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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #661.

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  1. Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797)
  2. Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796)
  3. Reliable Beacon Detection (Q4795)
  4. AltBeacon (Q4794)
  5. BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793)
  6. BLE calibration calculation (Q4792)
  7. Andrew Yang's Data Dividend Isn't Radical, It's Useless (Q4791)
  8. Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790)
  9. Ernst Hafen (Q4789)
  10. Towards Rawlsian ‘property-owning democracy’ through personal data platform cooperatives (Q4788)
  11. StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787)
  12. Android COVID-19 Tracing App Pairwise Attenuations: Calibration Needed (Q4786)
  13. Stephen Farrell (Q4785)
  14. Doug Leith (Q4784)
  15. Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783)
  16. A Coronavirus Contact Tracing App Replay Attack with Estimated Amplification Factors (Q4782)
  17. Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780)
  18. Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779)
  19. SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778)
  20. SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777)
  21. Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776)
  22. Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)
  23. GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774)
  24. Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773)
  25. Android permissions dataset (Q4772)
  26. Joel Reardon (Q4771)
  27. Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770)
  28. SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769)
  29. SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768)
  30. No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767)
  31. SciPol.org (Q4766)
  32. Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765)
  33. Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764)
  34. BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763)
  35. Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762)
  36. The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761)
  37. Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760)
  38. COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759)
  39. StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758)
  40. Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757)
  41. Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756)
  42. Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755)
  43. How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754)
  44. Android Advertising Identifier (Q4753)
  45. Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752)
  46. Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751)
  47. Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750)
  48. Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749)
  49. Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748)
  50. Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747)

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