Difference between revisions of "Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)"
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(Created claim: quote (P203): For example, by placing a Bluetooth LE sensor close to a camera with facial recognition functionality, it is in principle possible to directly associate the proximity identifier beaconed over Bluetooth LE (and thus the used pseudonym) with an identifiable person to entirely de-anonymize the person in question.) |
(Changed claim: date (P100): 10 June 2020) |
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Latest revision as of 07:20, 6 July 2020
journal article from 'arXiv:2006.05914 [cs]' published in June 2020
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English |
Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps
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journal article from 'arXiv:2006.05914 [cs]' published in June 2020
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Statements
For example, by placing a Bluetooth LE sensor close to a camera with facial recognition functionality, it is in principle possible to directly associate the proximity identifier beaconed over Bluetooth LE (and thus the used pseudonym) with an identifiable person to entirely de-anonymize the person in question.
0 references
10 June 2020
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