Pages that link to "Property:P110"
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The following pages link to concerns (P110):
Displayed 469 items.
View (previous 500 | next 500) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- Apple COVID-19 (Q4375) (← links)
- Bottom-up data Trusts: disturbing the ‘one size fits all’ approach to data governance (Q4376) (← links)
- WeTrace (Q4378) (← links)
- Projects using personal data to combat SARS-CoV-2 (Q4381) (← links)
- Surveillance responses to COVID19 (Q4382) (← links)
- SARS-CoV-2 Tracking under GDPR (Q4383) (← links)
- Joint Statement on the right to data protection in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4384) (← links)
- D'scover (Q4387) (← links)
- grippenet.ch (Q4389) (← links)
- The power of data in a pandemic - Technology in the NHS (Q4390) (← links)
- Rapport d’activités de l’Autorité de surveillance indépendante des activités de renseignement (AS-Rens) : potentiel d’amélioration du traitement des données par le Service de renseignement de la Confédération (SRC) (Q4392) (← links)
- The Role of Age Distribution and Family Structure on COVID-19 Dynamics: A Preliminary Modeling Assessment for Hubei and Lombardy (Q4393) (← links)
- Lessons from Italy’s Response to Coronavirus (Q4394) (← links)
- New York Attorney General Looks Into Zoom’s Privacy Practices (Q4395) (← links)
- I-am-Immune (Q4397) (← links)
- Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) (Q4399) (← links)
- Healthy Together (Q4400) (← links)
- Tracy (Q4401) (← links)
- ConTrace (Q4407) (← links)
- User Acceptance on mobile contact tracing app (Q4408) (← links)
- How does the public, across several countries, feel about an automatic contact tracing app to combat the spread of COVID-19? (Q4409) (← links)
- Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool (Q4410) (← links)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4412) (← links)
- Poland’s coronavirus app offers playbook for other governments (Q4413) (← links)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4414) (← links)
- Coronavirus pandemic sparks new calls for personal surveillance, and concerns (Q4417) (← links)
- Aarogya Setu (Q4418) (← links)
- Protego (Q4419) (← links)
- Rakning C-19 (Q4420) (← links)
- COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422) (← links)
- Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (Q4423) (← links)
- WeTrace Philippines (Q4424) (← links)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425) (← links)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426) (← links)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429) (← links)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430) (← links)
- Data-driven approaches to assessing civil liberties impact of Covid-19 (Q4431) (← links)
- ProteGO Safe (Q4432) (← links)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433) (← links)
- Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks (Q4434) (← links)
- HaMagen (Q4435) (← links)
- Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436) (← links)
- Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437) (← links)
- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438) (← links)
- Cocoa (Q4439) (← links)
- Coronavirus : qu’est-ce que StopCovid, l’appli de traçage étudiée par le gouvernement ? (Q4440) (← links)
- « L’application StopCovid retracera l’historique des relations sociales » : les pistes du gouvernement pour le traçage numérique des malades (Q4441) (← links)
- StopCovid (Q4442) (← links)
- Far-Right Extremists Helped Create The World's Most Powerful Facial Recognition Technology (Q4443) (← links)
- We must save privacy from privacy itself (Q4444) (← links)
- Intervention RTBF on contact tracing (Q4445) (← links)
- I saw the first results, and I thought, holy fuck, that timeline. (Q4447) (← links)
- How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course of the COVID-19 epidemic? (Q4448) (← links)
- Netherlands could be dealing with coronavirus pandemic for over 2 years: report (Q4449) (← links)
- Audition of the President of the Italian Data Protection Authority regarding use of new technologies and the Internet to counter the Covid-19 epidemiological emergency (Q4450) (← links)
- Apple and Google partner on COVID-19 contact tracing technology (Q4451) (← links)
- A phased lift of control: a practical strategy to achieve herd immunity against Covid-19 at the country level (Q4452) (← links)
- The long tail of contact tracing (Q4453) (← links)
- New York State Geolocation Tracking Ban - A10246 Bill Text (Q4454) (← links)
- covid19 civil society (Q4455) (← links)
- BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders (Q4456) (← links)
- Radio distance is not spatial distance (Q4457) (← links)
- Tracing mobile data in the fight against Covid-19 - Analysis of potentials and limits (Q4458) (← links)
- Opinion on the use of the mobile phone for surveillance needs (Q4460) (← links)
- Analysis of DP3T: Between Scylla and Charybdis (Q4461) (← links)
- Stopcovid19 (Q4462) (← links)
- SM-Covid-19 (Q4463) (← links)
- Contact Tracing- Bluetooth Specification (authors:Apple- Google) (Q4464) (← links)
- Automated contact tracing is not a coronavirus panacea (Q4465) (← links)
- Bluetooth's Complexity Has Become a Security Risk (Q4466) (← links)
- Guide to bluetooth security (Q4467) (← links)
- Flattening the curve helps protect privacy, too (Q4468) (← links)
- Give more data, awareness and control to individual citizens, and they will help COVID-19 containment (Q4469) (← links)
- Primer on Decentralized Contact Tracing (Q4470) (← links)
- NHS app (Q4471) (← links)
- Smittestopp (Q4472) (← links)
- eRouška (Q4473) (← links)
- DataWalk (Q4474) (← links)
- Contre le Covid-19, les immenses défis et inconnues des applications mobiles de « suivi de contacts » (Q4475) (← links)
- MahaKavach (Q4476) (← links)
- StopKorona! (Q4477) (← links)
- The tech ‘solutions’ for coronavirus take the surveillance state to the next level (Q4478) (← links)
- Visible and vocal - Delivery apps have transformed urban life in China (Q4479) (← links)
- Covid ou la fabrique du consentement aveugle (Q4483) (← links)
- Data Protection Impact Assessment for the Corona App (Q4484) (← links)
- Contact-Tracing: Nur die staatliche App schafft Vertrauen (Q4485) (← links)
- A European roadmap to lifting coronavirus containment measures (Q4486) (← links)
- ePrivacy Directive (Q4487) (← links)
- Immuni (Q4489) (← links)
- EDPB Letter concerning the European Commission's draft Guidance on apps supporting the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4490) (← links)
- Bluetooth tracking and COVID-19: A tech primer (Q4491) (← links)
- Corona-Datenspende (Q4492) (← links)
- Ford Tests Buzzing Wristbands to Keep Workers at Safe Distances (Q4494) (← links)
- Germany launches smartwatch app to monitor coronavirus spread (Q4495) (← links)
- Testing, not tracing, is the privacy preserving response to COVID-19 (Q4496) (← links)
- Le Port d’Anvers teste l’utilisation d’un bracelet électronique pour endiguer la propagation du COVID-19 au sein de ses équipes (Q4497) (← links)
- The anti-corona technology still has its pitfalls (Q4498) (← links)
- Europe’s PEPP-PT COVID-19 contacts tracing standard push could be squaring up for a fight with Apple and Google (Q4499) (← links)
- development of EPFL's "Covid proximity tracing App" project is in line with data protection requirements. (Q4500) (← links)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4502) (← links)
- Risks related to the StopCovid application (Q4503) (← links)
- ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol (Q4504) (← links)
- How to create a trustworthy COVID-19 tracking technology (Q4505) (← links)
- Le traçage anonyme, dangereux oxymore: Analyse de risques à destination des non-specialistes (Q4506) (← links)
- Scenario: effect of track&trace apps (Q4507) (← links)
- Rift Opens Over European Coronavirus Contact Tracing Apps (Q4508) (← links)
- Why are there doubts over contact-tracing apps? (Q4509) (← links)
- Copasir (Q4510) (← links)
- Exit through the App Store?A rapid evidence review on the technical considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis (Q4511) (← links)
- Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515) (← links)
- Bending Spoons (Q4517) (← links)
- SwissCovid (Q4518) (← links)
- Ubique (Q4519) (← links)
- NHS coronavirus app: memo discussed giving ministers power to 'de-anonymise' users (Q4522) (← links)
- Report: Red Cross "Corona App" reviewed by noyb (Q4523) (← links)
- Can one fairly incentivize the adoption of a digital contact tracing app? (Q4524) (← links)
- Die Corona-Warn-App kommt – so kannst du sie schon jetzt ausprobieren (Q4525) (← links)
- Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data (Q4526) (← links)
- Technology and Public Health Perspectives on Private Automated Contact Tracing (Q4527) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Clear majority in Switzerland supports tracking infection chains via smartphone (Q4529) (← links)
- A European Contact-Tracing App Might Be More Privacy-Invading Than Apple and Google’s (Q4530) (← links)
- Pj20 tracer (Q4531) (← links)
- Technology Can Help Solve the Coronavirus Crisis If Government Steps Up (Q4532) (← links)
- Tracking mobile devices to fight coronavirus (Q4533) (← links)
- COVID-19 Content Moderation Research Letter (Q4534) (← links)
- Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537) (← links)
- How do you trace Covid-19 while respecting privacy? (Q4538) (← links)
- Le Conseil est favorable au principe de StopCOVID, en tant que brique d’une stratégie plus globale (Q4540) (← links)
- Face-to-Face Proximity Estimation Using Bluetooth On Smartphones (Q4541) (← links)
- StopCovid est un projet désastreux piloté par des apprentis sorciers (Q4542) (← links)
- Délibération n° 2020-046 du 24 avril 2020 portant avis sur un projet d’application mobile dénommée « StopCovid » (Q4544) (← links)
- WeTrace -- A Privacy-preserving Mobile COVID-19 Tracing Approach and Application (Q4545) (← links)
- Joint Statement on Digital Contact Tracing (Q4547) (← links)
- Introductory remarks before the committee for European Affairs of the senate of the Republic of France - Wojciech Wiewiórowski (Q4550) (← links)
- Avis sur le suivi numérique des personnes (Q4552) (← links)
- Test criteria and contact tracing. FAQs (Q4553) (← links)
- Tracking Anonymized Bluetooth Devices (Q4554) (← links)
- Coronavirus Tracking Apps Raise Questions About Bluetooth Security (Q4556) (← links)
- «Capture d’écrans» N°8 : StopCovid, la zizanie franco-française (Q4557) (← links)
- Apple and Google release sample code, UI and detailed policies for COVID-19 exposure-notification apps (Q4558) (← links)
- 1point5 (Q4559) (← links)
- Why use Bluetooth for contact tracing? (Q4560) (← links)
- Inventor finds bluetooth unsuitable for corona app (Q4561) (← links)
- Fighting Covid-19 Shouldn't Mean Abandoning Human Rights (Q4565) (← links)
- Supplementary Written Evidence on COVID-19 Tracing Apps to the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Q4566) (← links)
- Pisarasi (Q4567) (← links)
- CovApp (Q4569) (← links)
- The Pronto-C2 Fully Decentralized Automatic Contact Tracing System (Q4571) (← links)
- Retour sur la série Westworld : du traçage à la programmation algorithmique des comportements individuels (Q4572) (← links)
- The Covid19Impact Survey: Assessing the Pulse of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Spain via 24 questions (Q4575) (← links)
- Application StopCovid : solution scientifique ou calcul politique ? (Q4584) (← links)
- Covid-19 : pourquoi le « contact tracking » ne fonctionnera (probablement) pas (Q4585) (← links)
- Les chercheurs français mettent en garde contre les applications de traçage (Q4587) (← links)
- Beyond R0 : Heterogeneity in secondary infections and probabilistic epidemic forecasting (Q4590) (← links)
- L’équipe-projet StopCovid démarre la publication du code source et de la documentation de l’application StopCovid | Inria (Q4591) (← links)
- Une pandémie à l’ère des technologies émergentes (Q4592) (← links)
- Naomi Klein: How big tech plans to profit from the pandemic (Q4595) (← links)
- The Practical Guide to Hacking Bluetooth Low Energy (Q4597) (← links)
- A Singapour, le traçage par app dégénère en surveillance de masse (Q4598) (← links)
- SafeEntry (Q4599) (← links)
- BLE contact tracing sniffer PoC (Q4601) (← links)
- Op-Ed: Coronavirus tracing apps are coming. Here’s how they could reshape surveillance as we know it (Q4602) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4603) (← links)
- Applications de suivi : traque-moi si tu peux (Q4607) (← links)
- Centralized or Decentralized? The Contact Tracing Dilemma (Q4608) (← links)
- The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609) (← links)
- Bluetooth vs Ultra-Wideband: which indoor location system? (Q4610) (← links)
- The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611) (← links)
- Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612) (← links)
- Sur Android, le StopCovid anglais demande l’accès à la localisation (mais promet de ne pas l’utiliser) (Q4613) (← links)
- Location needs to be enabled for Bluetooth Low Energy Scanning on Android 6.0 (Q4616) (← links)
- Bluetooth low energy overview (Q4617) (← links)
- Opinion | In Stores, Secret Bluetooth Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move (Q4618) (← links)
- Critical Bluetooth Vulnerability in Android (CVE-2020-0022) – BlueFrag (Q4619) (← links)
- Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4620) (← links)
- ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621) (← links)
- DESIRE: A Third Way for a European Exposure Notification System (Q4622) (← links)
- Ephemeral Bluetooth Identifier (Q4623) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625) (← links)
- The New United Nations Coronavirus Social Distancing App Doesn’t Even Work (Q4627) (← links)
- VírusRadar (Q4629) (← links)
- COVIDSafe (Q4630) (← links)
- NHS COVID-19 (Q4632) (← links)
- L'Europe plaide pour l'interopérabilité des « StopCovid » nationaux, ce que proposent Apple et Google (Q4633) (← links)
- COVID-19 tracing apps must not interfere with human rights (Q4634) (← links)
- Alerta Guate (Q4635) (← links)
- How Facebook Could Use Giphy to Collect Your Data (Q4638) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-App (Q4639) (← links)
- Etude de la sensibilité des citoyens au traçage numérique (Q4640) (← links)
- nRF Connect for Mobile (Q4641) (← links)
- Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642) (← links)
- Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643) (← links)
- A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. (Q4645) (← links)
- Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646) (← links)
- Avec CopSonic, StopCovid pourrait bientôt intégrer les ultrasons (Q4648) (← links)
- CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650) (← links)
- L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651) (← links)
- Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652) (← links)
- NSW is unable to use Covidsafe app’s data for contact tracing (Q4653) (← links)
- Les ultrasons, nouveaux ennemis invisibles de la vie privée ? (Q4654) (← links)
- Your browser can pick up ultrasonic signals you can't hear, and that sounds like a privacy nightmare to some (Q4655) (← links)
- Distance Estimation of Smart Device using Bluetooth (Q4656) (← links)
- Human interaction discovery in smartphone proximity networks (Q4657) (← links)
- Evaluating the Implications of Varying Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Transmission Power Levels on Wireless Indoor Localization Accuracy and Precision (Q4658) (← links)
- Apps for COVID: to do or not to do (Q4659) (← links)
- Inferring distance from Bluetooth signal strength: a deep dive (Q4660) (← links)
- Apple and Google’s covid-tracing tech has been released to 23 countries (Q4662) (← links)
- Les critiques contre l’application demeurent vives (Q4663) (← links)
- How did the Covidsafe app go from being vital to almost irrelevant? (Q4664) (← links)
- Care19 App (Q4666) (← links)
- Renee DiResta on Disinformation and COVID-19 (Q4668) (← links)
- Split Learning (Q4669) (← links)
- Coronavirus Contact Tracing: Evaluating The Potential Of Using Bluetooth Received SignalStrength For Proximity Detection (Q4671) (← links)
- L’API de contact tracing d’Apple et Google est opérationnelle (Q4672) (← links)
- Apturi Covid (Q4673) (← links)
- A BLE RSSI ranking based indoor positioning system for generic smartphones (Q4675) (← links)
- Briser la chaine (Q4676) (← links)
- New Ultrasonic Contact-Tracing App Promises Better Accuracy Than Bluetooth Alternatives (Q4678) (← links)
- Sonar-X (Q4679) (← links)
- Data for Policy Journal (Q4680) (← links)
- The Open Data Barometer (Q4682) (← links)
- CoronaRiskScoring (Q4684) (← links)
- Why StopCOVID Fails as a Privacy-Preserving Design (Q4706) (← links)
- « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708) (← links)
- E7mi (Q4709) (← links)
- Ehteraz (Q4711) (← links)
- BeAware Bahrain (Q4712) (← links)
- CoronApp (Q4714) (← links)
- Koronavilkku (Q4716) (← links)
- The 14 Features Any Ethical Covid-19 Contact Tracing Effort Should Incorporate (Q4717) (← links)
- An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718) (← links)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720) (← links)
- Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721) (← links)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724) (← links)
- L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725) (← links)
- Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728) (← links)
- TraceCovid (Q4730) (← links)
- Wiqaytna (Q4733) (← links)
- Ito (Q4735) (← links)
- Zostan Zdravy (Q4736) (← links)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737) (← links)
- contact tracing protocol (Q4738) (← links)
- DP3T - Exposure Score Calculation (Q4739) (← links)
- CovTracer (Q4740) (← links)
- Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741) (← links)
- SwissCovid Proximity Tracing System - Public Security Test (Q4743) (← links)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746) (← links)
- Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747) (← links)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748) (← links)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749) (← links)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751) (← links)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752) (← links)
- How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754) (← links)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755) (← links)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756) (← links)
- Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757) (← links)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758) (← links)
- COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759) (← links)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760) (← links)
- The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761) (← links)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762) (← links)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763) (← links)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764) (← links)
- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765) (← links)
- SciPol.org (Q4766) (← links)
- No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767) (← links)
- SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768) (← links)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769) (← links)
- Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770) (← links)
- Android permissions dataset (Q4772) (← links)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773) (← links)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774) (← links)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775) (← links)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776) (← links)
- SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777) (← links)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778) (← links)
- Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779) (← links)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780) (← links)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783) (← links)
- StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787) (← links)
- Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790) (← links)
- BLE calibration calculation (Q4792) (← links)
- BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793) (← links)
- AltBeacon (Q4794) (← links)
- Reliable Beacon Detection (Q4795) (← links)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796) (← links)
- Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797) (← links)
- SwissCovid Exposure Score Calculation (Q4799) (← links)
- Malgré les apparences, SwissCovid fait face à une défiance massive (Q4800) (← links)
- How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801) (← links)
- Exploring Accidental Triggers of Smart Speakers (Q4803) (← links)
- Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807) (← links)
- COVID Tracker (Q4811) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- Contact Tracing: An Overview of Technologies and Cyber Risks (Q4813) (← links)
- Smitte|stop (Q4814) (← links)
- The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- Coronavirus – SUS (Q4840) (← links)
- Beat Covid Gibraltar (Q4841) (← links)
- Stayaway Covid (Q4845) (← links)
- Tabaud (Q4847) (← links)
- Coronavirus UY (Q4849) (← links)
- Here are the countries using Google and Apple’s COVID-19 Contact Tracing API (Q4851) (← links)
- Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852) (← links)
- A research agenda for digital proximity tracing apps (Q4863) (← links)
- SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864) (← links)
- New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872) (← links)
- The Dark Side of SwissCovid (Q4873) (← links)
- SwissCovid élargit son filet (Q4874) (← links)
- The great coronavirus-tracing apps mystery (Q4875) (← links)
- Eins (Q4879) (← links)
- SwissCovid - méthodes d'estimation du nombre d'applications actives- Notes sur les méthodes de calcul (Q4881) (← links)
- Facebook tarde à livrer les données promises aux scientifiques (Q4891) (← links)
- Des ténors du prétoire font le procès des algorithmes (Q4892) (← links)
- ‘The Great Hack’ expert warns that Facebook data-grabbing puts ‘power over people’ (Q4895) (← links)
- L’homme qui aimait «The Great Hack» (Q4896) (← links)
- The Great Hack: the film that goes behind the scenes of the Facebook data scandal (Q4897) (← links)
- Die verrückte Geschichte, wie die Schweiz zur (vielleicht) weltbesten Corona-Warn-App kam (Q4898) (← links)
- Apple and Google's Coronavirus Tracking Plan Is a Symptom of Their Power (Q4900) (← links)
- Des doutes sur la sécurité de SwissCovid, basée sur l'API d'Apple et Google (Q4901) (← links)
- Covid-19: the race to create privacy-focused contact tracing tools (Q4902) (← links)
- RSI interview on contact tracing app (Q4903) (← links)
- Non solo “Immuni”: le App anti-Covid in ritardo in tutta Europa (Q4904) (← links)
- Ordinance on the Proximity Tracing System for the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus (Q4906) (← links)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracking (TACT) (Q4908) (← links)
- Für Mathematiker ist Schweizer Tracing-App ein Fail (Q4909) (← links)
- Hashomer – A Proposal for a Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth BasedContact Tracing Scheme for Hamagen (Q4913) (← links)
- Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914) (← links)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917) (← links)
- Instagram ID (P382) (← links)
- An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918) (← links)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919) (← links)
- Association nationale de vidéoprotection (Q4920) (← links)
- Jessica Pidoux, ou le mystère des algorithmes de Tinder (Q4923) (← links)
- Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924) (← links)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925) (← links)
- Cowidwise (Q4926) (← links)
- e-Tabib (Q4928) (← links)
- ViruSafe (Q4932) (← links)
- Stop COVID-19 (Q4933) (← links)
- Radar Covid (Q4934) (← links)
- Coronalert (Q4935) (← links)
- Corona Tracer BD (Q4937) (← links)
- Aman (Q4939) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940) (← links)
- PeduliLindungi (Q4941) (← links)
- NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943) (← links)
- MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944) (← links)
- OstaniZdrav (Q4945) (← links)
- Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)
- HOAI (Q4950) (← links)
- COVID alert (Q4951) (← links)
- StopCovid NI (Q4952) (← links)
- Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954) (← links)
- Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956) (← links)
- Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957) (← links)
- Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958) (← links)
- Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963) (← links)
- Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964) (← links)
- Protect Scotland (Q4965) (← links)
- L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966) (← links)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972) (← links)
- Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973) (← links)
- COVID Alert Malta (Q4974) (← links)
- Saqbol (Q4976) (← links)
- TraceTogether Token (Q4977) (← links)
- ASI (Q4978) (← links)
- Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980) (← links)
- Ma3an (Q4982) (← links)
- COVI-ID (Q4984) (← links)
- Contact tracing app laws in the EU (Q4990) (← links)
- Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994) (← links)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995) (← links)
- Doctolib (Q4998) (← links)
- Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004) (← links)
- MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006) (← links)
- Exo (Q5012) (← links)
- The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025) (← links)
- Jersey Covid alert (Q5027) (← links)
- La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029) (← links)
- PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030) (← links)
- Dii vdoma (Q5032) (← links)
- Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19 (Q5033) (← links)
- Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (Q5036) (← links)
- Health Passport Ireland (Q5037) (← links)
- COVID-Tech: the sinister consequences of immunity passports (Q5038) (← links)
- On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042) (← links)
- How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043) (← links)
- Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044) (← links)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051) (← links)
- Perils of Location Tracking? Personalized and Interpretable Privacy Preservation in Consumer Mobile Trajectories (Q5052) (← links)
- MobiAmbulance: Optimal Scheduling of Emergency Vehicles in Catastrophic Situations (Q5053) (← links)
- MobiRescue: Reinforcement Learning based RescueTeam Dispatching in a Flooding Disaster (Q5054) (← links)
- Applying Mobile Location Data to Improve Hurricane Evacuation Plans (Q5055) (← links)
- Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056) (← links)
- How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057) (← links)
- Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058) (← links)
- Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060) (← links)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067) (← links)
- Contact Tracing & Giant Data Collectors: A Journey from Utopia to Dystopia? (Q5068) (← links)
- Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069) (← links)
- Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071) (← links)
- Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072) (← links)
- Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073) (← links)
- Swiped: How dating apps harm marginalized communities (Q5080) (← links)
- Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094) (← links)
- ExpressVPN investigation into geolocation adtech (Q5095) (← links)
- L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096) (← links)
- X-Mode Controversy: Find Apps that Track Location Data (Q5099) (← links)
- “Out Of Control” – A Review Of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps (Q5101) (← links)
- Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102) (← links)
- Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105) (← links)
- Technology, Privacy, and User Opinions of COVID-19 Mobile Apps for Contact Tracing: Systematic Search and Content Analysis (Q5111) (← links)
- TikTok without filters (Q5113) (← links)
- Where You Go Matters: A Study on the Privacy Implications of Continuous Location Tracking (Q5115) (← links)
- Posmo (Q5122) (← links)
- An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125) (← links)
- Predicio (Q5126) (← links)
- Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130) (← links)
- Uber drivers v. Uber (transparency requests) (Q5131) (← links)
- Uber drivers v. Uber (deactivation) (Q5132) (← links)
- Ola drivers v. Ola Cabs (transparency requests) (Q5133) (← links)
- Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147) (← links)
- What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5148) (← links)
- GDPRhub (Q5152) (← links)
- Indigo (Q5162) (← links)
- Moventia (Q5163) (← links)
- mobility organizing authority (Q5193) (← links)
- Law LOM (Q5194) (← links)
- (Q5196) (← links)
- Control Creep: When the Data Always Travels, So Do the Harms (Q5209) (← links)
- Big Data and the Law: a holistic analysis based on a three-step approach – Mapping property-like rights, their exceptions and licensing practices (Q5210) (← links)
- Facebook Dating-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5224) (← links)
- Coffee Meets Bagel-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5225) (← links)
- Match.com-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5226) (← links)
- eHarmony-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5227) (← links)
- Christian mingle-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5228) (← links)
- Jdate-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5229) (← links)
- Bumble-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5230) (← links)
- HER-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5231) (← links)
- Hinge-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5232) (← links)
- La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237) (← links)
- Réseaux sociaux, avons-nous perdu le pouvoir? (Q5249) (← links)
- Algorithmic management and collective bargaining (Q5269) (← links)
- Solving the ‘Gig-saw’? Collective Rights and Platform Work (Q5271) (← links)
- health data PersonalData.IO investigation (Q5285) (← links)
- What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5293) (← links)
- E-commerce negotiations advance, delve deeper into data issues (Q5294) (← links)
- Organismes ayant désigné un(e) délégué(e) à la protection des données (DPD/DPO) (Q5300) (← links)
- COVID-19 Technology in the EU: A Bittersweet Victory for Human Rights? (Q5324) (← links)
- German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), January 2021 (Q5328) (← links)
- Facebook Dating and Facebook ad data (Q5329) (← links)
- Ostrom's Law: Property rights in the commons (Q5333) (← links)
- Ostrom, the Commons, and today's data economy (Q5334) (← links)
- Commons and cooperatives: A new governance of collective action (Q5338) (← links)
- Pass sanitaire: la faille qui va provoquer une épidémie de fraudes (Q5339) (← links)
- How Private Is My VPN? (Q5373) (← links)
- "UXP2 Dark Patterns" research group (Q5376) (← links)
- Open Terms Archive (Q5379) (← links)
- DataNeo (Q5382) (← links)
- Comment Facebook pourrait encore étendre sa domination (Q5383) (← links)
- Garbo (Q5384) (← links)
- Exercice collectif du droit d’accès LPD par les travailleuses et travailleurs de plateforme (Q5438) (← links)
- MITC Consulting (Q5453) (← links)