Pages that link to "Item:Q1206"
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The following pages link to news item (Q1206):
Displayed 357 items.
View (previous 500 | next 500) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- Helsingin Sanomat article in context of MyData (Q1205) (← links)
- RSI interview on sovereignty loss tied to Facebook (Q1417) (← links)
- The Creators Of Pokémon Go Mapped The World. Now They're Mapping You (Q1500) (← links)
- RTBF interview on smart devices (Q1550) (← links)
- The EU guarantees its citizens’ data rights, in theory (Q1788) (← links)
- Facebook still hasn’t launched a big privacy feature that Mark Zuckerberg promised more than seven months ago (Q1790) (← links)
- I Downloaded the Information That Facebook Has on Me. Yikes. (Q1793) (← links)
- Facebook forced to disclose more information about its ad targeting (Q1794) (← links)
- Facebook's New Privacy Feature Comes with a Loophole (Q1796) (← links)
- Protection des données: les partis à la traîne (Q1826) (← links)
- Mauro Poggia Vs Uber (Q1890) (← links)
- The Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) will follow the trail of mobile phones throughout Spain for eight days (Q2114) (← links)
- WTO e-commerce talks could be a long slog (Q2136) (← links)
- Are free trade deals expanding a digital divide? (Q2141) (← links)
- Digital trade: smoothing the way for tech multinationals (Q2146) (← links)
- Facebook ist phantastisch für die Demokratie (Q2159) (← links)
- Platforms don't exist (Q2204) (← links)
- Taxonomizing platforms to scale regulation (Q2206) (← links)
- U.S. Using Trade Deals to Shield Tech Giants From Foreign Regulators (Q2241) (← links)
- I Invented the World Wide Web. Here’s How We Can Fix It. (Q2257) (← links)
- Put globalization to work for democracies (Q2295) (← links)
- Will the New NAFTA Boost Digital Trade? (Q2392) (← links)
- A Harvard Business School professor says that it might be a good idea to shut down Facebook or Google for 'a day or a week in order to show that it is democracy that rules here' (Q2400) (← links)
- Trade war goes digital: countries eye tariffs on Internet economy (Q2406) (← links)
- Facebook’s Privacy Tool Launched Months Ago. Or Did It? (Q2411) (← links)
- How social media took us from Tahrir Square to Donald Trump (Q2414) (← links)
- Technology is threatening our democracy. How do we save it? (Q2416) (← links)
- Left Populism and the Rediscovery of Agonistic Politics (Q2663) (← links)
- How we survive the surveillance apocalypse (Q3022) (← links)
- Les données et nous : exploiter ou être exploité ? (Q3033) (← links)
- The privacy project (Q3034) (← links)
- Algorithms drive online discrimination, academic warns (Q3246) (← links)
- Le Temps's folder (Q3248) (← links)
- 2019: The Year of Ad-Tech Darwinism (Q3495) (← links)
- Was anyone ever so young? What 10 years of my Instagram data revealed (Q3497) (← links)
- Google’s renewed privacy push raises tough antitrust questions (Q3509) (← links)
- The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It (Q3517) (← links)
- Facebook Is Investigating A Voter Engagement App Used By Italy’s Five Star Movement (Q3538) (← links)
- Comment la désinformation sur le climat se diffuse et se finance sur YouTube (Q3558) (← links)
- You are now remotely controlled (Q3565) (← links)
- Yle digital data trail article (Q3612) (← links)
- Data protection: Are our authorities independent? (Q3615) (← links)
- Agenda technologique et industriel: quelle place pour la souveraineté numérique ? (Q3708) (← links)
- No obligation to release entire chat logs, Tinder tells DPC (Q3709) (← links)
- Le casse-tête de l’ingérence électorale en ligne (Q3710) (← links)
- The SyRI case: a landmark ruling for benefits claimants around the world (Q3749) (← links)
- 'They know us better than we know ourselves': how Amazon tracked my last two years of reading (Q3784) (← links)
- "Je ne veux pas que Google dicte la mémoire collective" (Q3786) (← links)
- Les logiciels de stratégie électorale, alliés essentiels des élections municipales (Q3789) (← links)
- Collecting facial data without the consent of the persons concerned constitutes a violation on their privacy. (Q3831) (← links)
- The Help. Gig-economy apps affect more than the economy—they’re changing what it means to be a friend (Q3838) (← links)
- The AI Hierarchy of Needs (Q3964) (← links)
- La commission du National dit non aux émoluments (Q3966) (← links)
- Helping individuals take control of their data (Q4016) (← links)
- AI and Facial Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities (Q4018) (← links)
- Putting the Swiss stamp on digital trust (Q4022) (← links)
- Jessica Pidoux, l’algorithme de Tinder dans la peau (Q4024) (← links)
- Les CFF collectionnent toujours plus de données clients (Q4027) (← links)
- Facebook's latest 'transparency' tool doesn't offer much - so we went digging (Q4031) (← links)
- Why Amazon knows so much about you (Q4038) (← links)
- Parlament schützt Datensammler – nicht die Bürger (Q4073) (← links)
- SBB wollen mit Axon Vibe neue Mobilitätsplattform entwickeln (Q4077) (← links)
- Une centaine de chauffeurs Uber rassemblés à Aubervilliers pour de meilleures conditions de travail (Q4078) (← links)
- Google kennt Ihr Wunschgewicht (Q4079) (← links)
- Avec les CFF, mes données sont en sécurité (Q4092) (← links)
- No PhDs needed: how citizen science is transforming research (Q4101) (← links)
- You Shouldn’t Have to Give Google Your Data to Access a COVID-19 Test (Q4137) (← links)
- Coronavirus: le cabinet De Block dit «oui» à l’utilisation des données télécoms (Q4140) (← links)
- COVID-19 outbreak response: first assessment of mobility changes in Italy following lockdown (Q4141) (← links)
- Greetings from a corona positive patient from quarantine! (Q4142) (← links)
- South Korea is watching quarantined citizens with a smartphone app (Q4146) (← links)
- Phones Could Track the Spread of Covid-19. Is It a Good Idea? (Q4148) (← links)
- With coronavirus containment efforts, what are the privacy rights of patients? (Q4153) (← links)
- telecom companies collaborate with the virus covid 19 control authorities (Q4157) (← links)
- Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging (Q4158) (← links)
- Mapping the Social Network of Coronavirus (Q4164) (← links)
- Israeli Coronavirus Surveillance Explained: Who's Tracking You and What Happens With the Data (Q4165) (← links)
- Searching for infected persons with mobile phone tracking (Q4172) (← links)
- Confinement: A1 provides movement data to government (Q4173) (← links)
- Zuckerberg: Facebook isn't giving governments data to track coronavirus spread (Q4175) (← links)
- U.S. government, tech industry discussing ways to use smartphone location data to combat coronavirus (Q4176) (← links)
- The U.S. wants smartphone location data to fight coronavirus. Privacy advocates are worried. (Q4177) (← links)
- Surveillance Company Says It's Deploying 'Coronavirus-Detecting' Cameras in US (Q4179) (← links)
- COVID-19: Data Protection Checklist (Q4180) (← links)
- Mass testing, school closings, lockdowns: Countries pick tactics in ‘war’ against coronavirus (Q4181) (← links)
- La Corée du Sud, le pays qui ne s’est pas cadenassé (Q4182) (← links)
- Protect digital rights, promote public health: toward a better coronavirus response (Q4183) (← links)
- Advocacy group calls for Zoom to release a transparency report (Q4184) (← links)
- Mass testing, school closings, lockdowns: Countries pick tactics in ‘war’ against coronavirus (Q4185) (← links)
- NHS developing coronavirus contact tracking app (Q4186) (← links)
- Coronavirus : quand les Etats font pression pour utiliser les données personnelles (Q4188) (← links)
- "Utilisons les données télécom de tous les Belges pour stopper le coronavirus" (Q4189) (← links)
- Iran Launched an App That Claimed to Diagnose Coronavirus. Instead, It Collected Location Data on Millions of People (Q4190) (← links)
- Etat d’urgence sanitaire : les modifications adoptées par le Sénat en commission (Q4193) (← links)
- Facebook has a coronavirus problem. It's WhatsApp (Q4194) (← links)
- Archiving Information on the Novel Coronavirus (Q4195) (← links)
- Vodafone produces anonymous heat map to help Lombardy understand population movements (Q4197) (← links)
- Coronavirus, come funzionano il controllo delle celle e il tracciamento dei contagi. Il Garante: "Non bisogna improvvisare" - Intervista ad Antonello Soro (Q4198) (← links)
- Movement of visitors from high-risk areas to be tracked with mandatory sim and app (Q4200) (← links)
- Statement of the European Data Protection Board Chair on the processing of personal data in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4202) (← links)
- Personal data protection amid coronavirus: Key takeaways for businesses operating in China (Q4207) (← links)
- Covid-19: histoire d’une médiatisation (Q4208) (← links)
- Paraguay: Military will accompany police in enforcing restrictions on movement (Q4214) (← links)
- Berne pourrait utiliser les portables pour suivre les flux de populations (Q4217) (← links)
- Contre le virus, la tentation du pistage par smartphone (Q4222) (← links)
- We have taken the number of deaths from Wikipedia (Q4232) (← links)
- Yuval Noah Harari: the world after coronavirus (Q4235) (← links)
- COVID-19, Scientific Research and the GDPR – Some Basic Principles (Q4243) (← links)
- Statement by the GPA Executive Committee on the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic (Q4244) (← links)
- How the Virus Got Out (Q4246) (← links)
- Singapore launches TraceTogether mobile app to boost COVID-19 contact tracing efforts (Q4249) (← links)
- La méthode sud-coréenne face au coronavirus : traquer nos données personnelles pour sauver des vies… le pour et le contre (Q4250) (← links)
- Coronavirus (Covid-19) : les rappels de la CNIL sur la collecte de données personnelles | CNIL (Q4254) (← links)
- Data protection and limiting the spread of coronavirus (Q4255) (← links)
- Legal data protection framework for coronavirus containment (Q4256) (← links)
- Russian officials will track coronavirus patients' geolocation data to design a national warning system (Q4260) (← links)
- Phone location data could be used to help UK coronavirus effort (Q4261) (← links)
- UK coronavirus app 'must respect privacy rights' (Q4262) (← links)
- Open Letter: Contract Tracking and NHSX (Q4263) (← links)
- Two Steps Ahead of the Coronavirus (Q4266) (← links)
- A third of virus cases may be ‘silent carriers’, classified data suggests (Q4273) (← links)
- Die scheinbar stillgelegte Stadt: Bleiben die Zürcher jetzt wirklich zu Hause? (Q4276) (← links)
- An Official WHO Coronavirus App Will Be a “Waze for COVID-19” - IEEE Spectrum (Q4278) (← links)
- Health rating system deployed in over 100 cities: Alipay (Q4279) (← links)
- Covid-19 : après le confinement, l’inéluctable recul de nos libertés (Q4283) (← links)
- How South Korea Flattened the Curve (Q4284) (← links)
- 'Selfie app' to keep track of quarantined Poles (Q4285) (← links)
- Coronavirus Is Speeding Up the Amazonification of the Planet (Q4289) (← links)
- Swisscom aidera la Confédération à détecter les attroupements via les téléphones (Q4290) (← links)
- Effy Vayena: «Les crises de cette ampleur tendent un miroir à nos sociétés» (Q4297) (← links)
- COVID-19 Digital Rights Tracker (Q4307) (← links)
- Privacy fears as India hand stamps suspected coronavirus cases (Q4308) (← links)
- Moscow deploys facial recognition technology for coronavirus quarantine (Q4309) (← links)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4311) (← links)
- Swisscom nous épie pour le compte du Conseil fédéral (Q4312) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Mit Apps gegen die Pandemie? (Q4332) (← links)
- The Swiss federal government wants to use high-tech to fight the coronavirus (Q4340) (← links)
- Monitoring spread of COVID-19 (Q4353) (← links)
- Super-spreaders: what are they and how are they transmitting coronavirus? (Q4360) (← links)
- The Plague That Killed Athenian Democracy (Q4362) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Thierry Breton plaide pour une utilisation des données des opérateurs (Q4363) (← links)
- How the COVID Tracking Project fills the public health data gap (Q4364) (← links)
- Watchdog approves use of UK phone data to help fight coronavirus (Q4366) (← links)
- Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan (Q4368) (← links)
- Monitoring of COVID-19 via mobile data (Q4370) (← links)
- What You Should Know About Online Tools During the COVID-19 Crisis (Q4373) (← links)
- Apple announces COVID-19 website and app in partnership with CDC and the White House (Q4374) (← links)
- Simula is working with the Norwegian Institute of Public Health (Q4380) (← links)
- SARS-CoV-2 Tracking under GDPR (Q4383) (← links)
- Joint Statement on the right to data protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4384) (← links)
- The power of data in a pandemic - Technology in the NHS (Q4390) (← links)
- Lessons from Italy’s Response to Coronavirus (Q4394) (← links)
- New York Attorney General Looks Into Zoom’s Privacy Practices (Q4395) (← links)
- Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool (Q4410) (← links)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4412) (← links)
- Coronavirus pandemic sparks new calls for personal surveillance, and concerns (Q4417) (← links)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425) (← links)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426) (← links)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429) (← links)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430) (← links)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433) (← links)
- Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437) (← links)
- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438) (← links)
- Coronavirus : qu’est-ce que StopCovid, l’appli de traçage étudiée par le gouvernement ? (Q4440) (← links)
- « L’application StopCovid retracera l’historique des relations sociales » : les pistes du gouvernement pour le traçage numérique des malades (Q4441) (← links)
- Far-Right Extremists Helped Create The World's Most Powerful Facial Recognition Technology (Q4443) (← links)
- We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444) (← links)
- Intervention RTBF on contact tracing (Q4445) (← links)
- I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447) (← links)
- How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? (Q4448) (← links)
- Netherlands could be dealing with coronavirus pandemic for over 2 years: report (Q4449) (← links)
- Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450) (← links)
- Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology (Q4451) (← links)
- The long tail of contact tracing (Q4453) (← links)
- Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465) (← links)
- Bluetooth's Complexity Has Become a Security Risk (Q4466) (← links)
- Flattening the curve helps protect privacy, too (Q4468) (← links)
- Primer on Decentralized Contact Tracing (Q4470) (← links)
- Contre le Covid-19, les immenses défis et inconnues des applications mobiles de « suivi de contacts » (Q4475) (← links)
- The tech ‘solutions’ for coronavirus take the surveillance state to the next level (Q4478) (← links)
- Visible and vocal - Delivery apps have transformed urban life in China (Q4479) (← links)
- Covid ou la fabrique du consentement aveugle (Q4483) (← links)
- Contact-Tracing: Nur die staatliche App schafft Vertrauen (Q4485) (← links)
- Bluetooth tracking and COVID-19: A tech primer (Q4491) (← links)
- Ford Tests Buzzing Wristbands to Keep Workers at Safe Distances (Q4494) (← links)
- Germany launches smartwatch app to monitor coronavirus spread (Q4495) (← links)
- Testing, not tracing, is the privacy preserving response to COVID-19 (Q4496) (← links)
- Le Port d’Anvers teste l’utilisation d’un bracelet électronique pour endiguer la propagation du COVID-19 au sein de ses équipes (Q4497) (← links)
- The anti-corona technology still has its pitfalls (Q4498) (← links)
- Europe’s PEPP-PT COVID-19 contacts tracing standard push could be squaring up for a fight with Apple and Google (Q4499) (← links)
- development of EPFL's "Covid proximity tracing App" project is in line with data protection requirements. (Q4500) (← links)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4502) (← links)
- How to create a trustworthy COVID-19 tracking technology (Q4505) (← links)
- Le traçage anonyme, dangereux oxymore: Analyse de risques à destination des non-specialistes (Q4506) (← links)
- Scenario: effect of track&trace apps (Q4507) (← links)
- Rift Opens Over European Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps (Q4508) (← links)
- Why are there doubts over contact-tracing apps? (Q4509) (← links)
- Exit through the App Store?A rapid evidence review on the technical considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis (Q4511) (← links)
- Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515) (← links)
- NHS coronavirus app: memo discussed giving ministers power to 'de-anonymise' users (Q4522) (← links)
- Die Corona-Warn-App kommt – so kannst du sie schon jetzt ausprobieren (Q4525) (← links)
- Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data (Q4526) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Clear majority in Switzerland supports tracking infection chains via smartphone (Q4529) (← links)
- A European Contact-Tracing App Might Be More Privacy-Invading Than Apple and Google’s (Q4530) (← links)
- Technology Can Help Solve the Coronavirus Crisis If Government Steps Up (Q4532) (← links)
- Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537) (← links)
- How do you trace Covid-19 while respecting privacy? (Q4538) (← links)
- Le Conseil est favorable au principe de StopCOVID, en tant que brique d’une stratégie plus globale (Q4540) (← links)
- StopCovid est un projet désastreux piloté par des apprentis sorciers (Q4542) (← links)
- Délibération n° 2020-046 du 24 avril 2020 portant avis sur un projet d’application mobile dénommée « StopCovid » (Q4544) (← links)
- Test criteria and contact tracing. FAQs (Q4553) (← links)
- Coronavirus Tracking Apps Raise Questions About Bluetooth Security (Q4556) (← links)
- «Capture d’écrans» N°8 : StopCovid, la zizanie franco-française (Q4557) (← links)
- Apple and Google release sample code, UI and detailed policies for COVID-19 exposure-notification apps (Q4558) (← links)
- Inventor finds bluetooth unsuitable for corona app (Q4561) (← links)
- Fighting Covid-19 Shouldn't Mean Abandoning Human Rights (Q4565) (← links)
- Application StopCovid : solution scientifique ou calcul politique ? (Q4584) (← links)
- Covid-19 : pourquoi le « contact tracking » ne fonctionnera (probablement) pas (Q4585) (← links)
- Les chercheurs français mettent en garde contre les applications de traçage (Q4587) (← links)
- L’équipe-projet StopCovid démarre la publication du code source et de la documentation de l’application StopCovid | Inria (Q4591) (← links)
- Naomi Klein: How big tech plans to profit from the pandemic (Q4595) (← links)
- A Singapour, le traçage par app dégénère en surveillance de masse (Q4598) (← links)
- Op-Ed: Coronavirus tracing apps are coming. Here’s how they could reshape surveillance as we know it (Q4602) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4603) (← links)
- The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611) (← links)
- Sur Android, le StopCovid anglais demande l’accès à la localisation (mais promet de ne pas l’utiliser) (Q4613) (← links)
- Location needs to be enabled for Bluetooth Low Energy Scanning on Android 6.0 (Q4616) (← links)
- Opinion | In Stores, Secret Bluetooth Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move (Q4618) (← links)
- Critical Bluetooth Vulnerability in Android (CVE-2020-0022) – BlueFrag (Q4619) (← links)
- Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4620) (← links)
- ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625) (← links)
- The New United Nations Coronavirus Social Distancing App Doesn’t Even Work (Q4627) (← links)
- L'Europe plaide pour l'interopérabilité des « StopCovid » nationaux, ce que proposent Apple et Google (Q4633) (← links)
- How Facebook Could Use Giphy to Collect Your Data (Q4638) (← links)
- Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643) (← links)
- A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. (Q4645) (← links)
- Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646) (← links)
- Avec CopSonic, StopCovid pourrait bientôt intégrer les ultrasons (Q4648) (← links)
- CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650) (← links)
- L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651) (← links)
- Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652) (← links)
- NSW is unable to use Covidsafe app’s data for contact tracing (Q4653) (← links)
- Les ultrasons, nouveaux ennemis invisibles de la vie privée ? (Q4654) (← links)
- Your browser can pick up ultrasonic signals you can't hear, and that sounds like a privacy nightmare to some (Q4655) (← links)
- Inferring distance from Bluetooth signal strength: a deep dive (Q4660) (← links)
- Apple and Google’s covid-tracing tech has been released to 23 countries (Q4662) (← links)
- Les critiques contre l’application demeurent vives (Q4663) (← links)
- How did the Covidsafe app go from being vital to almost irrelevant? (Q4664) (← links)
- L’API de contact tracing d’Apple et Google est opérationnelle (Q4672) (← links)
- New Ultrasonic Contact-Tracing App Promises Better Accuracy Than Bluetooth Alternatives (Q4678) (← links)
- Why StopCOVID Fails as a Privacy-Preserving Design (Q4706) (← links)
- « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708) (← links)
- The 14 Features Any Ethical Covid-19 Contact Tracing Effort Should Incorporate (Q4717) (← links)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720) (← links)
- Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721) (← links)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724) (← links)
- L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725) (← links)
- Tinder: dans le ventre de l'appli (Q4729) (← links)
- Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746) (← links)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750) (← links)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751) (← links)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755) (← links)
- Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757) (← links)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758) (← links)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762) (← links)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764) (← links)
- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765) (← links)
- No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767) (← links)
- Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770) (← links)
- Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779) (← links)
- StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787) (← links)
- Andrew Yang's Data Dividend Isn't Radical, It's Useless (Q4791) (← links)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796) (← links)
- Malgré les apparences, SwissCovid fait face à une défiance massive (Q4800) (← links)
- Can you locate your location data? (Q4802) (← links)
- Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864) (← links)
- New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872) (← links)
- The great coronavirus-tracing apps mystery (Q4875) (← links)
- Data et RSE s'invitent dans les cursus (Q4887) (← links)
- Strip searches and ads: 10 tech and privacy hot spots for 2020 (Q4888) (← links)
- Privacy concerns pushing people to change online behavior, poll shows (Q4889) (← links)
- Cuando Google elimina tus datos pero no protege tu privacidad (Q4890) (← links)
- Facebook tarde à livrer les données promises aux scientifiques (Q4891) (← links)
- Des ténors du prétoire font le procès des algorithmes (Q4892) (← links)
- No way out as Big Brother is spying 24/7 on your digital life (Q4894) (← links)
- ‘The Great Hack’ expert warns that Facebook data-grabbing puts ‘power over people’ (Q4895) (← links)
- L’homme qui aimait «The Great Hack» (Q4896) (← links)
- The Great Hack: the film that goes behind the scenes of the Facebook data scandal (Q4897) (← links)
- Die verrückte Geschichte, wie die Schweiz zur (vielleicht) weltbesten Corona-Warn-App kam (Q4898) (← links)
- Apple and Google's Coronavirus Tracking Plan Is a Symptom of Their Power (Q4900) (← links)
- Des doutes sur la sécurité de SwissCovid, basée sur l'API d'Apple et Google (Q4901) (← links)
- Covid-19: the race to create privacy-focused contact tracing tools (Q4902) (← links)
- RSI interview on contact tracing app (Q4903) (← links)
- Non solo “Immuni”: le App anti-Covid in ritardo in tutta Europa (Q4904) (← links)
- Für Mathematiker ist Schweizer Tracing-App ein Fail (Q4909) (← links)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917) (← links)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919) (← links)
- Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924) (← links)
- MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944) (← links)
- Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)
- Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956) (← links)
- Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957) (← links)
- Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963) (← links)
- Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964) (← links)
- L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966) (← links)
- Traquer son ombre numérique (Q4999) (← links)
- Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004) (← links)
- The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025) (← links)
- La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029) (← links)
- How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043) (← links)
- Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044) (← links)
- Paul-Olivier Dehaye: 'Data governance should connect with individuals to have a global reach' (Q5045) (← links)
- «Reprendre le contrôle de nos données passera par un contre-pouvoir» (Q5046) (← links)
- Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056) (← links)
- How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057) (← links)
- Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058) (← links)
- Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060) (← links)
- Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069) (← links)
- Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072) (← links)
- Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073) (← links)
- Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082) (← links)
- Ce que WhatsApp révèle de la vulnérabilité de la protection des données en Suisse (Q5083) (← links)
- L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096) (← links)
- Facebook’s secret settlement on Cambridge Analytica gags UK data watchdog (Q5098) (← links)
- Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105) (← links)
- Wie viel verdient Google mit unseren Daten? (Q5114) (← links)
- Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130) (← links)
- Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147) (← links)
- (Q5179) (← links)
- 3D ECO - Deep fake et fake news: la parade des entreprises (Q5208) (← links)
- Control Creep: When the Data Always Travels, So Do the Harms (Q5209) (← links)
- Le casse-tête de la modération des réseaux sociaux (Q5214) (← links)
- Filling the gaps in the Mueller report:part one. Robert Mercer, the Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media (Q5216) (← links)
- La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237) (← links)
- Le site du groupe M3 rend nos données vulnérables (Q5252) (← links)
- La piattaforma per il test del Covid "spiffera" i dati personali: a rischio migliaia di assicurati (Q5253) (← links)
- Vie privée: comment savoir ce que les géants des données personnelles savent de vous (Q5264) (← links)
- Données personnelles : un outil pour les récupérer facilement auprès des entreprises (Q5280) (← links)
- E-commerce negotiations advance, delve deeper into data issues (Q5294) (← links)
- Très fortes réactions sur Facebook, Twitter et Linkedin suite au Cash sur les données personnelles (Q5311) (← links)
- Rencontres par affinités : «Sur ces sites, on suit aussi ce que l’appli et les algorithmes nous imposent» (Q5312) (← links)
- Features of using the SwissCovid app (Q5316) (← links)
- Entraîner des algorithmes sans dévoiler les données personnelles (Q5327) (← links)
- «Une application de rencontre peut ignorer nos préférences», notamment l’orientation sexuelle (Q5330) (← links)
- Les applications de rencontre n’ont pas le sens de l’orientation (Q5331) (← links)
- Pass sanitaire: la faille qui va provoquer une épidémie de fraudes (Q5339) (← links)
- How Private Is My VPN? (Q5373) (← links)
- Le grand débat - La vaccination devient-elle un critère de séduction? (Q5374) (← links)
- Comment Facebook pourrait encore étendre sa domination (Q5383) (← links)