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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #691.
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- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762)
- The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760)
- COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758)
- Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755)
- How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754)
- Android Advertising Identifier (Q4753)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748)
- Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747)
- Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745)
- happn (Q4744)
- SwissCovid Proximity Tracing System - Public Security Test (Q4743)
- Federal Office of Public Health (Q4742)
- Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741)
- CovTracer (Q4740)
- DP3T - Exposure Score Calculation (Q4739)
- contact tracing protocol (Q4738)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737)
- Zostan Zdravy (Q4736)
- Ito (Q4735)
- Morocco (Q4734)
- Wiqaytna (Q4733)
- Abu Dhabi Emirate (Q4732)
- Qatar (Q4731)
- TraceCovid (Q4730)
- Tinder: dans le ventre de l'appli (Q4729)
- Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728)
- EIT Digital (Q4726)
- L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724)
- Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720)
- Universally Unique IDentifier (Q4719)
- An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718)
- The 14 Features Any Ethical Covid-19 Contact Tracing Effort Should Incorporate (Q4717)
- Koronavilkku (Q4716)
- Columbia (Q4715)
- CoronApp (Q4714)
- Bahrain (Q4713)