Pages that link to "Property:P110"
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The following pages link to concerns (P110):
Displayed 219 items.
View (previous 500 | next 500) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749) (← links)
- Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751) (← links)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752) (← links)
- How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754) (← links)
- Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755) (← links)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756) (← links)
- Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757) (← links)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758) (← links)
- COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759) (← links)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760) (← links)
- The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761) (← links)
- Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762) (← links)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763) (← links)
- Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764) (← links)
- Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765) (← links)
- SciPol.org (Q4766) (← links)
- No, coronavirus apps don’t need 60% adoption to be effective (Q4767) (← links)
- SwissCovid: a critical analysis of risk assessment by Swiss authorities (Q4768) (← links)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769) (← links)
- Intervention SRF on security of SwissCovid (Q4770) (← links)
- Android permissions dataset (Q4772) (← links)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773) (← links)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774) (← links)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775) (← links)
- Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidé-mies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4776) (← links)
- SwissCovid app: Replay attacks and AEM-tampering (Q4777) (← links)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778) (← links)
- Coronavirus: What went wrong with the UK's contact tracing app? (Q4779) (← links)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780) (← links)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracing (TACT) (Q4783) (← links)
- StopCovid : 1,8 million d'activations, 14 notifications de contact à risque (Q4787) (← links)
- Covid Notions: Towards Formal Definitions – and Documented Understanding – of Privacy Goals and Claimed Protection in Proximity-Tracing Services (Q4790) (← links)
- BLE calibration calculation (Q4792) (← links)
- BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793) (← links)
- AltBeacon (Q4794) (← links)
- Reliable Beacon Detection (Q4795) (← links)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796) (← links)
- Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797) (← links)
- SwissCovid Exposure Score Calculation (Q4799) (← links)
- Malgré les apparences, SwissCovid fait face à une défiance massive (Q4800) (← links)
- How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801) (← links)
- Exploring Accidental Triggers of Smart Speakers (Q4803) (← links)
- Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807) (← links)
- COVID Tracker (Q4811) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- Contact Tracing: An Overview of Technologies and Cyber Risks (Q4813) (← links)
- Smitte|stop (Q4814) (← links)
- The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- Coronavirus – SUS (Q4840) (← links)
- Beat Covid Gibraltar (Q4841) (← links)
- Stayaway Covid (Q4845) (← links)
- Tabaud (Q4847) (← links)
- Coronavirus UY (Q4849) (← links)
- Here are the countries using Google and Apple’s COVID-19 Contact Tracing API (Q4851) (← links)
- Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852) (← links)
- A research agenda for digital proximity tracing apps (Q4863) (← links)
- SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864) (← links)
- New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872) (← links)
- The Dark Side of SwissCovid (Q4873) (← links)
- SwissCovid élargit son filet (Q4874) (← links)
- The great coronavirus-tracing apps mystery (Q4875) (← links)
- Eins (Q4879) (← links)
- SwissCovid - méthodes d'estimation du nombre d'applications actives- Notes sur les méthodes de calcul (Q4881) (← links)
- Facebook tarde à livrer les données promises aux scientifiques (Q4891) (← links)
- Des ténors du prétoire font le procès des algorithmes (Q4892) (← links)
- ‘The Great Hack’ expert warns that Facebook data-grabbing puts ‘power over people’ (Q4895) (← links)
- L’homme qui aimait «The Great Hack» (Q4896) (← links)
- The Great Hack: the film that goes behind the scenes of the Facebook data scandal (Q4897) (← links)
- Die verrückte Geschichte, wie die Schweiz zur (vielleicht) weltbesten Corona-Warn-App kam (Q4898) (← links)
- Apple and Google's Coronavirus Tracking Plan Is a Symptom of Their Power (Q4900) (← links)
- Des doutes sur la sécurité de SwissCovid, basée sur l'API d'Apple et Google (Q4901) (← links)
- Covid-19: the race to create privacy-focused contact tracing tools (Q4902) (← links)
- RSI interview on contact tracing app (Q4903) (← links)
- Non solo “Immuni”: le App anti-Covid in ritardo in tutta Europa (Q4904) (← links)
- Ordinance on the Proximity Tracing System for the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus (Q4906) (← links)
- Testing Apps for COVID-19 Tracking (TACT) (Q4908) (← links)
- Für Mathematiker ist Schweizer Tracing-App ein Fail (Q4909) (← links)
- Hashomer – A Proposal for a Privacy-Preserving Bluetooth BasedContact Tracing Scheme for Hamagen (Q4913) (← links)
- Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914) (← links)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917) (← links)
- Instagram ID (P382) (← links)
- An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918) (← links)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919) (← links)
- Association nationale de vidéoprotection (Q4920) (← links)
- Jessica Pidoux, ou le mystère des algorithmes de Tinder (Q4923) (← links)
- Are they any use? With Europe's black-box coronavirus apps it's hard to tell (Q4924) (← links)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925) (← links)
- Cowidwise (Q4926) (← links)
- e-Tabib (Q4928) (← links)
- ViruSafe (Q4932) (← links)
- Stop COVID-19 (Q4933) (← links)
- Radar Covid (Q4934) (← links)
- Coronalert (Q4935) (← links)
- Corona Tracer BD (Q4937) (← links)
- Aman (Q4939) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940) (← links)
- PeduliLindungi (Q4941) (← links)
- NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943) (← links)
- MedTech Fitbit posts early findings showing its trackers can identify cases of COVID-19 before symptoms take hold (Q4944) (← links)
- OstaniZdrav (Q4945) (← links)
- Cellphone Data Shows How Las Vegas Is “Gambling With Lives” Across the Country (Q4947) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)
- HOAI (Q4950) (← links)
- COVID alert (Q4951) (← links)
- StopCovid NI (Q4952) (← links)
- Exposure Notification System May Allow for Large-Scale Voter Suppression (Q4954) (← links)
- Consentement : le pire de l'expérience utilisateur et de la surveillance avec Lemonde.fr (Q4956) (← links)
- Covid-tracing Framework Privacy Busted By Bluetooth (Q4957) (← links)
- Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958) (← links)
- Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963) (← links)
- Global Data Governance Part Two: Evolving Government Data Collection Practices (Q4964) (← links)
- Protect Scotland (Q4965) (← links)
- L’application SwissCovid, vraiment utile ? (Q4966) (← links)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972) (← links)
- Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973) (← links)
- COVID Alert Malta (Q4974) (← links)
- Saqbol (Q4976) (← links)
- TraceTogether Token (Q4977) (← links)
- ASI (Q4978) (← links)
- Stop Covid - ერთად ვებრძოლოთ ინფექციას (Q4980) (← links)
- Ma3an (Q4982) (← links)
- COVI-ID (Q4984) (← links)
- Contact tracing app laws in the EU (Q4990) (← links)
- Response to ‘Analysis of DP3T:Between Scylla and Charybdis’ (Q4994) (← links)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q4995) (← links)
- Doctolib (Q4998) (← links)
- Les quatre failles qui continuent de miner SwissCovid. (Q5004) (← links)
- MIT COVID-19 Indoor Safety Guideline (Q5006) (← links)
- Exo (Q5012) (← links)
- The pandemic, contact tracing and cargo cults (Q5025) (← links)
- Jersey Covid alert (Q5027) (← links)
- La forteresse du Big Data: quel(s) impact(s) sur notre souveraineté collective? (Q5029) (← links)
- PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030) (← links)
- Dii vdoma (Q5032) (← links)
- Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19 (Q5033) (← links)
- Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (Q5036) (← links)
- Health Passport Ireland (Q5037) (← links)
- COVID-Tech: the sinister consequences of immunity passports (Q5038) (← links)
- On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042) (← links)
- How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043) (← links)
- Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044) (← links)
- Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051) (← links)
- Perils of Location Tracking? Personalized and Interpretable Privacy Preservation in Consumer Mobile Trajectories (Q5052) (← links)
- MobiAmbulance: Optimal Scheduling of Emergency Vehicles in Catastrophic Situations (Q5053) (← links)
- MobiRescue: Reinforcement Learning based RescueTeam Dispatching in a Flooding Disaster (Q5054) (← links)
- Applying Mobile Location Data to Improve Hurricane Evacuation Plans (Q5055) (← links)
- Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056) (← links)
- How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057) (← links)
- Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058) (← links)
- Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060) (← links)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067) (← links)
- Contact Tracing & Giant Data Collectors: A Journey from Utopia to Dystopia? (Q5068) (← links)
- Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069) (← links)
- Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071) (← links)
- Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072) (← links)
- Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073) (← links)
- Swiped: How dating apps harm marginalized communities (Q5080) (← links)
- Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094) (← links)
- ExpressVPN investigation into geolocation adtech (Q5095) (← links)
- L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096) (← links)
- X-Mode Controversy: Find Apps that Track Location Data (Q5099) (← links)
- “Out Of Control” – A Review Of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps (Q5101) (← links)
- Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102) (← links)
- Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105) (← links)
- Technology, Privacy, and User Opinions of COVID-19 Mobile Apps for Contact Tracing: Systematic Search and Content Analysis (Q5111) (← links)
- TikTok without filters (Q5113) (← links)
- Where You Go Matters: A Study on the Privacy Implications of Continuous Location Tracking (Q5115) (← links)
- Posmo (Q5122) (← links)
- An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125) (← links)
- Predicio (Q5126) (← links)
- Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130) (← links)
- Uber drivers v. Uber (transparency requests) (Q5131) (← links)
- Uber drivers v. Uber (deactivation) (Q5132) (← links)
- Ola drivers v. Ola Cabs (transparency requests) (Q5133) (← links)
- Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147) (← links)
- What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5148) (← links)
- GDPRhub (Q5152) (← links)
- Indigo (Q5162) (← links)
- Moventia (Q5163) (← links)
- mobility organizing authority (Q5193) (← links)
- Law LOM (Q5194) (← links)
- (Q5196) (← links)
- Control Creep: When the Data Always Travels, So Do the Harms (Q5209) (← links)
- Big Data and the Law: a holistic analysis based on a three-step approach – Mapping property-like rights, their exceptions and licensing practices (Q5210) (← links)
- Facebook Dating-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5224) (← links)
- Coffee Meets Bagel-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5225) (← links)
- Match.com-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5226) (← links)
- eHarmony-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5227) (← links)
- Christian mingle-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5228) (← links)
- Jdate-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5229) (← links)
- Bumble-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5230) (← links)
- HER-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5231) (← links)
- Hinge-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5232) (← links)
- La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237) (← links)
- Réseaux sociaux, avons-nous perdu le pouvoir? (Q5249) (← links)
- Algorithmic management and collective bargaining (Q5269) (← links)
- Solving the ‘Gig-saw’? Collective Rights and Platform Work (Q5271) (← links)
- health data PersonalData.IO investigation (Q5285) (← links)
- What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5293) (← links)
- E-commerce negotiations advance, delve deeper into data issues (Q5294) (← links)
- Organismes ayant désigné un(e) délégué(e) à la protection des données (DPD/DPO) (Q5300) (← links)
- COVID-19 Technology in the EU: A Bittersweet Victory for Human Rights? (Q5324) (← links)
- German Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC), January 2021 (Q5328) (← links)
- Facebook Dating and Facebook ad data (Q5329) (← links)
- Ostrom's Law: Property rights in the commons (Q5333) (← links)
- Ostrom, the Commons, and today's data economy (Q5334) (← links)
- Commons and cooperatives: A new governance of collective action (Q5338) (← links)
- Pass sanitaire: la faille qui va provoquer une épidémie de fraudes (Q5339) (← links)
- How Private Is My VPN? (Q5373) (← links)
- "UXP2 Dark Patterns" research group (Q5376) (← links)
- Open Terms Archive (Q5379) (← links)
- DataNeo (Q5382) (← links)
- Comment Facebook pourrait encore étendre sa domination (Q5383) (← links)
- Garbo (Q5384) (← links)
- Exercice collectif du droit d’accès LPD par les travailleuses et travailleurs de plateforme (Q5438) (← links)
- MITC Consulting (Q5453) (← links)