer (Q4491)
- EDPB Letter concerning the European Commission's draft Guidance on apps supporting the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4490)
- Immuni (Q4489)
- GDPR Article 23 (Q4488)
- ePrivacy Directive (Q4487)
- A European roadmap to lifting coronavirus containment measures (Q4486)
- Contact-Tracing: Nur die staatliche App schafft Vertrauen (Q4485)
- Data Protection Impact Assessment for the Corona App (Q4484)
- Covid ou la fabrique du consentement aveugle (Q4483)
- Visible and vocal - Delivery apps have transformed urban life in China (Q4479)
- The tech ‘solutions’ for coronavirus take the surveillance state to the next level (Q4478)
- StopKorona! (Q4477)
- MahaKavach (Q4476)
- Contre le Covid-19, les immenses défis et inconnues des applications mobiles de « suivi de contacts » (Q4475)
- DataWalk (Q4474)
- eRouška (Q4473)
- Smittestopp (Q4472)
- NHS app (Q4471)
- Primer on Decentralized Contact Tracing (Q4470)
- Give more data, awareness and control to individual citizens, and they will help COVID-19 containment (Q4469)
- Flattening the curve helps protect privacy, too (Q4468)
- Guide to bluetooth security (Q4467)
- Bluetooth's Complexity Has Become a Security Risk (Q4466)
- Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465)
- Contact Tracing- Bluetooth Specification (authors:Apple- Google) (Q4464)
- SM-Covid-19 (Q4463)
- Stopcovid19 (Q4462)
- Analysis of DP3T: Between Scylla and Charybdis (Q4461)
- Opinion on the use of the mobile phone for surveillance needs (Q4460)
- Antonio Casilli (Q4459)
- Project:Data anthropology and ethics/CivilSociety
- Tracing mobile data in the fight against Covid-19 - Analysis of potentials and limits (Q4458)
- Radio distance is not spatial distance (Q4457)
- BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders (Q4456)
- covid19 civil society (Q4455)
- File:Social contouring.png
- New York State Geolocation Tracking Ban - A10246 Bill Text (Q4454)
- The long tail of contact tracing (Q4453)
- A phased lift of control: a practical strategy to achieve herd immunity against Covid-19 at the country level (Q4452)
- Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology (Q4451)
- Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450)
- Netherlands could be dealing with coronavirus pandemic for over 2 years: report (Q4449)
- How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? (Q4448)
- I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447)
- Google Firebase (Q4446)
- Intervention RTBF on contact tracing (Q4445)
- Project:Data anthropology and ethics/Questionnaire
- We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444)
- Far-Right Extremists Helped Create The World's Most Powerful Facial Recognition Technology (Q4443)
- StopCovid (Q4442)
- « L’application StopCovid retracera l’historique des relations sociales » : les pistes du gouvernement pour le traçage numérique des malades (Q4441)
- Coronavirus : qu’est-ce que StopCovid, l’appli de traçage étudiée par le gouvernement ? (Q4440)
- User talk:RPetitpierre
- User talk:Winfried
- Cocoa (Q4439)
- User:Pidoux
- Project:Data anthropology and ethics
- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438)
- Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437)
- Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436)
- HaMagen (Q4435)
- Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks (Q4434)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433)
- ProteGO Safe (Q4432)
- Data-driven approaches to assessing civil liberties impact of Covid-19 (Q4431)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429)
- Evgeny Morozov (Q4428)
- To save everything, click here: the folly of technological solutionism (Q4427)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425)
- WeTrace Philippines (Q4424)
- Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (Q4423)
- COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422)
- Iceland (Q4421)
- Rakning C-19 (Q4420)
- Protego (Q4419)
- Aarogya Setu (Q4418)
- Coronavirus pandemic sparks new calls for personal surveillance, and concerns (Q4417)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4414)
- Poland’s coronavirus app offers playbook for other governments (Q4413)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4412)
- UK's National Health Service (Q4411)
- Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool (Q4410)
- How does the public, across several countries, feel about an automatic contact tracing app to combat the spread of COVID-19? (Q4409)
- User Acceptance on mobile contact tracing app (Q4408)
- ConTrace (Q4407)
- Bluetooth Low Energy (Q4406)
- Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (Q4405)
- Samia Hurst (Q4404)
- Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and Related Trade-offs (Q4403)
- Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing (Q4402)
- Tracy (Q4401)
- Healthy Together (Q4400)
- Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) (Q4399)
- Movesense (Q4398)
- I-am-Immune (Q4397)
- Personal data stores (Q4396)
- New York Attorney General Looks Into Zoom’s Privacy Practices (Q4395)
- Lessons from Italy’s Response to Coronavirus (Q4394)
- The Role of Age Distribution and Family Structure on COVID-19 Dynamics: A Preliminary Modeling Assessment for Hubei and Lombardy (Q4393)
- Rapport d’activités de l’Autorité de surveillance indépendante des activités de renseignement (AS-Rens) : potentiel d’amélioration du traitement des données par le Service de renseignement de la Confédération (SRC) (Q4392)
- Amazon Web Services (Q4391)
- The power of data in a pandemic - Technology in the NHS (Q4390)
- grippenet.ch (Q4389)
- Malaysia (Q4388)
- D'scover (Q4387)
- GDPR article 13 (Q4386)
- GDPR Article 32 (Q4385)
- Joint Statement on the right to data protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4384)
- SARS-CoV-2 Tracking under GDPR (Q4383)
- Surveillance responses to COVID19 (Q4382)
- Projects using personal data to combat SARS-CoV-2 (Q4381)
- Simula is working with the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (Q4380)
- World Health Organization (Q4379)
- WeTrace (Q4378)
- Règlement sur le télétravail (Q4377)
- Bottom-up data Trusts: disturbing the ‘one size fits all’ approach to data governance (Q4376)
- Apple COVID-19 (Q4375)
- Apple announces COVID-19 website and app in partnership with CDC and the White House (Q4374)
- What You Should Know About Online Tools During the COVID-19 Crisis (Q4373)
- Zoom (Q4372)
- User talk:Lurglomond
- Slovakia (Q4371)
- Monitoring of COVID-19 via mobile data (Q4370)
- Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan (Q4368)
- Government Measures Dataset (Q4367)
- Watchdog approves use of UK phone data to help fight coronavirus (Q4366)
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group7
- The COVID Tracking Project (Q4365)
- How the COVID Tracking Project fills the public health data gap (Q4364)
- Coronavirus: Thierry Breton plaide pour une utilisation des données des opérateurs (Q4363)
- The Plague That Killed Athenian Democracy (Q4362)
- Early in the epidemic: impact of preprints on global discourse about COVID-19 transmissibility (Q4361)
- Talk:Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28
- Super-spreaders: what are they and how are they transmitting coronavirus? (Q4360)
- Covidom (Q4359)
- Varmistetut koronatapaukset Suomessa (COVID-19) (Q4358)
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group6
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group5
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group4
- Template:End tab
- Template:Start tab
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Resources
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group3
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group2
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28/Group1
- Main Page/Coronadata
- Events/HackCovid/2020-03-28
- Events/HackCovid
- Martin Steiger (Q4357)
- Internet of Things (Q4356)
- On the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak and the Smart City Network: Universal Data Sharing Standards Coupled with Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Benefit Urban Health Monitoring and Management (Q4355)
- product of (P359)
- Personium Trails (Q4354)
- Monitoring spread of COVID-19 (Q4353)
- Track Virus (Q4352)
- CoronaMadrid (Q4351)
- Palantir technologies (Q4350)
- bookmarks (Q4349)
- shouts (Q4348)
- tags (Q4347)
- obsessions (Q4346)
- loved tracks (Q4345)
- following and follower data (Q4344)
- play history (Q4343)
- audio scrobbling data (Q4342)
- information collected from interactive applications (Q4341)
- The Swiss federal government wants to use high-tech to fight the coronavirus (Q4340)
- social media account and profile data (Q4339)
- income level (Q4338)
- information I have provided about others (Q4337)
- online presence (Q4336)
- interests (Q4335)
- likes (Q4334)
- Alipay Health Code (Q4333)
- Coronavirus: Mit Apps gegen die Pandemie? (Q4332)
- CBS (Q4331)
- CoronApp (Q4330)
- PIN number (Q4329)
- information provided about me by other individuals (Q4328)
- calling line identity (CLI) (Q4327)
- lifestyle information (Q4326)
- fax number (Q4325)
- Right to Data Portability Form (Q4324)
- information from credit reference agencies (Q4323)
- coronamap.site (Q4322)
- medical conditions (Q4321)
- religion (Q4320)
- ethnicity (Q4319)
- sexual orientation (Q4318)
- marital status (Q4317)
- demographic information (Q4316)
- sexual preference (Q4315)
- Stopp Corona (Q4314)
- Global Cases by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) (Q4313)
- Swisscom nous épie pour le compte du Conseil fédéral (Q4312)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4311)
- Kwarantanna domowa (Q4310)
- Moscow deploys facial recognition technology for coronavirus quarantine (Q4309)
- Privacy fears as India hand stamps suspected coronavirus cases (Q4308)
- COVID-19 Digital Rights Tracker (Q4307)
- Quantified Flu (Q4306)
- national identity number (Q4305)
- Pokémon Trainer Club Account information (Q4304)
- records of what information you have disclosed in connection with business transactions (Q4303)
- records of what information you have disclosed for your protection and the protection of others (Q4302)
- records of what information you have shared with other individuals (Q4301)
- fitness activity data (Q4300)
- information about what is installed on my device (Q4299)
- third-party sign in details (Q4298)
- Effy Vayena: «Les crises de cette ampleur tendent un miroir à nos sociétés» (Q4297)
- Effy Vayena (Q4296)
- Disposable Identities for Health Crisis (Q4295)
- VIA app (Q4294)
- MyLog14 (Q4293)
- Houseparty (Q4292)
- French data on the covid-19 epidemic (Q4291)
- Swisscom aidera la Confédération à détecter les attroupements via les téléphones (Q4290)
- Coronavirus Is Speeding Up the Amazonification of the Planet (Q4289)
- Fevermap (Q4288)
- US Health Weather Map (Q4287)
- Essai d’une nouvelle analyse de la mortalité causée par la petite vérole, et des avantages de l’inoculation pour la prévenir (Q4286)
- 'Selfie app' to keep track of quarantined Poles (Q4285)
- How South Korea Flattened the Curve (Q4284)
- Covid-19 : après le confinement, l’inéluctable recul de nos libertés (Q4283)
- File:Chain contact tracing.png
- File:Contact tracing.png
- Coronavirus world map evolution (Q4280)
- Health rating system deployed in over 100 cities: Alipay (Q4279)
- An Official WHO Coronavirus App Will Be a “Waze for COVID-19” - IEEE Spectrum (Q4278)
- Zurich monitoring COVID-19 effects (Q4277)
- Die scheinbar stillgelegte Stadt: Bleiben die Zürcher jetzt wirklich zu Hause? (Q4276)
- World Health Organization App (Q4275)
- COVID Symptom Tracker (Q4274)
- A third of virus cases may be ‘silent carriers’, classified data suggests (Q4273)
- SARS-CoV-2 Cases communicated by Swiss Cantons and Principality of Liechtenstein (FL) (Q4272)
- COVID 19: A Call to Arms to Rescue Privacy (from Itself) | LinkedIn (Q4271)
- Securing Justice, Health, and Democracy against the COVID-19 Threat (Q4270)
- Artificial intelligence in the fight against COVID-19 (Q4269)
- Philippines (Q4268)
- New contact tracer app for COVID-19 developed in Cebu (Q4267)
- Two Steps Ahead of the Coronavirus (Q4266)
- A framework for identifying regional outbreak and spread of COVID-19 from one-minute population-wide surveys (Q4265)
- Seznam’s Mapy.cz app has coronavirus tracking feature, but not everyone is impressed - Prague, Czech Republic (Q4264)
- Open Letter: Contract Tracking and NHSX (Q4263)
- UK coronavirus app 'must respect privacy rights' (Q4262)
- Phone location data could be used to help UK coronavirus effort (Q4261)
- Russian officials will track coronavirus patients' geolocation data to design a national warning system (Q4260)
- TraceTogether (Q4259)
- Coronaprivacy (Q4258)
- Data protection and Coronavirus (COVID-19) resources (Q4257)
- Legal data protection framework for coronavirus containment (Q4256)
- Data protection and limiting the spread of coronavirus (Q4255)
- Coronavirus (Covid-19) : les rappels de la CNIL sur la collecte de données personnelles | CNIL (Q4254)
- How should social mixing be measured: comparing web-based survey and sensor-based methods (Q4253)
- Contact tracing to control infectious disease: when enough is enough (Q4252)
- Apps Gone Rogue: Maintaining Personal Privacy in an Epidemic (Q4251)
- La méthode sud-coréenne face au coronavirus : traquer nos données personnelles pour sauver des vies… le pour et le contre (Q4250)
- Singapore launches TraceTogether mobile app to boost COVID-19 contact tracing efforts (Q4249)
- How the Virus Got Out (Q4246)
- Statement by the GPA Executive Committee on the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (Q4244)
- COVID-19, Scientific Research and the GDPR – Some Basic Principles (Q4243)
- MyData Taïwan (Q4242)
- Self-Health Management App for COVID-19-Taïwan (Q4241)
- worldwide (Q4240)
- Trust in Government Policies. Kore'as approach to COVID-19 (Q4239)
- Coronanow.kr (Q4238)
- Coronavirus numbers and an inevitable solution: MyData (Q4237)
- Swisscom Mobility Insights Platform (Q4236)
- Yuval Noah Harari: the world after coronavirus (Q4235)
- Initiative for Media Innovation (IMI) (Q4234)
- JLINC Protocol (Q4233)
- We have taken the number of deaths from Wikipedia (Q4232)
- Swiss COVID tracker (Q4231)
- Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response (Q4230)
- User:Genferei/QS
- Contre le virus, la tentation du pistage par smartphone (Q4222)
- Berne pourrait utiliser les portables pour suivre les flux de populations (Q4217)
- Paraguay (Q4215)
- Paraguay: Military will accompany police in enforcing restrictions on movement (Q4214)
- Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (Q4213)
- WHO guidelines on ethical issues in public health surveillance (Q4212)
- Coronaboard.kr (Q4210)
- Contact tracing (Q4209)
- Covid-19: histoire d’une médiatisation (Q4208)
- Personal data protection amid coronavirus: Key takeaways for businesses operating in China (Q4207)
- Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study (Q4203)
- Statement of the European Data Protection Board Chair on the processing of personal data in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4202)
- Thailand (Q4201)
- Movement of visitors from high-risk areas to be tracked with mandatory sim and app (Q4200)
- Private map plots locations of Singaporean COVID-19 patients (Q4199)
- Coronavirus, come funzionano il controllo delle celle e il tracciamento dei contagi. Il Garante: "Non bisogna improvvisare" - Intervista ad Antonello Soro (Q4198)
- Vodafone produces anonymous heat map to help Lombardy understand population movements (Q4197)
- Coronavirus Bill (Q4196)
- Archiving Information on the Novel Coronavirus (Q4195)
- Facebook has a coronavirus problem. It's WhatsApp (Q4194)
- Etat d’urgence sanitaire : les modifications adoptées par le Sénat en commission (Q4193)
- Marc Renfer (Q4192)
- Iran (Q4191)
- Iran Launched an App That Claimed to Diagnose Coronavirus. Instead, It Collected Location Data on Millions of People (Q4190)
- "Utilisons les données télécom de tous les Belges pour stopper le coronavirus" (Q4189)
- Coronavirus : quand les Etats font pression pour utiliser les données personnelles (Q4188)
- Call for action:toward building the data infrastructure and ecosystem we need to tackle pandemics and other dynamic societal and environmental threats (Q4187)
- NHS developing coronavirus contact tracking app (Q4186)
- Mass testing, school closings, lockdowns: Countries pick tactics in ‘war’ against coronavirus (Q4185)
- Advocacy group calls for Zoom to release a transparency report (Q4184)
- Protect digital rights, promote public health: toward a better coronavirus response (Q4183)
- La Corée du Sud, le pays qui ne s’est pas cadenassé (Q4182)
- Mass testing, school closings, lockdowns: Countries pick tactics in ‘war’ against coronavirus (Q4181)
- COVID-19: Data Protection Checklist (Q4180)
- Surveillance Company Says It's Deploying 'Coronavirus-Detecting' Cameras in US (Q4179)
- syndromic surveillance (Q4178)
- The U.S. wants smartphone location data to fight coronavirus. Privacy advocates are worried. (Q4177)
- U.S. government, tech industry discussing ways to use smartphone location data to combat coronavirus (Q4176)
- Zuckerberg: Facebook isn't giving governments data to track coronavirus spread (Q4175)
- Austria (Q4174)
- Confinement: A1 provides movement data to government (Q4173)
- Searching for infected persons with mobile phone tracking (Q4172)
- Telekom shares data on "flows of movement" of mobile phone users with Robert-Koch-Institut (Q4171)
- Projet de loi d'urgence pour faire face à l'épidémie de Covid-19 (Q4170)
- What the coronavirus bill will do (Q4169)
- COVID-19 Open Research Dataset (CORD-19) (Q4168)
- Covid Watch (Q4167)
- Israël (Q4166)
- Israeli Coronavirus Surveillance Explained: Who's Tracking You and What Happens With the Data (Q4165)
- Mapping the Social Network of Coronavirus (Q4164)
- Network Science Institute at Northeastern University (Q4163)
- Adam Satariano (Q4162)
- Coronavirus Tech Handbook (Q4161)
- Quantifying dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests that epidemic control and avoidance is feasible through instantaneous digital contact tracing (Q4160)
- Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand (Q4159)
- Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging (Q4158)
- telecom companies collaborate with the virus covid 19 control authorities (Q4157)
- Safe Paths (Q4156)
- Hong Kong (Q4155)
- Taiwan (Q4154)
- With coronavirus containment efforts, what are the privacy rights of patients? (Q4153)
- China (Q4152)
- Sustainable containment of COVID-19 using smartphones in China: Scientific and ethical underpinnings for implementation of similar approaches in other settings (Q4151)
- Co-Epi (Q4150)
- CoEpi (Q4149)
- Phones Could Track the Spread of Covid-19. Is It a Good Idea? (Q4148)
- self-quarantine safety protection mobile app (Q4147)
- South Korea is watching quarantined citizens with a smartphone app (Q4146)
- Singapore (Q4145)
- Dashboard of the COVID-19 Virus Outbreak in Singapore (Q4144)
- Greetings from a corona positive patient from quarantine! (Q4142)
- COVID-19 outbreak response: first assessment of mobility changes in Italy following lockdown (Q4141)
- Coronavirus: le cabinet De Block dit «oui» à l’utilisation des données télécoms (Q4140)
- Verily (Q4139)
- Coronadata (Q4138)
- You Shouldn’t Have to Give Google Your Data to Access a COVID-19 Test (Q4137)
- Science-Policy Interface (Q4136)
- Unifying Knowledge Creation Process Through Cascading Modes of Communication (Q4135)
- User:Alexbfree/GDPRTest
- Item talk:Q102
- The Politics of Expertise in International Organizations. How international bureaucracies produce and mobilize knowledge (Q4134)
- Three (Q4133)
- last.fm (Q4132)
- ifun.tv (Q4131)
- Niantic (Q4130)
- Algorithmes :contrôle des biais S.V.P. (Q4129)
- Dynamics of knowledge creation in global participatory science communities: open innovation communities from a network perspective (Q4128)
- The Great Hack panel at the Graduate Institute/FIFDH (Q4127)
- student ID number (Q4126)
- information required to match me against appropriate apprenticeship opportunities (Q4125)
- information you gather to provide facilities and ensure security (Q4124)
- information you use for marketing, communications, event registrations and advice (Q4123)
- information needed to personalise support or meet my needs (Q4122)
- information you need to confirm prior attainment (Q4121)
- information you need to deliver my chosen course of study and monitor progress (Q4120)
- information you are required to collect by law (Q4119)
- employment history (Q4118)
- education data (Q4117)
- marks (Q4116)
- examination scripts (Q4115)
- SEND data (Q4114)
- academic/education records (Q4113)
- grants data (Q4112)
- financial standing (Q4111)
- details of study (Q4110)
- academic result (Q4109)
- qualifications (Q4108)
- nationality (Q4107)
- family details (Q4106)
- opinions about me (Q4105)
- visitor data (Q4104)
- supporter data (Q4103)
- donor data (Q4102)
- No PhDs needed: how citizen science is transforming research (Q4101)
- UNDP’s Knowledge Management Strategy (Q4100)
- supplier/contractor data (Q4099)
- staff records (Q4098)
- data about my employers (Q4097)
- data about my parents (Q4096)
- pupil data (Q4095)
- educational establishment (Q4094)
- Better work in the gig economy:enabling gig workers to live with financial security, dignity and dream (Q4093)
- Avec les CFF, mes données sont en sécurité (Q4092)
- political opinions (Q4091)
- privacy records (Q4090)
- data combined with partner companies (Q4089)
- internet connection information (Q4088)
- branches used (Q4086)
- OBSOLETE (Q4084)
- voucher redemptions (Q4083)
- bookmarked or saved data (Q4082)
- Tages Anzeiger (Q4081)
- Booking.com (Q4080)
- Google kennt Ihr Wunschgewicht (Q4079)
- Une centaine de chauffeurs Uber rassemblés à Aubervilliers pour de meilleures conditions de travail (Q4078)
- SBB wollen mit Axon Vibe neue Mobilitätsplattform entwickeln (Q4077)
- CFF SmartWay (Q4076)
- civic tech (Q4075)
- Civic tech, data and Demos (Q4074)
- Item talk:Q101/francais
- Item talk:Q101/mailto
- Parlament schützt Datensammler – nicht die Bürger (Q4073)
- Future Skills Lab (Q4072)
- GendNotes (Q4071)
- Décret n° 2020-151 (Q4070)
- Capturing solutions for learning and scaling up : documenting operational experiences for organizational learning and knowledge sharing (Q4069)
- Working paper (Q4068)
- The art of knowledge exchange : a results-focused planning guide for development practitioners in the social, urban, land, and resilience sectors (Q4067)
- World Bank Group (Q4066)
- system activity (Q4065)
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- Template:PySarHelperEmailNotSwiss
- Template:PySarHelperEmailSwiss
- Template:PySarHelperEmail
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- complaints data (Q4064)
- Becoming a knowledge-sharing organization : a handbook for scaling up solutions through knowledge capturing and sharing (Q4063)
- crash reports (Q4062)
- avatar (Q4061)
- cloud-synced data (Q4060)
- smartphone manufacturer (Q4059)
