Items without sitelinks
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Showing below up to 50 results starting with #971.
View (previous 50 | next 50) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)
- Guide to bluetooth security (Q4467)
- Bluetooth's Complexity Has Become a Security Risk (Q4466)
- Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465)
- Contact Tracing- Bluetooth Specification (authors:Apple- Google) (Q4464)
- SM-Covid-19 (Q4463)
- Stopcovid19 (Q4462)
- Analysis of DP3T: Between Scylla and Charybdis (Q4461)
- Opinion on the use of the mobile phone for surveillance needs (Q4460)
- Antonio Casilli (Q4459)
- Tracing mobile data in the fight against Covid-19 - Analysis of potentials and limits (Q4458)
- Radio distance is not spatial distance (Q4457)
- BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders (Q4456)
- covid19 civil society (Q4455)
- New York State Geolocation Tracking Ban - A10246 Bill Text (Q4454)
- The long tail of contact tracing (Q4453)
- A phased lift of control: a practical strategy to achieve herd immunity against Covid-19 at the country level (Q4452)
- Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology (Q4451)
- Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450)
- Netherlands could be dealing with coronavirus pandemic for over 2 years: report (Q4449)
- How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? (Q4448)
- I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447)
- Google Firebase (Q4446)
- Intervention RTBF on contact tracing (Q4445)
- We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444)
- Far-Right Extremists Helped Create The World's Most Powerful Facial Recognition Technology (Q4443)
- StopCovid (Q4442)
- « L’application StopCovid retracera l’historique des relations sociales » : les pistes du gouvernement pour le traçage numérique des malades (Q4441)
- Coronavirus : qu’est-ce que StopCovid, l’appli de traçage étudiée par le gouvernement ? (Q4440)
- Cocoa (Q4439)
- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438)
- Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437)
- Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436)
- HaMagen (Q4435)
- Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks (Q4434)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433)
- ProteGO Safe (Q4432)
- Data-driven approaches to assessing civil liberties impact of Covid-19 (Q4431)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429)
- Evgeny Morozov (Q4428)
- To save everything, click here: the folly of technological solutionism (Q4427)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425)
- WeTrace Philippines (Q4424)
- Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (Q4423)
- COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422)
- Iceland (Q4421)
- Rakning C-19 (Q4420)
- Protego (Q4419)
- Aarogya Setu (Q4418)