Pages that link to "Property:P203"
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The following pages link to quote (P203):
Displayed 50 items.
View (previous 50 | next 50) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)- A BLE RSSI ranking based indoor positioning system for generic smartphones (Q4675) (← links)
- « Contact tracing » : on (re)fait le point sur les problèmes avec le Bluetooth (Q4708) (← links)
- E7mi (Q4709) (← links)
- Ehteraz (Q4711) (← links)
- An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718) (← links)
- We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720) (← links)
- Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721) (← links)
- Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724) (← links)
- L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725) (← links)
- Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728) (← links)
- TraceCovid (Q4730) (← links)
- Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737) (← links)
- Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745) (← links)
- Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748) (← links)
- Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749) (← links)
- Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752) (← links)
- Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756) (← links)
- StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758) (← links)
- Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760) (← links)
- BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763) (← links)
- SwissCovid. Security Issue Submission [INR-4434]. Detailed analysis. (Q4769) (← links)
- Own Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4773) (← links)
- GAEN Due Diligence: Verifying The Google/Apple Covid Exposure Notification API (Q4774) (← links)
- Mind the GAP: Security & Privacy Risks of Contact Tracing Apps (Q4775) (← links)
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use (Q4778) (← links)
- Contact Tracing Coronavirus COVID-19 - Calibration Method and Proximity Accuracy - (Q4780) (← links)
- BLE calibration calculation (Q4792) (← links)
- BLE RSSI calibration procedure (Q4793) (← links)
- Données personnelles : Doctissimo visé par une plainte auprès de la CNIL (Q4796) (← links)
- Doctissimo. Réclamation auprès de laCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (Q4797) (← links)
- How To Make Digital Proximity Tracing Work: The View from Economics (Q4801) (← links)
- Le loup dans la bergerie numérique (Q4807) (← links)
- Swisscovid: plus utile que nuisible (Q4812) (← links)
- The hidden trackers in your phone, explained (Q4820) (← links)
- Saura-t-on un jour si l’application Swisscovid est efficace? (Q4822) (← links)
- Risk Estimation of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission from Bluetooth Low Energy Measurements (Q4852) (← links)
- A research agenda for digital proximity tracing apps (Q4863) (← links)
- SwissCovid, zéro en communication (Q4864) (← links)
- New SBB app. Still not very sensitive to data privacy (Q4872) (← links)
- SwissCovid - méthodes d'estimation du nombre d'applications actives- Notes sur les méthodes de calcul (Q4881) (← links)
- Cuando Google elimina tus datos pero no protege tu privacidad (Q4890) (← links)
- Ordinance on the Proximity Tracing System for the Sars-CoV-2 coronavirus (Q4906) (← links)
- A Pseudonymous Communications Infrastructure for the Internet (Q4910) (← links)
- Fawkes: Protecting Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models (Q4914) (← links)
- How One Company Collected Browsing Data Via Android Apps (Q4917) (← links)
- An update on Exposure Notifications (Q4918) (← links)
- Vidéosurveillance et intelligence artificielle: le grand flou de la RATP (Q4919) (← links)
- Americans' perceptions of privacy and surveillance in the COVID-19 Pandemic (Q4925) (← links)
- "The Authorities Should Focus Their Efforts on Super-Spreaders" (Q4948) (← links)
- Cross-border travel is confusing after COVID – this framework can help borders reopen safely (Q4949) (← links)