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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #661.
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- Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796)
- Reliable Beacon Detection (Q4795)
- AltBeacon (Q4794)
- BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793)
- BLE calibration calculation (Q4792)
- Andrew Yang's Data Dividend Isn't Radical, It's Useless (Q4791)
- Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790)
- Ernst Hafen (Q4789)
- Towards Rawlsian ‘property-owning democracy’ through personal data platform cooperatives (Q4788)
- StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787)
- Android COVID-19 Tracing App Pairwise Attenuations: Calibration Needed (Q4786)
- Stephen Farrell (Q4785)
- Doug Leith (Q4784)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783)
- A Coronavirus Contact Tracing App Replay Attack with Estimated Amplification Factors (Q4782)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780)
- Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778)
- SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773)
- Android permissions dataset (Q4772)
- Joel Reardon (Q4771)
- Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769)
- SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768)
- No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767)
- SciPol.org (Q4766)
- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762)
- The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760)
- COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758)
- Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755)
- How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754)
- Android Advertising Identifier (Q4753)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748)
- Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747)