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Showing below up to 500 results starting with #51.
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- advertising and public relations company (Q5433)
- Havas Media Switzerland (Q5432)
- Blick (Q5431)
- Gloo (Q5430)
- Olivier Baude (Q5429)
- Huma-Num (Q5428)
- Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein (Q5427)
- buyers.json protocol (Q5426)
- vaccfree.love (Q5425)
- Unjected (Q5424)
- javascript library (Q5423)
- prebid.js (Q5422)
- AdRadar (Q5421)
- Evidon (Q5419)
- SourcePoint (Q5418)
- Didomi (Q5417)
- DeliFood (Q5416)
- MyTheresa (Q5415)
- swisscharge.ch (Q5414)
- evpass (Q5413)
- charging station app (Q5412)
- Chargemap (Q5411)
- MTV3 (Q5410)
- L’IQOS : un écran de fumée ? (Q5409)
- HestiaLabs and personaldata.io (Q5408)
- La protection des données personnelles (Q5407)
- postcode (Q5406)
- The Labour Party (Q5405)
- UK political party that had a data breach (Q5404)
- Quora (Q5403)
- Pinterest (Q5402)
- VK (Q5401)
- OK.ru (Q5400)
- WeChat (Q5399)
- bol.com (Q5398)
- RTBF (Q5397)
- postNL (Q5396)
- Stockmann (Q5395)
- Dating Privacy (Q5394)
- The Eyeballs (Q5393)
- Aamulehti (Q5392)
- Donkey Republic (Q5391)
- Book Beat (Q5390)
- IQOS (Q5389)
- Philipp Morris (Q5388)
- Facebook XCheck program (Q5387)
- content rules violation score (Q5386)
- Checkr (Q5385)
- Garbo (Q5384)
- Comment Facebook pourrait encore étendre sa domination (Q5383)
- DataNeo (Q5382)
- BlaBlaCar (Q5381)
- terms of service (Q5380)
- Open Terms Archive (Q5379)
- algorithmic audit (Q5378)
- French public authority "Pôle d'Expertise de la Régulation Numérique" (Q5377)
- "UXP2 Dark Patterns" research group (Q5376)
- Sciences Po Paris (Q5375)
- Le grand débat - La vaccination devient-elle un critère de séduction? (Q5374)
- How Private Is My VPN? (Q5373)
- SAS Scandinavian Airlines (Q5372)
- Nordic Regional Airlines (Q5371)
- Hesburger (Q5369)
- Wolt (Q5368)
- Foodora (Q5367)
- Etelä-Suomen Sanomat (Q5366)
- Ilkka-Pohjalainen (Q5365)
- Savon Sanomat (Q5364)
- Keskisuomalainen (Q5363)
- Ålandsbanken (Q5362)
- Aktia Bank (Q5361)
- St1 (Q5360)
- Nordnet bank (Q5359)
- Pivo (Q5357)
- MobilePay (Q5356)
- Turun Sanomat (Q5355)
- Lidl Finland (Q5354)
- DNA Oyj (Q5353)
- Hoop (Q5352)
- HSL (Q5351)
- Samocat (Q5350)
- Voi (Q5349)
- Lime (Q5348)
- Whim (Q5347)
- scooter rental service (Q5346)
- Tier (Q5345)
- VR Matkalla (Q5344)
- Iltalehti (Q5343)
- corrupt marketing (Q5342)
- ABC-mobiili (Q5340)
- Pass sanitaire: la faille qui va provoquer une épidémie de fraudes (Q5339)
- Commons and cooperatives: A new governance of collective action (Q5338)
- Data and Digital Intelligence Commons (Making a Case for their Community Ownership) (Q5337)
- The Value of Data (Q5336)
- metaverse (Q5335)
- Ostrom, the Commons, and today's data economy (Q5334)
- Ostrom's Law: Property rights in the commons (Q5333)
- Digital contact tracing apps: do they actually work? A review of early evidence (Q5332)
- Les applications de rencontre n’ont pas le sens de l’orientation (Q5331)
- «Une application de rencontre peut ignorer nos préférences», notamment l’orientation sexuelle (Q5330)
- Facebook Dating and Facebook ad data (Q5329)
- German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), January 2021 (Q5328)
- Entraîner des algorithmes sans dévoiler les données personnelles (Q5327)
- TOMP-API (Q5326)
- KargoBike (Q5325)
- COVID-19 Technology in the EU: A Bittersweet Victory for Human Rights? (Q5324)
- political tool (Q5323)
- ZeCible (Q5322)
- GenePartner (Q5321)
- DNA Romance (Q5320)
- Pithus : un projet pour analyser les dangers des applications Android (Q5319)
- La nouvelle guerre des étoiles (Q5317)
- Features of using the SwissCovid app (Q5316)
- Contrôle de nos données: quel est le rôle de Genève dans la gouvernance mondiale des données? (Q5315)
- Geneva Human Rights Talks (Q5314)
- Journée de la protection des données 2021 (Q5313)
- Rencontres par affinités : «Sur ces sites, on suit aussi ce que l’appli et les algorithmes nous imposent» (Q5312)
- Très fortes réactions sur Facebook, Twitter et Linkedin suite au Cash sur les données personnelles (Q5311)
- Regional elections in 2021 (Q5310)
- (Q5309)
- SelfContact (Q5308)
- NAF (Q5307)
- ISIC (Q5306)
- NACE (Q5305)
- Poligma (Q5304)
- Caisse primaire de l'assurance maladie du Bas-Rhin (Q5303)
- Caisse primaire de l'assurance maladie de Paris (Q5302)
- Caisse nationale de l'assurance maladie (Q5301)
- Organismes ayant désigné un(e) délégué(e) à la protection des données (DPD/DPO) (Q5300)
- Common Agricultural Policy (Q5299)
- Payments for Environmental Services (Q5298)
- Suez (Q5297)
- Orange (Q5296)
- Agdatahub (Q5295)
- E-commerce negotiations advance, delve deeper into data issues (Q5294)
- What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5293)
- Abuse of power: coordinated online harassment of Finnish government ministers (Q5292)
- participative investigation (Q5291)
- pharmaceutical company (Q5290)
- patient (Q5289)
- occupation (Q5288)
- pharmacist (Q5287)
- Resopharma (Q5286)
- health data PersonalData.IO investigation (Q5285)
- cooperative (Q5284)
- Pharmastat (Q5283)
- Euris (Q5282)
- Interhop (Q5281)
- Données personnelles : un outil pour les récupérer facilement auprès des entreprises (Q5280)
- Révision de la Loi sur la protection des données (Q5279)
- HarveyWalsh (Q5278)
- MediData (Q5277)
- contract research organization (Q5276)
- Navigo Agency (Q5275)
- passabene (Q5274)
- Exercice du droit d’accès aux données personnelles (Q5273)
- Privacy at the Margins (Q5272)
- Solving the ‘Gig-saw’? Collective Rights and Platform Work (Q5271)
- Art. 173 du Code pénal suisse (CP) : Délits contre l’honneur (Q5270)
- Algorithmic management and collective bargaining (Q5269)
- UAB Adnet (Q5268)
- Vinted (Q5267)
- AddApptr (Q5266)
- Nos données personnelles valent de l'or (Q5265)
- Vie privée: comment savoir ce que les géants des données personnelles savent de vous (Q5264)
- BFMTV (Q5263)
- OpenHealth (Q5262)
- AeroLeads (Q5261)
- Marmiton (Q5260)
- Ma grossesse Doctissimo (Q5259)
- IQVia (Q5258)
- Insure the box (Q5257)
- ryd (Q5256)
- telematics insurance (Q5255)
- datenauskunftsbegehren.ch (Q5254)
- La piattaforma per il test del Covid "spiffera" i dati personali: a rischio migliaia di assicurati (Q5253)
- Le site du groupe M3 rend nos données vulnérables (Q5252)
- HestiaLabs (Q5251)
- Autonomy and Meaning through Data Collaboratives (Q5250)
- Réseaux sociaux, avons-nous perdu le pouvoir? (Q5249)
- Kaspr (Q5248)
- Lusha (Q5247)
- contestation of the curb (Q5246)
- Roundtable on Socializing Data Value (Q5245)
- Dark Data: Why What You Don’t Know Matters (Q5244)
- (Q5243)
- list of blocked users (Q5242)
- UBP (Q5241)
- Mahandry Rambinintsoa (Q5240)
- Michael Platen (Q5239)
- Aequivalent SA (Q5238)
- La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237)
- Libération (Q5236)
- Arc Publishing (Q5235)
- Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Q5234)
- Action populaire (Q5233)
- Hinge-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5232)
- HER-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5231)
- Bumble-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5230)
- Jdate-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5229)
- Christian mingle-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5228)
- eHarmony-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5227)
- Match.com-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5226)
- Coffee Meets Bagel-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5225)
- Facebook Dating-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5224)
- Lovoo (Q5223)
- Mektoube (Q5222)
- Evermatch (Q5221)
- Mignonne (Q5220)
- eharmony (Q5219)
- Hily (Q5218)
- yoomee (Q5217)
- Filling the gaps in the Mueller report:part one. Robert Mercer, the Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media (Q5216)
- Schufa (Q5215)
- Le casse-tête de la modération des réseaux sociaux (Q5214)
- website builder (Q5213)
- Elementor (Q5212)
- Yaniv Benhamou (Q5211)
- Big Data and the Law: a holistic analysis based on a three-step approach – Mapping property-like rights, their exceptions and licensing practices (Q5210)
- Control Creep: When the Data Always Travels, So Do the Harms (Q5209)
- 3D ECO - Deep fake et fake news: la parade des entreprises (Q5208)
- real estate agency (Q5207)
- Foncia (Q5206)
- Omegle (Q5205)
- (Q5204)
- Optile (Q5203)
- bike station (Q5202)
- itineraries (Q5201)
- (Q5200)
- tariffs (Q5199)
- accessibility for people with disabilities (Q5198)
- timetables (Q5197)
- (Q5196)
- open data (Q5195)
- Law LOM (Q5194)
- mobility organizing authority (Q5193)
- Ile-de-France Mobilités (Q5192)
- Vianavigo (mobile app) (Q5191)
- Calypso Networks Association (Q5190)
- (Q5189)
- RFID chip (Q5188)
- Navigo (travel pass) (Q5187)
- Somupi (Q5186)
- distance travelled (Q5185)
- (Q5184)
- (Q5183)
- (Q5182)
- investment fund (Q5181)
- (Q5180)
- (Q5179)
- (Q5178)
- public procurement (Q5177)
- (Q5176)
- (Q5175)
- public service (Q5174)
- Brand (Q5173)
- (Q5172)
- (Q5171)
- Ile-de-france (Q5170)
- (Q5169)
- comité des usagers Vélib' (Q5168)
- (Q5167)
- (Q5166)
- (Q5165)
- (Q5164)
- Moventia (Q5163)
- Indigo (Q5162)
- consortium of companies (Q5161)
- (Q5160)
- (Q5159)
- Smovengo (Q5158)
- (Q5157)
- (Q5156)
- bike rental service (Q5155)
- Vélib' Métropole (Q5154)
- Etat d'urgence technologique (Q5153)
- GDPRhub (Q5152)
- Rocket Mountain (Q5151)
- Converto (Q5150)
- Le droit d'accès (Q5149)
- What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5148)
- Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147)
- Hornet (Q5146)
- Shaadi (Q5145)
- Inshallah (Q5144)
- Jdate (Q5142)
- Sparks networks (Q5141)
- Christian mingle (Q5140)
- Tesla dating (Q5139)
- Zoosk (Q5138)
- XO (Q5137)
- Pickable (Q5136)
- (Q5135)
- (Q5134)
- Ola drivers v. Ola Cabs (transparency requests) (Q5133)
- Uber drivers v. Uber (deactivation) (Q5132)
- Uber drivers v. Uber (transparency requests) (Q5131)
- Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130)
- Ola Cabs (Q5129)
- GDPR Article 22 (Q5128)
- Dispo (Q5127)
- Predicio (Q5126)
- An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125)
- Androguard (Q5124)
- Pithus (Q5123)
- Posmo (Q5122)
- Kantara Initiative (Q5121)
- User-Managed Access (Q5120)
- HEART WG (Q5119)
- HIE of One (Q5118)
- Dua.com (Q5117)
- MyData operator (Q5116)
- Where You Go Matters: A Study on the Privacy Implications of Continuous Location Tracking (Q5115)
- Wie viel verdient Google mit unseren Daten? (Q5114)
- TikTok without filters (Q5113)
- Sephora (Q5112)
- Technology, Privacy, and User Opinions of COVID-19 Mobile Apps for Contact Tracing: Systematic Search and Content Analysis (Q5111)
- Singles50 (Q5110)
- Nos belles années (Q5109)
- Google Adsense (Q5108)
- club 50 plus (Q5107)
- DisonsDemain - Site de rencontre pour les 50+ (Q5106)
- Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105)
- growth hacking (Q5104)
- Clubhouse (Q5103)
- Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102)
- “Out Of Control” – A Review Of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps (Q5101)
- X-Mode Controversy: Find Apps that Track Location Data (Q5099)
- Facebook’s secret settlement on Cambridge Analytica gags UK data watchdog (Q5098)
- L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096)
- ExpressVPN investigation into geolocation adtech (Q5095)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094)
- HUD (Q5093)
- waiter (Q5092)
- PLAY (Q5091)
- Rencontre coquine - Plan Cul (Q5090)
- Pure (Q5089)
- lovescout24 (Q5088)
- Fruitz (Q5087)
- (Q5086)
- (Q5085)
- Once (Q5084)
- Ce que WhatsApp révèle de la vulnérabilité de la protection des données en Suisse (Q5083)
- Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082)
- Swiped: How dating apps harm marginalized communities (Q5080)
- Photo Roulette (Q5079)
- Ingress (Q5078)
- Facebook Dating (Q5077)
- Cisco Meraki (Q5076)
- Digital Markets Act (Q5074)
- Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073)
- Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072)
- Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071)
- Digital Services Act (Q5070)
- Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069)
- Contact Tracing & Giant Data Collectors: A Journey from Utopia to Dystopia? (Q5068)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067)
- online dating application (Q5066)
- Veraset (Q5065)
- Ethos Fund (Q5064)
- Cambridge Analytica scandal: history and lessons (Q5063)
- APEC MyData Forum (Q5062)
- Les applications COVID-19: quels choix techniques pour des choix éthiques? (Q5061)
- Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060)
- Match.com (Q5059)
- Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058)
- How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057)
- Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056)
- Applying Mobile Location Data to Improve Hurricane Evacuation Plans (Q5055)
- MobiRescue: Reinforcement Learning based RescueTeam Dispatching in a Flooding Disaster (Q5054)
- MobiAmbulance: Optimal Scheduling of Emergency Vehicles in Catastrophic Situations (Q5053)
- Perils of Location Tracking? Personalized and Interpretable Privacy Preservation in Consumer Mobile Trajectories (Q5052)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051)
- «Reprendre le contrôle de nos données passera par un contre-pouvoir» (Q5046)
- Paul-Olivier Dehaye: 'Data governance should connect with individuals to have a global reach' (Q5045)
- Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044)
- How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043)
- On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042)
- Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2020 (Q5039)
- COVID-Tech: the sinister consequences of immunity passports (Q5038)
- Health Passport Ireland (Q5037)
- Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (Q5036)
- International Center for Journalists (Q5035)
- Hinge (Q5034)
- Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19 (Q5033)
- Dii vdoma (Q5032)
- Ukraine (Q5031)
- PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030)
- La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029)
- Jersey Covid alert (Q5027)
- Jersey (Q5026)
- The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025)
- (Q5024)
- (Q5023)
- (Q5022)
- (Q5021)
- electric vehicle (Q5020)
- (Q5019)
- (Q5018)
- (Q5017)
- (Q5016)
- electricity meter (Q5015)
- producer of electricity (Q5014)
- EDF (Q5013)
- Exo (Q5012)
- videoconferencing (Q5011)
- Workplace (Q5010)
- Omniture (Q5009)
- IMI Annual Event 2020 - Interview of Paul-Olivier Dehaye (Q5008)
- pCloud (Q5007)
- MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006)
- Human dynamics (Q5005)
- Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004)
- Engaged Journalism Accelerator (Q5003)
- Civic journalism (Q5002)
- Transports publics fribourgeois (Q5001)
- leboncoin (Q5000)
- Traquer son ombre numérique (Q4999)
- Doctolib (Q4998)
- SAR Doctolib (Q4997)
- Privacy is power: reclaiming democracy in the digital age. (Q4996)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995)
- Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994)
- Cyprus (Q4993)
- GDPR Article 9 (Q4992)
- GDPR Article 6 (Q4991)
- Contact tracing app laws in the EU (Q4990)
- Helping media fight misinformation and restore the public’s trust (Q4989)
- OASC (Q4988)
- working group (Q4987)
- MIM4 group in OASC (Q4986)
- Mobility Data Specification (Q4985)
- COVI-ID (Q4984)
- Lebanon (Q4983)
- Ma3an (Q4982)
- Georgia (Q4981)
- Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980)
- Ecuador (Q4979)
- ASI (Q4978)
- TraceTogether Token (Q4977)
- Saqbol (Q4976)
- Malta (Q4975)
- COVID Alert Malta (Q4974)
- Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972)
- L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966)
- Protect Scotland (Q4965)
- Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964)
- Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963)
- Alexa Internet (Q4962)
- Groupe Up (Q4961)
- Martin Vuagnoux (Q4960)
- Serge Vaudenay (Q4959)
- Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958)
- Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957)
- Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956)
- Yumuv (Q4955)
- Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954)
- Northern Ireland (Q4953)
- StopCovid NI (Q4952)
- COVID alert (Q4951)
- HOAI (Q4950)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948)
- Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947)
- Slovenia (Q4946)
- OstaniZdrav (Q4945)
- MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944)
- NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943)
- Indonesia (Q4942)
- PeduliLindungi (Q4941)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940)
- Aman (Q4939)
- Jordan (Q4938)
- Corona Tracer BD (Q4937)
- Bangladesh (Q4936)
- Coronalert (Q4935)
- Radar Covid (Q4934)
- Stop COVID-19 (Q4933)
- ViruSafe (Q4932)
- Republic of Azerbaijan (Q4929)
- e-Tabib (Q4928)
- Virginia (Q4927)
- Cowidwise (Q4926)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925)
- Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924)
- Jessica Pidoux, ou le mystère des algorithmes de Tinder (Q4923)
- Valais (Q4922)
- Loi sur l'information du public, la protection des données et l'archivage (Q4921)
- Association nationale de vidéoprotection (Q4920)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919)
- An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917)
- Ogury (Q4916)
- Face++ (Q4915)
- Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914)
- Hashomer – A Proposal for a Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth BasedContact Tracing Scheme for Hamagen (Q4913)
- Pixel de tracking (Q4911)
- A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet (Q4910)
- Für Mathematiker ist Schweizer Tracing-App ein Fail (Q4909)