Difference between revisions of "Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775)"
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(Created claim: concerns (P110): Corona-Warn-App (Q4639)) |
(Created claim: quote (P203): For example, by placing a Bluetooth LE sensor close to a camera with facial recognition functionality, it is in principle possible to directly associate the proximity identifier beaconed over Bluetooth LE (and thus the used pseudonym) with an identifiable person to entirely de-anonymize the person in question.) |
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| Property / quote | |||
| + | For example, by placing a Bluetooth LE sensor close to a camera with facial recognition functionality, it is in principle possible to directly associate the proximity identifier beaconed over Bluetooth LE (and thus the used pseudonym) with an identifiable person to entirely de-anonymize the person in question. | ||
| Property / quote: For example, by placing a Bluetooth LE sensor close to a camera with facial recognition functionality, it is in principle possible to directly associate the proximity identifier beaconed over Bluetooth LE (and thus the used pseudonym) with an identifiable person to entirely de-anonymize the person in question. / rank | |||
| + | Normal rank | ||
Revision as of 21:35, 19 June 2020
journal article from 'arXiv:2006.05914 [cs]' published in June 2020
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English |
Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps
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journal article from 'arXiv:2006.05914 [cs]' published in June 2020
|
Statements
For example, by placing a Bluetooth LE sensor close to a camera with facial recognition functionality, it is in principle possible to directly associate the proximity identifier beaconed over Bluetooth LE (and thus the used pseudonym) with an identifiable person to entirely de-anonymize the person in question.
0 references