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Showing below up to 250 results starting with #301.

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  1. (Q5178)
  2. public procurement (Q5177)
  3. (Q5176)
  4. (Q5175)
  5. public service (Q5174)
  6. Brand (Q5173)
  7. (Q5172)
  8. (Q5171)
  9. Ile-de-france (Q5170)
  10. (Q5169)
  11. comité des usagers Vélib' (Q5168)
  12. (Q5167)
  13. (Q5166)
  14. (Q5165)
  15. (Q5164)
  16. Moventia (Q5163)
  17. Indigo (Q5162)
  18. consortium of companies (Q5161)
  19. (Q5160)
  20. (Q5159)
  21. Smovengo (Q5158)
  22. (Q5157)
  23. (Q5156)
  24. bike rental service (Q5155)
  25. Vélib' Métropole (Q5154)
  26. Etat d'urgence technologique (Q5153)
  27. GDPRhub (Q5152)
  28. Rocket Mountain (Q5151)
  29. Converto (Q5150)
  30. Le droit d'accès (Q5149)
  31. What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5148)
  32. Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147)
  33. Hornet (Q5146)
  34. Shaadi (Q5145)
  35. Inshallah (Q5144)
  36. Jdate (Q5142)
  37. Sparks networks (Q5141)
  38. Christian mingle (Q5140)
  39. Tesla dating (Q5139)
  40. Zoosk (Q5138)
  41. XO (Q5137)
  42. Pickable (Q5136)
  43. (Q5135)
  44. (Q5134)
  45. Ola drivers v. Ola Cabs (transparency requests) (Q5133)
  46. Uber drivers v. Uber (deactivation) (Q5132)
  47. Uber drivers v. Uber (transparency requests) (Q5131)
  48. Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130)
  49. Ola Cabs (Q5129)
  50. GDPR Article 22 (Q5128)
  51. Dispo (Q5127)
  52. Predicio (Q5126)
  53. An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125)
  54. Androguard (Q5124)
  55. Pithus (Q5123)
  56. Posmo (Q5122)
  57. Kantara Initiative (Q5121)
  58. User-Managed Access (Q5120)
  59. HEART WG (Q5119)
  60. HIE of One (Q5118)
  61. Dua.com (Q5117)
  62. MyData operator (Q5116)
  63. Where You Go Matters: A Study on the Privacy Implications of Continuous Location Tracking (Q5115)
  64. Wie viel verdient Google mit unseren Daten? (Q5114)
  65. TikTok without filters (Q5113)
  66. Sephora (Q5112)
  67. Technology, Privacy, and User Opinions of COVID-19 Mobile Apps for Contact Tracing: Systematic Search and Content Analysis (Q5111)
  68. Singles50 (Q5110)
  69. Nos belles années (Q5109)
  70. Google Adsense (Q5108)
  71. club 50 plus (Q5107)
  72. DisonsDemain - Site de rencontre pour les 50+ (Q5106)
  73. Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105)
  74. growth hacking (Q5104)
  75. Clubhouse (Q5103)
  76. Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102)
  77. “Out Of Control” – A Review Of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps (Q5101)
  78. X-Mode Controversy: Find Apps that Track Location Data (Q5099)
  79. Facebook’s secret settlement on Cambridge Analytica gags UK data watchdog (Q5098)
  80. L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096)
  81. ExpressVPN investigation into geolocation adtech (Q5095)
  82. Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094)
  83. HUD (Q5093)
  84. waiter (Q5092)
  85. PLAY (Q5091)
  86. Rencontre coquine - Plan Cul (Q5090)
  87. Pure (Q5089)
  88. lovescout24 (Q5088)
  89. Fruitz (Q5087)
  90. (Q5086)
  91. (Q5085)
  92. Once (Q5084)
  93. Ce que WhatsApp révèle de la vulnérabilité de la protection des données en Suisse (Q5083)
  94. Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082)
  95. Swiped: How dating apps harm marginalized communities (Q5080)
  96. Photo Roulette (Q5079)
  97. Ingress (Q5078)
  98. Facebook Dating (Q5077)
  99. Cisco Meraki (Q5076)
  100. Digital Markets Act (Q5074)
  101. Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073)
  102. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072)
  103. Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071)
  104. Digital Services Act (Q5070)
  105. Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069)
  106. Contact Tracing & Giant Data Collectors: A Journey from Utopia to Dystopia? (Q5068)
  107. Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067)
  108. online dating application (Q5066)
  109. Veraset (Q5065)
  110. Ethos Fund (Q5064)
  111. Cambridge Analytica scandal: history and lessons (Q5063)
  112. APEC MyData Forum (Q5062)
  113. Les applications COVID-19: quels choix techniques pour des choix éthiques? (Q5061)
  114. Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060)
  115. Match.com (Q5059)
  116. Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058)
  117. How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057)
  118. Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056)
  119. Applying Mobile Location Data to Improve Hurricane Evacuation Plans (Q5055)
  120. MobiRescue: Reinforcement Learning based RescueTeam Dispatching in a Flooding Disaster (Q5054)
  121. MobiAmbulance: Optimal Scheduling of Emergency Vehicles in Catastrophic Situations (Q5053)
  122. Perils of Location Tracking? Personalized and Interpretable Privacy Preservation in Consumer Mobile Trajectories (Q5052)
  123. Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051)
  124. «Reprendre le contrôle de nos données passera par un contre-pouvoir» (Q5046)
  125. Paul-Olivier Dehaye: 'Data governance should connect with individuals to have a global reach' (Q5045)
  126. Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044)
  127. How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043)
  128. On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042)
  129. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2020 (Q5039)
  130. COVID-Tech: the sinister consequences of immunity passports (Q5038)
  131. Health Passport Ireland (Q5037)
  132. Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (Q5036)
  133. International Center for Journalists (Q5035)
  134. Hinge (Q5034)
  135. Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19 (Q5033)
  136. Dii vdoma (Q5032)
  137. Ukraine (Q5031)
  138. PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030)
  139. La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029)
  140. Jersey Covid alert (Q5027)
  141. Jersey (Q5026)
  142. The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025)
  143. (Q5024)
  144. (Q5023)
  145. (Q5022)
  146. (Q5021)
  147. electric vehicle (Q5020)
  148. (Q5019)
  149. (Q5018)
  150. (Q5017)
  151. (Q5016)
  152. electricity meter (Q5015)
  153. producer of electricity (Q5014)
  154. EDF (Q5013)
  155. Exo (Q5012)
  156. videoconferencing (Q5011)
  157. Workplace (Q5010)
  158. Omniture (Q5009)
  159. IMI Annual Event 2020 - Interview of Paul-Olivier Dehaye (Q5008)
  160. pCloud (Q5007)
  161. MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006)
  162. Human dynamics (Q5005)
  163. Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004)
  164. Engaged Journalism Accelerator (Q5003)
  165. Civic journalism (Q5002)
  166. Transports publics fribourgeois (Q5001)
  167. leboncoin (Q5000)
  168. Traquer son ombre numérique (Q4999)
  169. Doctolib (Q4998)
  170. SAR Doctolib (Q4997)
  171. Privacy is power: reclaiming democracy in the digital age. (Q4996)
  172. Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995)
  173. Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994)
  174. Cyprus (Q4993)
  175. GDPR Article 9 (Q4992)
  176. GDPR Article 6 (Q4991)
  177. Contact tracing app laws in the EU (Q4990)
  178. Helping media fight misinformation and restore the public’s trust (Q4989)
  179. OASC (Q4988)
  180. working group (Q4987)
  181. MIM4 group in OASC (Q4986)
  182. Mobility Data Specification (Q4985)
  183. COVI-ID (Q4984)
  184. Lebanon (Q4983)
  185. Ma3an (Q4982)
  186. Georgia (Q4981)
  187. Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980)
  188. Ecuador (Q4979)
  189. ASI (Q4978)
  190. TraceTogether Token (Q4977)
  191. Saqbol (Q4976)
  192. Malta (Q4975)
  193. COVID Alert Malta (Q4974)
  194. Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973)
  195. Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972)
  196. L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966)
  197. Protect Scotland (Q4965)
  198. Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964)
  199. Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963)
  200. Alexa Internet (Q4962)
  201. Groupe Up (Q4961)
  202. Martin Vuagnoux (Q4960)
  203. Serge Vaudenay (Q4959)
  204. Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958)
  205. Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957)
  206. Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956)
  207. Yumuv (Q4955)
  208. Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954)
  209. Northern Ireland (Q4953)
  210. StopCovid NI (Q4952)
  211. COVID alert (Q4951)
  212. HOAI (Q4950)
  213. Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949)
  214. "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948)
  215. Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947)
  216. Slovenia (Q4946)
  217. OstaniZdrav (Q4945)
  218. MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944)
  219. NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943)
  220. Indonesia (Q4942)
  221. PeduliLindungi (Q4941)
  222. Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940)
  223. Aman (Q4939)
  224. Jordan (Q4938)
  225. Corona Tracer BD (Q4937)
  226. Bangladesh (Q4936)
  227. Coronalert (Q4935)
  228. Radar Covid (Q4934)
  229. Stop COVID-19 (Q4933)
  230. ViruSafe (Q4932)
  231. Republic of Azerbaijan (Q4929)
  232. e-Tabib (Q4928)
  233. Virginia (Q4927)
  234. Cowidwise (Q4926)
  235. Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925)
  236. Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924)
  237. Jessica Pidoux, ou le mystère des algorithmes de Tinder (Q4923)
  238. Valais (Q4922)
  239. Loi sur l'information du public, la protection des données et l'archivage (Q4921)
  240. Association nationale de vidéoprotection (Q4920)
  241. Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919)
  242. An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918)
  243. How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917)
  244. Ogury (Q4916)
  245. Face++ (Q4915)
  246. Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914)
  247. Hashomer – A Proposal for a Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth BasedContact Tracing Scheme for Hamagen (Q4913)
  248. Pixel de tracking (Q4911)
  249. A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet (Q4910)
  250. Für Mathematiker ist Schweizer Tracing-App ein Fail (Q4909)

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