Contact Tracing in the Real World (Q4537)
Revision as of 19:36, 24 April 2020 by Genferei (talk | contribs) (Changed claim: Property:P203: 1-it isn’t anonymous 2-contact tracers have access to all sorts of other data such as public transport ticketing and credit-card record 3 -you can’t wait for diagnoses 4-public health authorities need geographical data for purposes other than contact tracing 5- human aspect 6-Bluetooth also goes through plasterboard 7- decentralised systems are all very nice in theory but too hard to update.)
blog post published on April 2020
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Contact Tracing in the Real World
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blog post published on April 2020
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Statements
1-it isn’t anonymous 2-contact tracers have access to all sorts of other data such as public transport ticketing and credit-card record 3 -you can’t wait for diagnoses 4-public health authorities need geographical data for purposes other than contact tracing 5- human aspect 6-Bluetooth also goes through plasterboard 7- decentralised systems are all very nice in theory but too hard to update.
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Personally I feel conflicted. I recognise the overwhelming force of the public-health arguments for a centralised system, but I also have 25 years’ experience of the NHS being incompetent at developing systems and repeatedly breaking their privacy promises when they do manage to collect some data of value to somebody else.
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