Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective (Q4642)

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journal article from 'Nature' published in May 2020
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Show evidence that apps for COVID-19 contact-tracing are secure and effective
journal article from 'Nature' published in May 2020

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    Much attention has also been paid to Singapore's app, which now has more than one million users — roughly one-fifth of the population. But it still means that in any encounter between two randomly chosen people, there is only a 4% chance that both will have the app.
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    Speed is, of course, of the essence — but so is due diligence and due process. This includes public dialogue; more involvement from researchers, including those who study ethics, law and public engagement; and a cast-iron commitment from governments that the information being harvested is secure and will only ever be used for the reasons it is being requested.
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    It’s not that digital contact tracing shouldn’t be done, but it should not be a substitute for human contact-tracing teams; nor should it be seen as a replacement for necessary COVID-19 testing.
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    May 2020
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