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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #671.
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- Android COVID-19 Tracing App Pairwise Attenuations: Calibration Needed (Q4786)
- Stephen Farrell (Q4785)
- Doug Leith (Q4784)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783)
- A Coronavirus Contact Tracing App Replay Attack with Estimated Amplification Factors (Q4782)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780)
- Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778)
- SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773)
- Android permissions dataset (Q4772)
- Joel Reardon (Q4771)
- Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769)
- SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768)
- No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767)
- SciPol.org (Q4766)
- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762)
- The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760)
- COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758)
- Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755)
- How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754)
- Android Advertising Identifier (Q4753)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748)
- Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747)
- Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745)
- happn (Q4744)
- SwissCovid Proximity Tracing System - Public Security Test (Q4743)
- Federal Office of Public Health (Q4742)
- Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741)
- CovTracer (Q4740)
- DP3T - Exposure Score Calculation (Q4739)
- contact tracing protocol (Q4738)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737)
- Zostan Zdravy (Q4736)