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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #821.

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  1. NHS COVID-19 (Q4632)
  2. Isle of Wight (Q4631)
  3. COVIDSafe (Q4630)
  4. VírusRadar (Q4629)
  5. Abolish Silicon Valley: How to Liberate Technology from Capitalism (Q4628)
  6. The New United Nations Coronavirus Social Distancing App Doesn’t Even Work (Q4627)
  7. Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625)
  8. Ephemeral Bluetooth Identifier (Q4623)
  9. DESIRE: A Third Way for a European Exposure Notification System (Q4622)
  10. ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621)
  11. Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4620)
  12. Critical Bluetooth Vulnerability in Android (CVE-2020-0022) – BlueFrag (Q4619)
  13. Opinion | In Stores, Secret Bluetooth Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move (Q4618)
  14. Bluetooth low energy overview (Q4617)
  15. Location needs to be enabled for Bluetooth Low Energy Scanning on Android 6.0 (Q4616)
  16. Sur Android, le StopCovid anglais demande l’accès à la localisation (mais promet de ne pas l’utiliser) (Q4613)
  17. Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612)
  18. The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611)
  19. Bluetooth vs Ultra-Wideband: which indoor location system? (Q4610)
  20. The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609)
  21. Centralized or Decentralized? The Contact Tracing Dilemma (Q4608)
  22. Applications de suivi : traque-moi si tu peux (Q4607)
  23. facial coding (Q4606)
  24. Datakalab (Q4605)
  25. Amaelle Guiton (Q4604)
  26. Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4603)
  27. Op-Ed: Coronavirus tracing apps are coming. Here’s how they could reshape surveillance as we know it (Q4602)
  28. BLE contact tracing sniffer PoC (Q4601)
  29. SafeEntry (Q4599)
  30. A Singapour, le traçage par app dégénère en surveillance de masse (Q4598)
  31. The Practical Guide to Hacking Bluetooth Low Energy (Q4597)
  32. Bluetooth Low Energy Sniffer (Q4596)
  33. Naomi Klein: How big tech plans to profit from the pandemic (Q4595)
  34. Orestis Malaspinas (Q4594)
  35. Pandemic simulation (Q4593)
  36. Une pandémie à l’ère des technologies émergentes (Q4592)
  37. L’équipe-projet StopCovid démarre la publication du code source et de la documentation de l’application StopCovid | Inria (Q4591)
  38. Beyond R0 : Heterogeneity in secondary infections and probabilistic epidemic forecasting (Q4590)
  39. I-Louvain: An Attributed Graph Clustering Method (Q4589)
  40. When individual behaviour matters: homogeneous and network models in epidemiology (Q4588)
  41. Les chercheurs français mettent en garde contre les applications de traçage (Q4587)
  42. Covid-19 : pourquoi le « contact tracking » ne fonctionnera (probablement) pas (Q4585)
  43. Application StopCovid : solution scientifique ou calcul politique ? (Q4584)
  44. INRIA (Q4583)
  45. Rémi Petitpierre (Q4582)
  46. Mathematics of Epidemics on Networks: from Exact to Approximate Models (Q4581)
  47. Winfried Tilanus (Q4579)
  48. Miles Fahlman (Q4578)
  49. Nazeem Muhajarine (Q4577)
  50. Fast unfolding of communities in large networks (Q4576)

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