Pages that link to "Item:Q4138"
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The following pages link to Coronadata (Q4138):
Displayed 409 items.
View (previous 500 | next 500) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- Coronavirus Bill (Q4196) (← links)
- Vodafone produces anonymous heat map to help Lombardy understand population movements (Q4197) (← links)
- Coronavirus, come funzionano il controllo delle celle e il tracciamento dei contagi. Il Garante: "Non bisogna improvvisare" - Intervista ad Antonello Soro (Q4198) (← links)
- Private map plots locations of Singaporean COVID-19 patients (Q4199) (← links)
- Movement of visitors from high-risk areas to be tracked with mandatory sim and app (Q4200) (← links)
- Statement of the European Data Protection Board Chair on the processing of personal data in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4202) (← links)
- Early dynamics of transmission and control of COVID-19: a mathematical modelling study (Q4203) (← links)
- Personal data protection amid coronavirus: Key takeaways for businesses operating in China (Q4207) (← links)
- Covid-19: histoire d’une médiatisation (Q4208) (← links)
- Coronaboard.kr (Q4210) (← links)
- WHO guidelines on ethical issues in public health surveillance (Q4212) (← links)
- Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center (Q4213) (← links)
- Contre le virus, la tentation du pistage par smartphone (Q4222) (← links)
- Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response (Q4230) (← links)
- Swiss COVID tracker (Q4231) (← links)
- We have taken the number of deaths from Wikipedia (Q4232) (← links)
- JLINC Protocol (Q4233) (← links)
- Yuval Noah Harari: the world after coronavirus (Q4235) (← links)
- Coronavirus numbers and an inevitable solution: MyData (Q4237) (← links)
- Coronanow.kr (Q4238) (← links)
- Trust in Government Policies. Kore'as approach to COVID-19 (Q4239) (← links)
- Self-Health Management App for COVID-19-Taïwan (Q4241) (← links)
- COVID-19, Scientific Research and the GDPR – Some Basic Principles (Q4243) (← links)
- Statement by the GPA Executive Committee on the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (Q4244) (← links)
- How the Virus Got Out (Q4246) (← links)
- Singapore launches TraceTogether mobile app to boost COVID-19 contact tracing efforts (Q4249) (← links)
- La méthode sud-coréenne face au coronavirus : traquer nos données personnelles pour sauver des vies… le pour et le contre (Q4250) (← links)
- Apps Gone Rogue: Maintaining Personal Privacy in an Epidemic (Q4251) (← links)
- Contact tracing to control infectious disease: when enough is enough (Q4252) (← links)
- How should social mixing be measured: comparing web-based survey and sensor-based methods (Q4253) (← links)
- Coronavirus (Covid-19) : les rappels de la CNIL sur la collecte de données personnelles | CNIL (Q4254) (← links)
- Data protection and limiting the spread of coronavirus (Q4255) (← links)
- Legal data protection framework for coronavirus containment (Q4256) (← links)
- Data protection and Coronavirus (COVID-19) resources (Q4257) (← links)
- TraceTogether (Q4259) (← links)
- Russian officials will track coronavirus patients' geolocation data to design a national warning system (Q4260) (← links)
- Phone location data could be used to help UK coronavirus effort (Q4261) (← links)
- UK coronavirus app 'must respect privacy rights' (Q4262) (← links)
- Open Letter: Contract Tracking and NHSX (Q4263) (← links)
- Seznam’s Mapy.cz app has coronavirus tracking feature, but not everyone is impressed - Prague, Czech Republic (Q4264) (← links)
- A framework for identifying regional outbreak and spread of COVID-19 from one-minute population-wide surveys (Q4265) (← links)
- Two Steps Ahead of the Coronavirus (Q4266) (← links)
- New contact tracer app for COVID-19 developed in Cebu (Q4267) (← links)
- Artificial intelligence in the fight against COVID-19 (Q4269) (← links)
- Securing Justice, Health, and Democracy against the COVID-19 Threat (Q4270) (← links)
- COVID 19: A Call to Arms to Rescue Privacy (from Itself) | LinkedIn (Q4271) (← links)
- SARS-CoV-2 Cases communicated by Swiss Cantons and Principality of Liechtenstein (FL) (Q4272) (← links)
- A third of virus cases may be ‘silent carriers’, classified data suggests (Q4273) (← links)
- COVID Symptom Tracker (Q4274) (← links)
- World Health Organization App (Q4275) (← links)
- Die scheinbar stillgelegte Stadt: Bleiben die Zürcher jetzt wirklich zu Hause? (Q4276) (← links)
- Zurich monitoring COVID-19 effects (Q4277) (← links)
- An Official WHO Coronavirus App Will Be a “Waze for COVID-19” - IEEE Spectrum (Q4278) (← links)
- Health rating system deployed in over 100 cities: Alipay (Q4279) (← links)
- Coronavirus world map evolution (Q4280) (← links)
- Covid-19 : après le confinement, l’inéluctable recul de nos libertés (Q4283) (← links)
- How South Korea Flattened the Curve (Q4284) (← links)
- 'Selfie app' to keep track of quarantined Poles (Q4285) (← links)
- Essai d’une nouvelle analyse de la mortalité causée par la petite vérole, et des avantages de l’inoculation pour la prévenir (Q4286) (← links)
- US Health Weather Map (Q4287) (← links)
- Fevermap (Q4288) (← links)
- Coronavirus Is Speeding Up the Amazonification of the Planet (Q4289) (← links)
- Swisscom aidera la Confédération à détecter les attroupements via les téléphones (Q4290) (← links)
- French data on the covid-19 epidemic (Q4291) (← links)
- MyLog14 (Q4293) (← links)
- VIA app (Q4294) (← links)
- Disposable Identities for Health Crisis (Q4295) (← links)
- Effy Vayena (Q4296) (← links)
- Effy Vayena: «Les crises de cette ampleur tendent un miroir à nos sociétés» (Q4297) (← links)
- Quantified Flu (Q4306) (← links)
- COVID-19 Digital Rights Tracker (Q4307) (← links)
- Privacy fears as India hand stamps suspected coronavirus cases (Q4308) (← links)
- Moscow deploys facial recognition technology for coronavirus quarantine (Q4309) (← links)
- Kwarantanna domowa (Q4310) (← links)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4311) (← links)
- Swisscom nous épie pour le compte du Conseil fédéral (Q4312) (← links)
- Global Cases by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) (Q4313) (← links)
- Stopp Corona (Q4314) (← links)
- coronamap.site (Q4322) (← links)
- CoronApp (Q4330) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Mit Apps gegen die Pandemie? (Q4332) (← links)
- Alipay Health Code (Q4333) (← links)
- The Swiss federal government wants to use high-tech to fight the coronavirus (Q4340) (← links)
- Palantir technologies (Q4350) (← links)
- CoronaMadrid (Q4351) (← links)
- Track Virus (Q4352) (← links)
- Monitoring spread of COVID-19 (Q4353) (← links)
- Personium Trails (Q4354) (← links)
- On the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Outbreak and the Smart City Network: Universal Data Sharing Standards Coupled with Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Benefit Urban Health Monitoring and Management (Q4355) (← links)
- Martin Steiger (Q4357) (← links)
- Varmistetut koronatapaukset Suomessa (COVID-19) (Q4358) (← links)
- Covidom (Q4359) (← links)
- Super-spreaders: what are they and how are they transmitting coronavirus? (Q4360) (← links)
- Early in the epidemic: impact of preprints on global discourse about COVID-19 transmissibility (Q4361) (← links)
- The Plague That Killed Athenian Democracy (Q4362) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Thierry Breton plaide pour une utilisation des données des opérateurs (Q4363) (← links)
- How the COVID Tracking Project fills the public health data gap (Q4364) (← links)
- The COVID Tracking Project (Q4365) (← links)
- Watchdog approves use of UK phone data to help fight coronavirus (Q4366) (← links)
- Government Measures Dataset (Q4367) (← links)
- Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan (Q4368) (← links)
- Monitoring of COVID-19 via mobile data (Q4370) (← links)
- Apple announces COVID-19 website and app in partnership with CDC and the White House (Q4374) (← links)
- Apple COVID-19 (Q4375) (← links)
- Bottom-up data Trusts: disturbing the ‘one size fits all’ approach to data governance (Q4376) (← links)
- WeTrace (Q4378) (← links)
- Projects using personal data to combat SARS-CoV-2 (Q4381) (← links)
- Surveillance responses to COVID19 (Q4382) (← links)
- SARS-CoV-2 Tracking under GDPR (Q4383) (← links)
- Joint Statement on the right to data protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4384) (← links)
- D'scover (Q4387) (← links)
- grippenet.ch (Q4389) (← links)
- The power of data in a pandemic - Technology in the NHS (Q4390) (← links)
- The Role of Age Distribution and Family Structure on COVID-19 Dynamics: A Preliminary Modeling Assessment for Hubei and Lombardy (Q4393) (← links)
- Lessons from Italy’s Response to Coronavirus (Q4394) (← links)
- I-am-Immune (Q4397) (← links)
- Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) (Q4399) (← links)
- Healthy Together (Q4400) (← links)
- Tracy (Q4401) (← links)
- ConTrace (Q4407) (← links)
- User Acceptance on mobile contact tracing app (Q4408) (← links)
- How does the public, across several countries, feel about an automatic contact tracing app to combat the spread of COVID-19? (Q4409) (← links)
- Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool (Q4410) (← links)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4412) (← links)
- Poland’s coronavirus app offers playbook for other governments (Q4413) (← links)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4414) (← links)
- Coronavirus pandemic sparks new calls for personal surveillance, and concerns (Q4417) (← links)
- Aarogya Setu (Q4418) (← links)
- Protego (Q4419) (← links)
- Rakning C-19 (Q4420) (← links)
- COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422) (← links)
- Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (Q4423) (← links)
- WeTrace Philippines (Q4424) (← links)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425) (← links)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426) (← links)
- Evgeny Morozov (Q4428) (← links)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429) (← links)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430) (← links)
- Data-driven approaches to assessing civil liberties impact of Covid-19 (Q4431) (← links)
- ProteGO Safe (Q4432) (← links)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433) (← links)
- Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks (Q4434) (← links)
- HaMagen (Q4435) (← links)
- Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436) (← links)
- Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437) (← links)
- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438) (← links)
- Cocoa (Q4439) (← links)
- Coronavirus : qu’est-ce que StopCovid, l’appli de traçage étudiée par le gouvernement ? (Q4440) (← links)
- « L’application StopCovid retracera l’historique des relations sociales » : les pistes du gouvernement pour le traçage numérique des malades (Q4441) (← links)
- StopCovid (Q4442) (← links)
- We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444) (← links)
- Intervention RTBF on contact tracing (Q4445) (← links)
- I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447) (← links)
- How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? (Q4448) (← links)
- Netherlands could be dealing with coronavirus pandemic for over 2 years: report (Q4449) (← links)
- Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450) (← links)
- Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology (Q4451) (← links)
- A phased lift of control: a practical strategy to achieve herd immunity against Covid-19 at the country level (Q4452) (← links)
- The long tail of contact tracing (Q4453) (← links)
- New York State Geolocation Tracking Ban - A10246 Bill Text (Q4454) (← links)
- covid19 civil society (Q4455) (← links)
- BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders (Q4456) (← links)
- Radio distance is not spatial distance (Q4457) (← links)
- Tracing mobile data in the fight against Covid-19 - Analysis of potentials and limits (Q4458) (← links)
- Antonio Casilli (Q4459) (← links)
- Opinion on the use of the mobile phone for surveillance needs (Q4460) (← links)
- Analysis of DP3T: Between Scylla and Charybdis (Q4461) (← links)
- Stopcovid19 (Q4462) (← links)
- SM-Covid-19 (Q4463) (← links)
- Contact Tracing- Bluetooth Specification (authors:Apple- Google) (Q4464) (← links)
- Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465) (← links)
- Flattening the curve helps protect privacy, too (Q4468) (← links)
- Give more data, awareness and control to individual citizens, and they will help COVID-19 containment (Q4469) (← links)
- Primer on Decentralized Contact Tracing (Q4470) (← links)
- NHS app (Q4471) (← links)
- Smittestopp (Q4472) (← links)
- eRouška (Q4473) (← links)
- DataWalk (Q4474) (← links)
- Contre le Covid-19, les immenses défis et inconnues des applications mobiles de « suivi de contacts » (Q4475) (← links)
- MahaKavach (Q4476) (← links)
- StopKorona! (Q4477) (← links)
- The tech ‘solutions’ for coronavirus take the surveillance state to the next level (Q4478) (← links)
- Visible and vocal - Delivery apps have transformed urban life in China (Q4479) (← links)
- Covid ou la fabrique du consentement aveugle (Q4483) (← links)
- Data Protection Impact Assessment for the Corona App (Q4484) (← links)
- Contact-Tracing: Nur die staatliche App schafft Vertrauen (Q4485) (← links)
- A European roadmap to lifting coronavirus containment measures (Q4486) (← links)
- ePrivacy Directive (Q4487) (← links)
- Immuni (Q4489) (← links)
- EDPB Letter concerning the European Commission's draft Guidance on apps supporting the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4490) (← links)
- Bluetooth tracking and COVID-19: A tech primer (Q4491) (← links)
- Corona-Datenspende (Q4492) (← links)
- Ford Tests Buzzing Wristbands to Keep Workers at Safe Distances (Q4494) (← links)
- Germany launches smartwatch app to monitor coronavirus spread (Q4495) (← links)
- Testing, not tracing, is the privacy preserving response to COVID-19 (Q4496) (← links)
- Le Port d’Anvers teste l’utilisation d’un bracelet électronique pour endiguer la propagation du COVID-19 au sein de ses équipes (Q4497) (← links)
- The anti-corona technology still has its pitfalls (Q4498) (← links)
- Europe’s PEPP-PT COVID-19 contacts tracing standard push could be squaring up for a fight with Apple and Google (Q4499) (← links)
- development of EPFL's "Covid proximity tracing App" project is in line with data protection requirements. (Q4500) (← links)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4502) (← links)
- Risks related to the StopCovid application (Q4503) (← links)
- ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol (Q4504) (← links)
- How to create a trustworthy COVID-19 tracking technology (Q4505) (← links)
- Le traçage anonyme, dangereux oxymore: Analyse de risques à destination des non-specialistes (Q4506) (← links)
- Scenario: effect of track&trace apps (Q4507) (← links)
- Rift Opens Over European Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps (Q4508) (← links)
- Why are there doubts over contact-tracing apps? (Q4509) (← links)
- Copasir (Q4510) (← links)
- Exit through the App Store?A rapid evidence review on the technical considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis (Q4511) (← links)
- Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515) (← links)
- Bending Spoons (Q4517) (← links)
- SwissCovid (Q4518) (← links)
- NHS coronavirus app: memo discussed giving ministers power to 'de-anonymise' users (Q4522) (← links)
- Report: Red Cross "Corona App" reviewed by noyb (Q4523) (← links)
- Can one fairly incentivize the adoption of a digital contact tracing app? (Q4524) (← links)
- Die Corona-Warn-App kommt – so kannst du sie schon jetzt ausprobieren (Q4525) (← links)
- Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data (Q4526) (← links)
- Technology and Public Health Perspectives on Private Automated Contact Tracing (Q4527) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Clear majority in Switzerland supports tracking infection chains via smartphone (Q4529) (← links)
- A European Contact-Tracing App Might Be More Privacy-Invading Than Apple and Google’s (Q4530) (← links)
- Pj20 tracer (Q4531) (← links)
- Technology Can Help Solve the Coronavirus Crisis If Government Steps Up (Q4532) (← links)
- Tracking mobile devices to fight coronavirus (Q4533) (← links)
- COVID-19 Content Moderation Research Letter (Q4534) (← links)
- Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537) (← links)
- How do you trace Covid-19 while respecting privacy? (Q4538) (← links)
- Le Conseil est favorable au principe de StopCOVID, en tant que brique d’une stratégie plus globale (Q4540) (← links)
- StopCovid est un projet désastreux piloté par des apprentis sorciers (Q4542) (← links)
- Délibération n° 2020-046 du 24 avril 2020 portant avis sur un projet d’application mobile dénommée « StopCovid » (Q4544) (← links)
- WeTrace -- A Privacy-preserving Mobile COVID-19 Tracing Approach and Application (Q4545) (← links)
- Joint Statement on Digital Contact Tracing (Q4547) (← links)
- Introductory remarks before the committee for European Affairs of the senate of the Republic of France - Wojciech Wiewiórowski (Q4550) (← links)
- Avis sur le suivi numérique des personnes (Q4552) (← links)
- Test criteria and contact tracing. FAQs (Q4553) (← links)
- Coronavirus Tracking Apps Raise Questions About Bluetooth Security (Q4556) (← links)
- «Capture d’écrans» N°8 : StopCovid, la zizanie franco-française (Q4557) (← links)
- Apple and Google release sample code, UI and detailed policies for COVID-19 exposure-notification apps (Q4558) (← links)
- 1point5 (Q4559) (← links)
- Why use Bluetooth for contact tracing? (Q4560) (← links)
- Inventor finds bluetooth unsuitable for corona app (Q4561) (← links)
- Fighting Covid-19 Shouldn't Mean Abandoning Human Rights (Q4565) (← links)
- Supplementary Written Evidence on COVID-19 Tracing Apps to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Q4566) (← links)
- Pisarasi (Q4567) (← links)
- CovApp (Q4569) (← links)
- The Pronto-C2 Fully Decentralized Automatic Contact Tracing System (Q4571) (← links)
- Retour sur la série Westworld : du traçage à la programmation algorithmique des comportements individuels (Q4572) (← links)
- Social Contours (Q4573) (← links)
- The Covid19Impact Survey: Assessing the Pulse of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Spain via 24 questions (Q4575) (← links)
- Application StopCovid : solution scientifique ou calcul politique ? (Q4584) (← links)
- Covid-19 : pourquoi le « contact tracking » ne fonctionnera (probablement) pas (Q4585) (← links)
- Les chercheurs français mettent en garde contre les applications de traçage (Q4587) (← links)
- Beyond R0 : Heterogeneity in secondary infections and probabilistic epidemic forecasting (Q4590) (← links)
- L’équipe-projet StopCovid démarre la publication du code source et de la documentation de l’application StopCovid | Inria (Q4591) (← links)
- Une pandémie à l’ère des technologies émergentes (Q4592) (← links)
- Naomi Klein: How big tech plans to profit from the pandemic (Q4595) (← links)
- A Singapour, le traçage par app dégénère en surveillance de masse (Q4598) (← links)
- SafeEntry (Q4599) (← links)
- BLE contact tracing sniffer PoC (Q4601) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4603) (← links)
- Amaelle Guiton (Q4604) (← links)
- Datakalab (Q4605) (← links)
- Applications de suivi : traque-moi si tu peux (Q4607) (← links)
- Centralized or Decentralized? The Contact Tracing Dilemma (Q4608) (← links)
- The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609) (← links)
- The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611) (← links)
- Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612) (← links)
- Sur Android, le StopCovid anglais demande l’accès à la localisation (mais promet de ne pas l’utiliser) (Q4613) (← links)
- Location needs to be enabled for Bluetooth Low Energy Scanning on Android 6.0 (Q4616) (← links)
- Bluetooth low energy overview (Q4617) (← links)
- Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4620) (← links)
- ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621) (← links)
- DESIRE: A Third Way for a European Exposure Notification System (Q4622) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625) (← links)
- The New United Nations Coronavirus Social Distancing App Doesn’t Even Work (Q4627) (← links)
- VírusRadar (Q4629) (← links)
- COVIDSafe (Q4630) (← links)
- NHS COVID-19 (Q4632) (← links)
- L'Europe plaide pour l'interopérabilité des « StopCovid » nationaux, ce que proposent Apple et Google (Q4633) (← links)
- COVID-19 tracing apps must not interfere with human rights (Q4634) (← links)
- Alerta Guate (Q4635) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-App (Q4639) (← links)
- Etude de la sensibilité des citoyens au traçage numérique (Q4640) (← links)
- Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642) (← links)
- Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643) (← links)
- A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. (Q4645) (← links)
- Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646) (← links)
- Avec CopSonic, StopCovid pourrait bientôt intégrer les ultrasons (Q4648) (← links)
- CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650) (← links)
- L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651) (← links)
- Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652) (← links)
- NSW is unable to use Covidsafe app’s data for contact tracing (Q4653) (← links)
- Apps for COVID: to do or not to do (Q4659) (← links)
- Inferring distance from Bluetooth signal strength: a deep dive (Q4660) (← links)
- Apple and Google’s covid-tracing tech has been released to 23 countries (Q4662) (← links)
- Les critiques contre l’application demeurent vives (Q4663) (← links)
- How did the Covidsafe app go from being vital to almost irrelevant? (Q4664) (← links)
- Care19 App (Q4666) (← links)
- Renee DiResta on Disinformation and COVID-19 (Q4668) (← links)
- Split Learning (Q4669) (← links)
- Apturi Covid (Q4673) (← links)
- Briser la chaine (Q4676) (← links)
- New Ultrasonic Contact-Tracing App Promises Better Accuracy Than Bluetooth Alternatives (Q4678) (← links)
- Sonar-X (Q4679) (← links)
- Why StopCOVID Fails as a Privacy-Preserving Design (Q4706) (← links)
- « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708) (← links)
- E7mi (Q4709) (← links)
- Ehteraz (Q4711) (← links)
- BeAware Bahrain (Q4712) (← links)
- CoronApp (Q4714) (← links)
- Koronavilkku (Q4716) (← links)
- The 14 Features Any Ethical Covid-19 Contact Tracing Effort Should Incorporate (Q4717) (← links)
- An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718) (← links)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720) (← links)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724) (← links)
- TraceCovid (Q4730) (← links)
- Wiqaytna (Q4733) (← links)
- Ito (Q4735) (← links)
- Zostan Zdravy (Q4736) (← links)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737) (← links)
- contact tracing protocol (Q4738) (← links)
- DP3T - Exposure Score Calculation (Q4739) (← links)
- CovTracer (Q4740) (← links)
- Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741) (← links)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746) (← links)
- Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747) (← links)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748) (← links)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749) (← links)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751) (← links)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752) (← links)
- How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754) (← links)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755) (← links)
- COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759) (← links)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760) (← links)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762) (← links)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763) (← links)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764) (← links)
- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765) (← links)
- No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767) (← links)
- SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768) (← links)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769) (← links)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773) (← links)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775) (← links)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776) (← links)
- SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777) (← links)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778) (← links)
- Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779) (← links)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783) (← links)
- Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790) (← links)
- Malgré les apparences, SwissCovid fait face à une défiance massive (Q4800) (← links)
- How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801) (← links)
- COVID Tracker (Q4811) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- Smitte|stop (Q4814) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- Beat Covid Gibraltar (Q4841) (← links)
- Tabaud (Q4847) (← links)
- Here are the countries using Google and Apple’s COVID-19 Contact Tracing API (Q4851) (← links)
- Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852) (← links)
- Apple and Google's Coronavirus Tracking Plan Is a Symptom of Their Power (Q4900) (← links)
- Covid-19: the race to create privacy-focused contact tracing tools (Q4902) (← links)
- Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924) (← links)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925) (← links)
- Cowidwise (Q4926) (← links)
- Coronalert (Q4935) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940) (← links)
- PeduliLindungi (Q4941) (← links)
- NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943) (← links)
- MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944) (← links)
- OstaniZdrav (Q4945) (← links)
- Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)
- HOAI (Q4950) (← links)
- COVID alert (Q4951) (← links)
- StopCovid NI (Q4952) (← links)
- Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954) (← links)
- Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957) (← links)
- Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958) (← links)
- Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963) (← links)
- Protect Scotland (Q4965) (← links)
- Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973) (← links)
- COVID Alert Malta (Q4974) (← links)
- Saqbol (Q4976) (← links)
- TraceTogether Token (Q4977) (← links)
- Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980) (← links)
- Ma3an (Q4982) (← links)
- COVI-ID (Q4984) (← links)
- Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994) (← links)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995) (← links)
- Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004) (← links)
- MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006) (← links)
- Exo (Q5012) (← links)
- The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025) (← links)
- Jersey Covid alert (Q5027) (← links)
- Dii vdoma (Q5032) (← links)
- On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042) (← links)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051) (← links)
- Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056) (← links)
- How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057) (← links)
- Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060) (← links)
- Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071) (← links)
- Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094) (← links)
- Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102) (← links)
- Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105) (← links)
- An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125) (← links)
- Etat d'urgence technologique (Q5153) (← links)
- COVID-19 Technology in the EU: A Bittersweet Victory for Human Rights? (Q5324) (← links)