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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #971.

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  1. Guide to bluetooth security (Q4467)
  2. Bluetooth's Complexity Has Become a Security Risk (Q4466)
  3. Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465)
  4. Contact Tracing- Bluetooth Specification (authors:Apple- Google) (Q4464)
  5. SM-Covid-19 (Q4463)
  6. Stopcovid19 (Q4462)
  7. Analysis of DP3T: Between Scylla and Charybdis (Q4461)
  8. Opinion on the use of the mobile phone for surveillance needs (Q4460)
  9. Antonio Casilli (Q4459)
  10. Tracing mobile data in the fight against Covid-19 - Analysis of potentials and limits (Q4458)
  11. Radio distance is not spatial distance (Q4457)
  12. BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders (Q4456)
  13. covid19 civil society (Q4455)
  14. New York State Geolocation Tracking Ban - A10246 Bill Text (Q4454)
  15. The long tail of contact tracing (Q4453)
  16. A phased lift of control: a practical strategy to achieve herd immunity against Covid-19 at the country level (Q4452)
  17. Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology (Q4451)
  18. Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450)
  19. Netherlands could be dealing with coronavirus pandemic for over 2 years: report (Q4449)
  20. How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? (Q4448)
  21. I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447)
  22. Google Firebase (Q4446)
  23. Intervention RTBF on contact tracing (Q4445)
  24. We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444)
  25. Far-Right Extremists Helped Create The World's Most Powerful Facial Recognition Technology (Q4443)
  26. StopCovid (Q4442)
  27. « L’application StopCovid retracera l’historique des relations sociales » : les pistes du gouvernement pour le traçage numérique des malades (Q4441)
  28. Coronavirus : qu’est-ce que StopCovid, l’appli de traçage étudiée par le gouvernement ? (Q4440)
  29. Cocoa (Q4439)
  30. Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438)
  31. Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437)
  32. Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436)
  33. HaMagen (Q4435)
  34. Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks (Q4434)
  35. 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433)
  36. ProteGO Safe (Q4432)
  37. Data-driven approaches to assessing civil liberties impact of Covid-19 (Q4431)
  38. Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430)
  39. How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429)
  40. Evgeny Morozov (Q4428)
  41. To save everything, click here: the folly of technological solutionism (Q4427)
  42. Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426)
  43. Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425)
  44. WeTrace Philippines (Q4424)
  45. Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (Q4423)
  46. COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422)
  47. Iceland (Q4421)
  48. Rakning C-19 (Q4420)
  49. Protego (Q4419)
  50. Aarogya Setu (Q4418)

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