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- Swisscom analyses support the fight against coronavirus (Q4438)
- Protection des données dans le cadre de l’endiguement du coronavirus : L’accès de l’OFSP aux données visualisées de Swisscom est conforme au droit de la protection des données (Q4437)
- Anonymous Collocation Discovery: Harnessing Privacy to Tame the Coronavirus (Q4436)
- HaMagen (Q4435)
- Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 while Mitigating Privacy Risks (Q4434)
- 10 requirements for the evaluation of "Contact Tracing" apps (Q4433)
- ProteGO Safe (Q4432)
- Data-driven approaches to assessing civil liberties impact of Covid-19 (Q4431)
- Covid-19, le solutionnisme n’est pas la solution (Q4430)
- How PEPP-PT, a solution aiming at fighting COVID-19 through privacy-preserving proximity tracing, works (Q4429)
- Evgeny Morozov (Q4428)
- To save everything, click here: the folly of technological solutionism (Q4427)
- Experts warn of privacy risk as US uses GPS to fight coronavirus spread (Q4426)
- Call for more people to use contact-tracing app (Q4425)
- WeTrace Philippines (Q4424)
- Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (Q4423)
- COVID-19 Community Mobility Report for Switzerland (Q4422)
- Iceland (Q4421)
- Rakning C-19 (Q4420)
- Protego (Q4419)
- Aarogya Setu (Q4418)
- Coronavirus pandemic sparks new calls for personal surveillance, and concerns (Q4417)
- Evaluating COVID-19 contact tracing apps? Here are 8 privacy questions we think you should ask. (Q4414)
- Poland’s coronavirus app offers playbook for other governments (Q4413)
- A Closer Look at Location Data: Privacy and Pandemics (Q4412)
- UK's National Health Service (Q4411)
- Palantir in Talks With Germany, France for Virus-Fighting Tool (Q4410)
- How does the public, across several countries, feel about an automatic contact tracing app to combat the spread of COVID-19? (Q4409)
- User Acceptance on mobile contact tracing app (Q4408)
- ConTrace (Q4407)
- Bluetooth Low Energy (Q4406)
- Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (Q4405)
- Samia Hurst (Q4404)
- Contact Tracing Mobile Apps for COVID-19: Privacy Considerations and Related Trade-offs (Q4403)
- Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with digital contact tracing (Q4402)
- Tracy (Q4401)
- Healthy Together (Q4400)
- Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) (Q4399)
- Movesense (Q4398)
- I-am-Immune (Q4397)
- Personal data stores (Q4396)
- New York Attorney General Looks Into Zoom’s Privacy Practices (Q4395)
- Lessons from Italy’s Response to Coronavirus (Q4394)
- The Role of Age Distribution and Family Structure on COVID-19 Dynamics: A Preliminary Modeling Assessment for Hubei and Lombardy (Q4393)
- Rapport d’activités de l’Autorité de surveillance indépendante des activités de renseignement (AS-Rens) : potentiel d’amélioration du traitement des données par le Service de renseignement de la Confédération (SRC) (Q4392)
- Amazon Web Services (Q4391)
- The power of data in a pandemic - Technology in the NHS (Q4390)
- grippenet.ch (Q4389)
- Malaysia (Q4388)
- D'scover (Q4387)