Pages that link to "Item:Q4209"
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The following pages link to Contact tracing (Q4209):
Displayed 25 items.
View (previous 50 | next 50) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Europe’s GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q4940) (← links)
- PeduliLindungi (Q4941) (← links)
- NZ COVID Tracer (Q4943) (← links)
- OstaniZdrav (Q4945) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)
- COVID alert (Q4951) (← links)
- Lessons from SwissCovid (Q4958) (← links)
- Why Contact-Tracing Apps Haven’t Slowed Covid-19 in the US (Q4963) (← links)
- Protect Scotland (Q4965) (← links)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q4972) (← links)
- Blind-sided by privacy? Digital contact tracing, the Apple/Google API and big tech’s newfound role as global health policy makers (Q4973) (← links)
- COVID Alert Malta (Q4974) (← links)
- Saqbol (Q4976) (← links)
- TraceTogether Token (Q4977) (← links)
- Exo (Q5012) (← links)
- Jersey Covid alert (Q5027) (← links)
- PRIViLEDGE Workshop on Data Sharing and Privacy (Q5030) (← links)
- Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060) (← links)
- Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067) (← links)
- Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082) (← links)
- Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094) (← links)
- Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102) (← links)
- Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105) (← links)
- La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237) (← links)