Items without sitelinks

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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #791.

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  1. Apple and Google’s covid-tracing tech has been released to 23 countries (Q4662)
  2. The Syllabus (Q4661)
  3. Inferring distance from Bluetooth signal strength: a deep dive (Q4660)
  4. Apps for COVID: to do or not to do (Q4659)
  5. Evaluating the Implications of Varying Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Transmission Power Levels on Wireless Indoor Localization Accuracy and Precision (Q4658)
  6. Human interaction discovery in smartphone proximity networks (Q4657)
  7. Distance Estimation of Smart Device using Bluetooth (Q4656)
  8. Your browser can pick up ultrasonic signals you can't hear, and that sounds like a privacy nightmare to some (Q4655)
  9. Les ultrasons, nouveaux ennemis invisibles de la vie privée ? (Q4654)
  10. NSW is unable to use Covidsafe app’s data for contact tracing (Q4653)
  11. Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652)
  12. L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651)
  13. CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650)
  14. NOVID (Q4649)
  15. Avec CopSonic, StopCovid pourrait bientôt intégrer les ultrasons (Q4648)
  16. Ultrasound (Q4647)
  17. Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646)
  18. A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking us. Now it’s time to keep track of them. (Q4645)
  19. Ethics of Digital Contact Tracing and COVID-19: Who Is (Not) Free to Go? (Q4644)
  20. Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643)
  21. Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642)
  22. nRF Connect for Mobile (Q4641)
  23. Etude de la sensibilité des citoyens au traçage numérique (Q4640)
  24. Corona-Warn-App (Q4639)
  25. How Facebook Could Use Giphy to Collect Your Data (Q4638)
  26. Giphy (Q4637)
  27. Guatemala (Q4636)
  28. Alerta Guate (Q4635)
  29. COVID-19 tracing apps must not interfere with human rights (Q4634)
  30. L'Europe plaide pour l'interopérabilité des « StopCovid » nationaux, ce que proposent Apple et Google (Q4633)
  31. NHS COVID-19 (Q4632)
  32. Isle of Wight (Q4631)
  33. COVIDSafe (Q4630)
  34. VírusRadar (Q4629)
  35. Abolish Silicon Valley: How to Liberate Technology from Capitalism (Q4628)
  36. The New United Nations Coronavirus Social Distancing App Doesn’t Even Work (Q4627)
  37. Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625)
  38. Ephemeral Bluetooth Identifier (Q4623)
  39. DESIRE: A Third Way for a European Exposure Notification System (Q4622)
  40. ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621)
  41. Guidelines 04/2020 on the use of location data and contact tracing tools in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak (Q4620)
  42. Critical Bluetooth Vulnerability in Android (CVE-2020-0022) – BlueFrag (Q4619)
  43. Opinion | In Stores, Secret Bluetooth Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move (Q4618)
  44. Bluetooth low energy overview (Q4617)
  45. Location needs to be enabled for Bluetooth Low Energy Scanning on Android 6.0 (Q4616)
  46. Sur Android, le StopCovid anglais demande l’accès à la localisation (mais promet de ne pas l’utiliser) (Q4613)
  47. Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612)
  48. The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611)
  49. Bluetooth vs Ultra-Wideband: which indoor location system? (Q4610)
  50. The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609)

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