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This page lists pages with no connected data item (in namespaces that support connected items). The list is sorted by descending page ID, so that newer pages are listed first.

 

Showing below up to 250 results in range #251 to #500.

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  1. BFMTV (Q5263)
  2. OpenHealth (Q5262)
  3. AeroLeads (Q5261)
  4. Marmiton (Q5260)
  5. Ma grossesse Doctissimo (Q5259)
  6. IQVia (Q5258)
  7. Insure the box (Q5257)
  8. ryd (Q5256)
  9. telematics insurance (Q5255)
  10. datenauskunftsbegehren.ch (Q5254)
  11. La piattaforma per il test del Covid "spiffera" i dati personali: a rischio migliaia di assicurati (Q5253)
  12. Le site du groupe M3 rend nos données vulnérables (Q5252)
  13. HestiaLabs (Q5251)
  14. Autonomy and Meaning through Data Collaboratives (Q5250)
  15. Réseaux sociaux, avons-nous perdu le pouvoir? (Q5249)
  16. Kaspr (Q5248)
  17. Lusha (Q5247)
  18. contestation of the curb (Q5246)
  19. Roundtable on Socializing Data Value (Q5245)
  20. Dark Data: Why What You Don’t Know Matters (Q5244)
  21. (Q5243)
  22. list of blocked users (Q5242)
  23. UBP (Q5241)
  24. Mahandry Rambinintsoa (Q5240)
  25. Michael Platen (Q5239)
  26. Aequivalent SA (Q5238)
  27. La vulnérabilité d'Android sur le tracing impacte-t-elle SwissCovid? (Q5237)
  28. Libération (Q5236)
  29. Arc Publishing (Q5235)
  30. Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Q5234)
  31. Action populaire (Q5233)
  32. Hinge-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5232)
  33. HER-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5231)
  34. Bumble-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5230)
  35. Jdate-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5229)
  36. Christian mingle-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5228)
  37. eHarmony-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5227)
  38. Match.com-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5226)
  39. Coffee Meets Bagel-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5225)
  40. Facebook Dating-report from Mozilla foundation (Q5224)
  41. Lovoo (Q5223)
  42. Mektoube (Q5222)
  43. Evermatch (Q5221)
  44. Mignonne (Q5220)
  45. eharmony (Q5219)
  46. Hily (Q5218)
  47. yoomee (Q5217)
  48. Filling the gaps in the Mueller report:part one. Robert Mercer, the Big Data Billionaire Waging War on Mainstream Media (Q5216)
  49. Schufa (Q5215)
  50. Le casse-tête de la modération des réseaux sociaux (Q5214)
  51. website builder (Q5213)
  52. Elementor (Q5212)
  53. Yaniv Benhamou (Q5211)
  54. Big Data and the Law: a holistic analysis based on a three-step approach – Mapping property-like rights, their exceptions and licensing practices (Q5210)
  55. Control Creep: When the Data Always Travels, So Do the Harms (Q5209)
  56. 3D ECO - Deep fake et fake news: la parade des entreprises (Q5208)
  57. real estate agency (Q5207)
  58. Foncia (Q5206)
  59. Omegle (Q5205)
  60. (Q5204)
  61. Optile (Q5203)
  62. bike station (Q5202)
  63. itineraries (Q5201)
  64. (Q5200)
  65. tariffs (Q5199)
  66. accessibility for people with disabilities (Q5198)
  67. timetables (Q5197)
  68. (Q5196)
  69. open data (Q5195)
  70. Law LOM (Q5194)
  71. mobility organizing authority (Q5193)
  72. Ile-de-France Mobilités (Q5192)
  73. Vianavigo (mobile app) (Q5191)
  74. Calypso Networks Association (Q5190)
  75. (Q5189)
  76. RFID chip (Q5188)
  77. Navigo (travel pass) (Q5187)
  78. Somupi (Q5186)
  79. distance travelled (Q5185)
  80. (Q5184)
  81. (Q5183)
  82. (Q5182)
  83. investment fund (Q5181)
  84. (Q5180)
  85. (Q5179)
  86. (Q5178)
  87. public procurement (Q5177)
  88. (Q5176)
  89. (Q5175)
  90. public service (Q5174)
  91. Brand (Q5173)
  92. (Q5172)
  93. (Q5171)
  94. Ile-de-france (Q5170)
  95. (Q5169)
  96. comité des usagers Vélib' (Q5168)
  97. (Q5167)
  98. (Q5166)
  99. (Q5165)
  100. (Q5164)
  101. Moventia (Q5163)
  102. Indigo (Q5162)
  103. consortium of companies (Q5161)
  104. (Q5160)
  105. (Q5159)
  106. Smovengo (Q5158)
  107. (Q5157)
  108. (Q5156)
  109. bike rental service (Q5155)
  110. Vélib' Métropole (Q5154)
  111. Etat d'urgence technologique (Q5153)
  112. GDPRhub (Q5152)
  113. Project:Post
  114. User:Genferei/Zatoo
  115. User:Genferei/Blick
  116. User:Genferei/Bluewin
  117. Rocket Mountain (Q5151)
  118. Converto (Q5150)
  119. Le droit d'accès (Q5149)
  120. What is at stake for developing countries in trade negotiations on e-commerce? (Q5148)
  121. Tinder will soon let you run a background check on a potential date (Q5147)
  122. Hornet (Q5146)
  123. Shaadi (Q5145)
  124. Inshallah (Q5144)
  125. Jdate (Q5142)
  126. Sparks networks (Q5141)
  127. Christian mingle (Q5140)
  128. Tesla dating (Q5139)
  129. Zoosk (Q5138)
  130. XO (Q5137)
  131. Pickable (Q5136)
  132. (Q5135)
  133. (Q5134)
  134. Ola drivers v. Ola Cabs (transparency requests) (Q5133)
  135. Uber drivers v. Uber (deactivation) (Q5132)
  136. Uber drivers v. Uber (transparency requests) (Q5131)
  137. Enquête: un an après, le bilan en demi-teinte de SwissCovid (Q5130)
  138. Ola Cabs (Q5129)
  139. GDPR Article 22 (Q5128)
  140. Dispo (Q5127)
  141. Predicio (Q5126)
  142. An Empirical Assessment of Global COVID-19 Contact Tracing Applications (Q5125)
  143. Androguard (Q5124)
  144. Pithus (Q5123)
  145. User talk:Jud
  146. Events/Trainings/UniGETransversal
  147. Posmo (Q5122)
  148. Kantara Initiative (Q5121)
  149. User-Managed Access (Q5120)
  150. HEART WG (Q5119)
  151. HIE of One (Q5118)
  152. Dua.com (Q5117)
  153. MyData operator (Q5116)
  154. Where You Go Matters: A Study on the Privacy Implications of Continuous Location Tracking (Q5115)
  155. Wie viel verdient Google mit unseren Daten? (Q5114)
  156. TikTok without filters (Q5113)
  157. Sephora (Q5112)
  158. Technology, Privacy, and User Opinions of COVID-19 Mobile Apps for Contact Tracing: Systematic Search and Content Analysis (Q5111)
  159. Singles50 (Q5110)
  160. Nos belles années (Q5109)
  161. Google Adsense (Q5108)
  162. club 50 plus (Q5107)
  163. DisonsDemain - Site de rencontre pour les 50+ (Q5106)
  164. Selbst Laien können die SwissCovid-App austricksen (Q5105)
  165. growth hacking (Q5104)
  166. Template:MailtoDual
  167. Item talk:Q5103
  168. Clubhouse (Q5103)
  169. Contact Tracing by Giant Data Collectors: Opening Pandora's Box of Threats to Privacy, Sovereignty and National Security (Q5102)
  170. User:Frandrews
  171. File:Datingprivacy.png
  172. “Out Of Control” – A Review Of Data Sharing By Popular Mobile Apps (Q5101)
  173. X-Mode Controversy: Find Apps that Track Location Data (Q5099)
  174. Facebook’s secret settlement on Cambridge Analytica gags UK data watchdog (Q5098)
  175. L’âge du capitalisme de surveillance : vers un capitalisme et une surveillance sans limites ? (Q5096)
  176. Project:Location tracking/Exponea
  177. Project:Location tracking/Fysical
  178. Project:Location tracking/GeoUniq
  179. Project:Location tracking/OneAudience
  180. Project:Location tracking/OpenSignal
  181. Project:Location tracking/Placed Foursquared
  182. Project:Location tracking/Quadrant
  183. Project:Location tracking/Sense360
  184. Project:Location tracking/SignalFrame
  185. Project:Location tracking/Predic.io
  186. Project:Location tracking/Sygic
  187. Project:Location tracking/X-mode
  188. Project:Location tracking
  189. ExpressVPN investigation into geolocation adtech (Q5095)
  190. Contact Tracing App Privacy: What Data Is Shared By Non-GAEN Contact Tracing Apps (Q5094)
  191. HUD (Q5093)
  192. waiter (Q5092)
  193. PLAY (Q5091)
  194. Rencontre coquine - Plan Cul (Q5090)
  195. Pure (Q5089)
  196. lovescout24 (Q5088)
  197. Fruitz (Q5087)
  198. (Q5086)
  199. (Q5085)
  200. Once (Q5084)
  201. Ce que WhatsApp révèle de la vulnérabilité de la protection des données en Suisse (Q5083)
  202. Apple denied COVID app to secure contact tracing monopoly, lawsuit claims (Q5082)
  203. Ranking PlayStore CH (P390)
  204. Ranking PlayStore FR (P389)
  205. Ranking PlayStore UK (P388)
  206. Ranking AppStore CH (P387)
  207. Ranking AppStore FR (P386)
  208. Ranking AppStore UK (P385)
  209. number of downloads in Google Play (P384)
  210. Swiped: How dating apps harm marginalized communities (Q5080)
  211. Photo Roulette (Q5079)
  212. Ingress (Q5078)
  213. Talk:Beta-testing Facebook Dating
  214. Beta-testing Facebook Dating
  215. Facebook Dating (Q5077)
  216. Cisco Meraki (Q5076)
  217. User:HermineL
  218. Digital Markets Act (Q5074)
  219. Palantir will soon help the FDA evaluate drugs, including COVID-19 treatments (Q5073)
  220. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Collaborates with Salesforce to Help Equitably Distribute Two Billion COVID-19 Vaccines by the End of 2021 (Q5072)
  221. Vaccine tracker technology (Q5071)
  222. Digital Services Act (Q5070)
  223. Apple and Google to Stop X-Mode From Collecting Location Data From Users’ Phones (Q5069)
  224. Contact Tracing & Giant Data Collectors: A Journey from Utopia to Dystopia? (Q5068)
  225. Template talk:Item
  226. Proximity Tracing in an Ecosystem of Surveillance Capitalism (Q5067)
  227. User talk:Frandrews
  228. online dating application (Q5066)
  229. Project:Dating Privacy
  230. Veraset (Q5065)
  231. Ethos Fund (Q5064)
  232. Cambridge Analytica scandal: history and lessons (Q5063)
  233. APEC MyData Forum (Q5062)
  234. Les applications COVID-19: quels choix techniques pour des choix éthiques? (Q5061)
  235. Australia’s spy agencies caught collecting COVID-19 app data (Q5060)
  236. Match.com (Q5059)
  237. Phone tracking is having a moment, but gay dating app Scruff wants no part of it (Q5058)
  238. How the cell phones of spring breakers who flouted coronavirus warnings were tracked (Q5057)
  239. Tech Firms Are Spying on You. In a Pandemic, Governments Say That’s OK. (Q5056)
  240. Applying Mobile Location Data to Improve Hurricane Evacuation Plans (Q5055)
  241. MobiRescue: Reinforcement Learning based RescueTeam Dispatching in a Flooding Disaster (Q5054)
  242. MobiAmbulance: Optimal Scheduling of Emergency Vehicles in Catastrophic Situations (Q5053)
  243. Perils of Location Tracking? Personalized and Interpretable Privacy Preservation in Consumer Mobile Trajectories (Q5052)
  244. Trading Privacy for the Greater Social Good: How Did America React During COVID-19? (Q5051)
  245. «Reprendre le contrôle de nos données passera par un contre-pouvoir» (Q5046)
  246. Paul-Olivier Dehaye: 'Data governance should connect with individuals to have a global reach' (Q5045)
  247. Your phone already tracks your location. Now that data could fight voter suppression (Q5044)
  248. How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps (Q5043)
  249. On the Effectiveness of Time Travel to Inject COVID-19 Alerts (Q5042)
  250. Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society 2020 (Q5039)

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