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Showing below up to 50 results starting with #691.

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  1. Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway contact tracing apps a danger for privacy (Q4765)
  2. Application SwissCovid: Attaques par rediffusion et manipulations (Q4764)
  3. BIAS: Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (Q4763)
  4. Contact Tracing With Your Phone: It’s Easier but There Are Tradeoffs (Q4762)
  5. The CNIL publishes a GDPR guide for developers (Q4761)
  6. Replays attacks (SwissCovid) (Q4760)
  7. COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps in the US, EU and Asia (Q4759)
  8. StopCovid, l'appli qui en savait trop (Q4758)
  9. Se le prove di efficacia non arrivano dall’alto, lanciamo una ricerca dal basso (Q4757)
  10. Swiss Criminal Code (Q4756)
  11. Risque de cyberattaques sur l'application de traçage Swisscovid (Q4755)
  12. How easy is it to detect (and relay) BLE beacons? (Q4754)
  13. Android Advertising Identifier (Q4753)
  14. Privacy in the Age of COVID: An IDAC Investigation of COVID-19 Apps (Q4752)
  15. Sens. Propose Bill to Regulate Privacy of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (Q4751)
  16. Message concernant la modification urgente de la loi sur les épidémies en lien avec le coronavirus (Système de traçage de proximité) (Q4750)
  17. Analysis of SwissCovid (Q4749)
  18. Critical Limitations of Digital Epidemiology (Q4748)
  19. Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing (Q4747)
  20. Corona-Warn-Apps: Totalüberwachung im Namen der Gesundheit? (Q4746)
  21. Anomali Threat Research Identifies Fake COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps Used to Download Malware that Monitors Devices, Steals Personal Data (Q4745)
  22. happn (Q4744)
  23. SwissCovid Proximity Tracing System - Public Security Test (Q4743)
  24. Federal Office of Public Health (Q4742)
  25. Google Apple Contact Tracing (GACT): a wolf in sheep’s clothes. // (Q4741)
  26. CovTracer (Q4740)
  27. DP3T - Exposure Score Calculation (Q4739)
  28. contact tracing protocol (Q4738)
  29. Google/Apple contact tracing protocol (Q4737)
  30. Zostan Zdravy (Q4736)
  31. Ito (Q4735)
  32. Morocco (Q4734)
  33. Wiqaytna (Q4733)
  34. Abu Dhabi Emirate (Q4732)
  35. Qatar (Q4731)
  36. TraceCovid (Q4730)
  37. Tinder: dans le ventre de l'appli (Q4729)
  38. Tracking Tools, Social Plugins and Third Party Cookies (Q4728)
  39. EIT Digital (Q4726)
  40. L’application CFF fournit des données de ses utilisateurs à Google (Q4725)
  41. Le traçage de SwissCovid: comme la grêle après les vendanges (Q4724)
  42. Données personnelles: les entreprises savent tout de vous (Q4721)
  43. We were told technology would end Covid-19 lockdowns, but the truth is there’s no app for that (Q4720)
  44. Universally Unique IDentifier (Q4719)
  45. An efficient algorithm to estimate Covid-19 infectiousness risk from BLE-RSSI measurements (Q4718)
  46. The 14 Features Any Ethical Covid-19 Contact Tracing Effort Should Incorporate (Q4717)
  47. Koronavilkku (Q4716)
  48. Columbia (Q4715)
  49. CoronApp (Q4714)
  50. Bahrain (Q4713)

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