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  1. Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822)
  2. X-mode (Q4821)
  3. The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820)
  4. Dutch SAR study (Q4819)
  5. Karl Firston (Q4818)
  6. Bitmoji (Q4817)
  7. Snapchat (Q4816)
  8. Denmark (Q4815)
  9. Smitte|stop (Q4814)
  10. Contact Tracing: An Overview of Technologies and Cyber Risks (Q4813)
  11. Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812)
  12. COVID Tracker (Q4811)
  13. last active times (Q4810)
  14. registration time (Q4809)
  15. Tumblr (Q4808)
  16. Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807)
  17. Google assistant (Q4806)
  18. Siri (Q4805)
  19. virtual assistant (Q4804)
  20. Exploring Accidental Triggers of Smart Speakers (Q4803)
  21. Can you locate your location data? (Q4802)
  22. How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801)
  23. Malgré les apparences, SwissCovid fait face à une défiance massive (Q4800)
  24. SwissCovid Exposure Score Calculation (Q4799)
  25. Http toolkit (Q4798)
  26. Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797)
  27. Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796)
  28. Reliable Beacon Detection (Q4795)
  29. AltBeacon (Q4794)
  30. BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793)
  31. BLE calibration calculation (Q4792)
  32. Andrew Yang's Data Dividend Isn't Radical, It's Useless (Q4791)
  33. Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790)
  34. Ernst Hafen (Q4789)
  35. Towards Rawlsian ‘property-owning democracy’ through personal data platform cooperatives (Q4788)
  36. StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787)
  37. Android COVID-19 Tracing App Pairwise Attenuations: Calibration Needed (Q4786)
  38. Stephen Farrell (Q4785)
  39. Doug Leith (Q4784)
  40. Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783)
  41. A Coronavirus Contact Tracing App Replay Attack with Estimated Amplification Factors (Q4782)
  42. Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780)
  43. Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779)
  44. SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778)
  45. SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777)
  46. Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776)
  47. Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)
  48. GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774)
  49. Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773)
  50. Android permissions dataset (Q4772)

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