Difference between revisions of "Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing (Q4515)"
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(Created claim: concerns (P110): health data (Q2990)) |
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| + | When a patient tests positive here, the health team retraces their movements based on their oral testimony, and then combs through relevant C.C.T.V. footage in order to locate others who might have been exposed | ||||||||||||||
| Property / quote: When a patient tests positive here, the health team retraces their movements based on their oral testimony, and then combs through relevant C.C.T.V. footage in order to locate others who might have been exposed / rank | |||||||||||||||
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| + | Health authorities, with the approval of the police and other supervising agencies, can make use of cell-phone G.P.S. data, credit-card payment information, and travel and medical records. The government has also a data-analysis platform that automates the process, allowing investigators to get clearance and pull up patient trajectories in under a minute. | ||||||||||||||
| Property / quote: Health authorities, with the approval of the police and other supervising agencies, can make use of cell-phone G.P.S. data, credit-card payment information, and travel and medical records. The government has also a data-analysis platform that automates the process, allowing investigators to get clearance and pull up patient trajectories in under a minute. / rank | |||||||||||||||
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| + | 17 April 2020
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| Property / date: 17 April 2020 / rank | |||||||||||||||
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Latest revision as of 12:52, 21 April 2020
article published by the New Yorker on April 17, 2020
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English |
Seoul’s Radical Experiment in Digital Contact Tracing
|
article published by the New Yorker on April 17, 2020
|
Statements
When a patient tests positive here, the health team retraces their movements based on their oral testimony, and then combs through relevant C.C.T.V. footage in order to locate others who might have been exposed
0 references
Health authorities, with the approval of the police and other supervising agencies, can make use of cell-phone G.P.S. data, credit-card payment information, and travel and medical records. The government has also a data-analysis platform that automates the process, allowing investigators to get clearance and pull up patient trajectories in under a minute.
0 references
17 April 2020
0 references