Pages that link to "Property:P203"
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The following pages link to quote (P203):
Displayed 100 items.
View (previous 100 | next 100) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- EDPB Letter concerning the European Commission's draft Guidance on apps supporting the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic (Q4490) (← links)
- Corona-Datenspende (Q4492) (← links)
- Germany launches smartwatch app to monitor coronavirus spread (Q4495) (← links)
- Testing, not tracing, is the privacy preserving response to COVID-19 (Q4496) (← links)
- development of EPFL's "Covid proximity tracing App" project is in line with data protection requirements. (Q4500) (← links)
- ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing protocol (Q4504) (← links)
- Exit through the App Store?A rapid evidence review on the technical considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis (Q4511) (← links)
- Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515) (← links)
- NHS coronavirus app: memo discussed giving ministers power to 'de-anonymise' users (Q4522) (← links)
- Bluetooth contact tracing needs bigger, better data (Q4526) (← links)
- Coronavirus: Clear majority in Switzerland supports tracking infection chains via smartphone (Q4529) (← links)
- Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537) (← links)
- Face-to-Face Proximity Estimation Using Bluetooth On Smartphones (Q4541) (← links)
- StopCovid est un projet désastreux piloté par des apprentis sorciers (Q4542) (← links)
- Délibération n° 2020-046 du 24 avril 2020 portant avis sur un projet d’application mobile dénommée « StopCovid » (Q4544) (← links)
- Introductory remarks before the committee for European Affairs of the senate of the Republic of France - Wojciech Wiewiórowski (Q4550) (← links)
- Avis sur le suivi numérique des personnes (Q4552) (← links)
- Test criteria and contact tracing. FAQs (Q4553) (← links)
- Tracking Anonymized Bluetooth Devices (Q4554) (← links)
- «Capture d’écrans» N°8 : StopCovid, la zizanie franco-française (Q4557) (← links)
- Why use Bluetooth for contact tracing? (Q4560) (← links)
- Inventor finds bluetooth unsuitable for corona app (Q4561) (← links)
- GDPR Article 35 (Q4570) (← links)
- The Pronto-C2 Fully Decentralized Automatic Contact Tracing System (Q4571) (← links)
- Une pandémie à l’ère des technologies émergentes (Q4592) (← links)
- Centralized or Decentralized? The Contact Tracing Dilemma (Q4608) (← links)
- The COVID19 APP Bluetooth tracing but not tracking? (Q4609) (← links)
- Bluetooth vs Ultra-Wideband: which indoor location system? (Q4610) (← links)
- The inventors of bluetooth say there could be problems using their tech for coronavirus contact tracing (Q4611) (← links)
- Swiss Proximitiy Tracing App (application Swiss PT): Q&A (Q4612) (← links)
- ACM Europe TPC Statement on Principles, Practices for COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q4621) (← links)
- Nearly 40% of Icelanders are using a covid app—and it hasn’t helped much (Q4625) (← links)
- How Facebook Could Use Giphy to Collect Your Data (Q4638) (← links)
- Corona-Warn-App (Q4639) (← links)
- Etude de la sensibilité des citoyens au traçage numérique (Q4640) (← links)
- Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642) (← links)
- Surveiller la surveillance: Olivier Tesquet, « Nous sommes dans un moment foucaldien de l’Histoire » (Q4643) (← links)
- Coronavirus : « Sur l’application StopCovid, il convient de sortir des postures dogmatiques » (Q4646) (← links)
- NOVID (Q4649) (← links)
- CMU Professor Creates Innovative App to Anonymously Trace Exposure to COVID-19 (Q4650) (← links)
- L'abracadabrantesque histoire de StopCovid (Q4651) (← links)
- Anonymous COVID-19 contact tracing using physical tokens (Q4652) (← links)
- Your browser can pick up ultrasonic signals you can't hear, and that sounds like a privacy nightmare to some (Q4655) (← links)
- Distance Estimation of Smart Device using Bluetooth (Q4656) (← links)
- Human interaction discovery in smartphone proximity networks (Q4657) (← links)
- Evaluating the Implications of Varying Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Transmission Power Levels on Wireless Indoor Localization Accuracy and Precision (Q4658) (← links)
- Apps for COVID: to do or not to do (Q4659) (← links)
- The Institutionalisation of Digital Public Health: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 App (Q4665) (← links)
- Nextdoor (Q4670) (← links)
- Coronavirus Contact Tracing: Evaluating The Potential Of Using Bluetooth Received SignalStrength For Proximity Detection (Q4671) (← links)
- A BLE RSSI ranking based indoor positioning system for generic smartphones (Q4675) (← links)
- « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708) (← links)
- E7mi (Q4709) (← links)
- Ehteraz (Q4711) (← links)
- An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718) (← links)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720) (← links)
- Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721) (← links)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724) (← links)
- L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725) (← links)
- Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728) (← links)
- TraceCovid (Q4730) (← links)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737) (← links)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745) (← links)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748) (← links)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749) (← links)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752) (← links)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756) (← links)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758) (← links)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760) (← links)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763) (← links)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769) (← links)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773) (← links)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774) (← links)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775) (← links)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778) (← links)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780) (← links)
- BLE calibration calculation (Q4792) (← links)
- BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793) (← links)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796) (← links)
- Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797) (← links)
- How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801) (← links)
- Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852) (← links)
- A research agenda for digital proximity tracing apps (Q4863) (← links)
- SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864) (← links)
- New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872) (← links)
- SwissCovid - méthodes d'estimation du nombre d'applications actives- Notes sur les méthodes de calcul (Q4881) (← links)
- Cuando Google elimina tus datos pero no protege tu privacidad (Q4890) (← links)
- Ordinance on the Proximity Tracing System for the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus (Q4906) (← links)
- A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet (Q4910) (← links)
- Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914) (← links)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917) (← links)
- An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918) (← links)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919) (← links)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)