Difference between revisions of "Feminism and data protection"

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** "the critical view of consent that is currently claimed by feminist theories is not the consent as a symptom of contemporary individualism; it has a collective approach through the idea of “the ethics of consent”" (Fraisse 2012)
 
** "the critical view of consent that is currently claimed by feminist theories is not the consent as a symptom of contemporary individualism; it has a collective approach through the idea of “the ethics of consent”" (Fraisse 2012)
 
** " “for feminism: no is a political labure”. In other words, “if your position is precarious you might not be able to afford no. [...] This is why the less precarious might have a political obligation to say no on behalf of or alongside those who are more precarious” (Ahmed 2017)
 
** " “for feminism: no is a political labure”. In other words, “if your position is precarious you might not be able to afford no. [...] This is why the less precarious might have a political obligation to say no on behalf of or alongside those who are more precarious” (Ahmed 2017)
** "we, as consumers of services from a very few companies that
+
** "we, as consumers of services from a very few companies that hold the monopoly of the most used communications tools and social media networks, are deprived of “no” when we face the terms and conditions of such platforms. We are forced to take a oversimplified binary option between agree or disagree, while the latest ultimately means opting for some level of digital exclusion."
hold the monopoly of the most used communications tools and
+
** ". This situation represents structural problem, which, from the feminist perspectives that we mapped before, won’t
social media networks, are deprived of “no” when we face the
 
terms and conditions of such platforms. We are forced to take a
 
oversimplified binary option between agree or disagree, while the
 
latest ultimately means opting for some level of digital exclusion."
 
** ". This situation represents structural problem,
 
which, from the feminist perspectives that we mapped before, won’t
 
 
be solved by the individual level. "
 
be solved by the individual level. "
** " the structural problem will remain, unless there is a
+
** " the structural problem will remain, unless there is a power shift towards allowing the collective possibility of consenting
power shift towards allowing the collective possibility of consenting
 
 
to something else. "
 
to something else. "
** " It is obvious an individual framing of
+
** " It is obvious an individual framing of consent, based in the assumption
consent, based in the assumption
+
that we are all autonomous, free and rational individuals with
that we are all autonomous, free
+
capacity to consent, disregarded our possibility of doing so due to
and rational individuals with
 
capacity to consent, disregarded
 
our possibility of doing so due to
 
 
unequal power dynamics. "
 
unequal power dynamics. "
 
** "critical adherents" vs "consent agnostics"
 
** "critical adherents" vs "consent agnostics"
** " privacy is not a thing or an abstract right, but
+
** " privacy is not a thing or an abstract right, but an environmental condition that enables situated subjects to navigate within
an environmental condition that enables situated subjects to navigate within
 
 
preexisting cultural and social matrices (Cohen, 2012, 2018)"
 
preexisting cultural and social matrices (Cohen, 2012, 2018)"
** "Therefore, as context is crucial to consent, we have to accept its fluid nature, which is something that the #TimesUp movement has brought into public debate: “Context is crucial to consent,
+
** "Therefore, as context is crucial to consent, we have to accept its fluid nature, which is something that the #TimesUp movement has brought into public debate: “Context is crucial to consent, we can change our opinion over time depending on how we feel in any given moment and how we evaluate the situation” (Carmi, 2018)."
we can change our opinion over time depending on how we feel in any given moment and how we evaluate
 
the situation” (Carmi, 2018)."
 
 
   
 
   
 
* [http://criticallegalthinking.com/2019/04/10/cfp-workshop-on-feminist-data-protection-berlin-20-nov-2019/ Berlin workshop], November 20th 2019
 
* [http://criticallegalthinking.com/2019/04/10/cfp-workshop-on-feminist-data-protection-berlin-20-nov-2019/ Berlin workshop], November 20th 2019
 
* [https://bookbook.pubpub.org/data-feminism Data feminism book]
 
* [https://bookbook.pubpub.org/data-feminism Data feminism book]

Revision as of 09:40, 28 April 2019

  • Consent to our data bodies:
    • lessons from feminist theories to enforce data protection
    • "consent has been seen as a feminine verb" (Pérez 2016)
    • "sexual workers could demonstrate how desire and consent are different"
    • "the critical view of consent that is currently claimed by feminist theories is not the consent as a symptom of contemporary individualism; it has a collective approach through the idea of “the ethics of consent”" (Fraisse 2012)
    • " “for feminism: no is a political labure”. In other words, “if your position is precarious you might not be able to afford no. [...] This is why the less precarious might have a political obligation to say no on behalf of or alongside those who are more precarious” (Ahmed 2017)
    • "we, as consumers of services from a very few companies that hold the monopoly of the most used communications tools and social media networks, are deprived of “no” when we face the terms and conditions of such platforms. We are forced to take a oversimplified binary option between agree or disagree, while the latest ultimately means opting for some level of digital exclusion."
    • ". This situation represents structural problem, which, from the feminist perspectives that we mapped before, won’t

be solved by the individual level. "

    • " the structural problem will remain, unless there is a power shift towards allowing the collective possibility of consenting

to something else. "

    • " It is obvious an individual framing of consent, based in the assumption

that we are all autonomous, free and rational individuals with capacity to consent, disregarded our possibility of doing so due to unequal power dynamics. "

    • "critical adherents" vs "consent agnostics"
    • " privacy is not a thing or an abstract right, but an environmental condition that enables situated subjects to navigate within

preexisting cultural and social matrices (Cohen, 2012, 2018)"

    • "Therefore, as context is crucial to consent, we have to accept its fluid nature, which is something that the #TimesUp movement has brought into public debate: “Context is crucial to consent, we can change our opinion over time depending on how we feel in any given moment and how we evaluate the situation” (Carmi, 2018)."